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Glantz, David M. and Harold S. Orenstein (editors). The Battle for Kursk, 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study. London: Frank Cass, 1999

ISBN 0-7146-4933-3
349 pages

Editor's Foreword; Foreword by Major-General P. P. Vechnyi; maps; tables; charts; Index

Appendices: List of Abbreviations; Key Soviet and German Command Personnel; Editor's Maps

   During the course of the Great Patriotic War the Soviet General Staff began to systematically compile and synthesize classified studies of important operations. These documents were distributed to higher echelon military leaders with the intent of keeping them abreast of the latest developments in warmaking techniques, thus regularizing the assimilation and dissemination of "lessons learned."
   A number of these wartime Staff Studies have already been translated into English and published in commercially available editions. This latest Study, translated and edited by David M. Glantz and Harold Orenstein, provides a deeply detailed analysis of the Battle of Kursk in 1943 and this particular Study has already been self-published in a "desktop publishing" edition by David Glantz. (See our review of that edition.)
   The relative lack of narrative describing the actual course of the battle is explained by the intent of the Staff Study series and its target audience. The Study is weighted heavily toward the nitty-gritty aspects of military science such as planning artillery support, controlling troop movements, maintaining communications with subordinate formations, training troops, and planning and constructing defensive lines.
   A look at the table of contents can be instructive in that regard:

1. Fundamentals of the Organization of the Kursk Bridgehead Defense
   The Overall Situation
   Planning the Defensive Operation
   Correlation of Forces before the German Offensive
   General Conclusions

2. Preparation of the Kursk Bridgehead for Defense
   Characteristics of the Defensive Works
   Organization of the System of Fires
   Troop Combat Training
   Conclusions

3. Brief Characteristics of German Operations in the July Operation
   Regroupings and the Creation of Reserves
   The German Command's Plan
   Enemy Preparation for the Offensive
   General Course of the German Offensive
   General Conclusions

4. The Defensive Battle for the Kursk Bridgehead
   The Defensive Battle on the Belgorod-Kursk Axis
   The Defensive Battle on the Central Front's Right Flank
   Results and Conclusions

5. Troop Control during the Defensive Battle in the Kursk Bridgehead
   Operational Planning
   Control of Execution and Practical Assistance for Forces
   Organization of Troop Command and Control
   Conclusions

6. Protecting Junctions in the Defense: From the Experience of the Voronezh Front
   Organization of Junction Defense between the Voronezh and the Southwestern Fronts
   Protecting the Junction between the 6th and the 7th Guards Armies
   Some Conclusions

7. Artillery Support of the Kursk Bridgehead Defense
   Grouping of Artillery
   Preparation and Planning of Artillery Support
   Artillery Operations during the Defensive Battle
   Brief General Conclusions

8. Tank Forces in the Defense of the Kursk Bridgehead
   Combat Operations of the 2nd Tank Army
   Combat Operations of the 1st Tank Army
   Combat Operations of the 5th Guards Tank Army
   Conclusions Regarding the Operational Employment of Tank Armies in the Defensive Operation
   Conclusions

9. Air Operations in the Battle of Kursk
   Preparation of Aviation for Combat Operations
   Air Operations during the Defensive Battle: the Belgorod-Kursk Axis
   Air Operations during the Defensive Battle: the Orel-Kursk Axis
   Some Questions Concerning the Combat Employment of Aviation
   General Conclusions

10. Engineer Support of the Defensive Operation
   Mission of Engineer Forces and Engineer Support
   Fortification of the Terrain
   Mine-demolition Obstacles [Minefields]
   Road and Bridge Work: Based on Voronezh Front Information
   Maskirovka [Deception and Camouflage]: Based on Voronezh Front Information
   Engineer Reconnaissance
   The Work of Engineer Forces Headquarters
   General Conclusions

11. The Maneuver of Mobile Antitank Reserves in a Defensive Operation
   The Formation of the Antitank Defense
   Mobile Antitank Reserves
   The Fight of All Artillery Calibers with Enemy Tanks
   General Conclusions

   For the most part, the book is clearly devoted to investigating a variety of technical topics which would be of most interest to the generals responsible for planning and fighting similar battles. Likewise, much is left out. For example, there is little or no explanation of the structure and capabilities of various Soviet combat units and nothing on performance specifications of tanks or aircraft; the authors assume their audience of military professionals will already be familiar with this information.
   It's also important to keep in mind that, while intentional distortions seem to be at a minimum, the authors are not omniscient, particularly in regard to German planning, strength, operations, and results. This is after all a wartime document prepared with all the limitations that implies. The authors don't always get everything exactly right, and the lessons they have drawn from experiences at Kursk might or might not have held up in later campaigns.
   In addition, Glantz has contributed an unusually small amount of annotation, explanation, and amplification to this work in comparison to Kharkov 1942. Where he wrote large chunks of additional material for that Soviet Staff Study, his words here are limited to a few dozen editorial footnotes, a list of abbreviations used in the text, and a list of key German and Soviet figures.
   All this leaves a Staff Study which must stand on its own merits. It's an important wartime document and a rich source of raw material, but shouldn't be confused with a fully realized, carefully considered, and wholly balanced dissertation by a trained historian. In that sense, one of the best uses of The Battle for Kursk, 1943 is to compare it with some related books.

   Kursk 1943: The Soviet General Staff Study. This volume is Glantz's earlier, self-published version of the same Soviet General Staff Study. The contents are identical.

   Battle for Stalingrad. This Soviet General Staff Study was edited by Louis Rotundo and published by Pergamon-Brassey's in 1989. The approach is very similar, with a careful translation of the original Soviet document supported by a new introduction and a handful of editorial notes at the end of each chapter.

   Kharkov 1942. Another Soviet General Staff Study, this was published by Sarpedon in 1998 and also edited by Glantz. The approach is quite different, however. In Kharkov, Glantz has -- besides contributing much better maps, new appendices, OBs, a photo section, bibliography, and endnotes -- written a significant amount of additional textual material to expand, clarify, and correct the original document. This remains the model for the optimal approach to presenting these Staff Studies.

   Neither Decision in the Ukraine by George Nipe nor Kursk by Walter Dunn, both fine books about the battle published within the last few years, seems to have utilized this Staff Study. Both however, along with Glantz's notes in this volume, take issue with, for example, Soviet estimates of German tank losses at Prokhorovka.

   The Battle of Kursk, 1943 by Glantz and Jonathan House, forthcoming from University Press of Kansas in October, promises to be everything that the Staff Study isn't: a well-rounded view of the planning, forces, and operations of both sides, written for the contemporary military history audience rather than Soviet generals during the war.

   While the Staff Study provides invaluable background material with a great deal of detail presented from a rather narrow, specialized perspective, probably its greatest value will be for historians and writers such as Glantz to mine for information to be assimilated, augmented, and interpreted within broader, more complete works on the campaign.
   Highly recommended for researchers, historians, and wargame designers, but less so for more general readers.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Frank Cass. Distributed in the US by International Specialized Book Services.
   Thanks to Cass and ISBS for providing this review copy.

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Reviewed 19 September 1999
Copyright © 1999 by Bill Stone
May not be reproduced in any form without written permission of Stone & Stone
 

 

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