Reprint of 1966 edition from University of Toronto Press originally entitled "The St. Pierre and Miquelon Affaire of 1941"

ISBN 0-96842290-X
219 pages

Preface; Introduction; maps; photos; Select Bibliography; Notes; Index

Appendices: Administrator de Bournat's Proclamation; Proposals for Settlement of the St. Pierre and Miquelon Question; Dramatis Personae

   Prior to Anglin's book, there was perhaps no more obscure diplomatic contretemps in the course of the war than the Free French seizure from Vichy of the tiny colony of St. Pierre and Miquelon. Anglin's little gem of a book has made the affair much less obscure; nothing, however, not even his thoughtful and revealing investigation, can imbue the events with a great deal of lasting importance. Despite this lack of relevance and war-winning decisiveness, for readers with an interest in unusual corners of World War II, much pleasure can be derived from Anglin's brief but thorough account of this historical footnote.
   The first chapter of the book discusses the founding of the French colony twelve miles off the coast of Newfoundland near the entrance to the Gulf of St. Lawrence and the many twists and turns which led on more than one occasion to its loss and recovery by France. In 1941 it stood out as France's oldest and smallest colony: three main islands and a half dozen rocky islets amounting to less than 100 square miles just and a population of under 5000.
   In the immediate aftermath of the fall of France, the citizens of St. Pierre and Miquelon were, with the exception of the government-appointed Administrator of the island, Count Gilbert de Bournat, almost entirely pro-Free French. However, the armed fisheries patrol sloop Ville d'Ys arrived in St. Pierre and Miquelon shortly after the armistice not only as a symbol of Bournat's Vichyist authority, but also as a source of armed seaman to back up that authority. The Ville d'Ys accompanied the large French fishing fleet which had been on the Grand Banks and sought refuge in the colony while waiting to determine if it should return to France.
   Following the Royal Navy's attack on the French fleet at Mers el Kebir in July, a proportion of public opinion turned from de Gaulle in favor of Vichy. A few more colonists began to support de Bournat and Vichy after the colony began to suffer shortages of food and other goods as a result of the sudden severing of its supply line to Vichy. De Bournat visited Washington and Ottawa and successfully negotiated arrangements by which frozen Vichy funds were released each month to pay for emergency imports from the United States and Canada, thus preventing utter economic collapse.
   While the Administrator and the wealthier citizens supported Vichy and the status quo, the majority of the working—and unemployed—class continued to favor de Gaulle. By September 1940 the War Veterans Association, confident of an overwhelming victory, sought a popular referendum on rallying St. Pierre and Miquelon to the Free French. De Bournat, however, wielded sufficient power to prevent such a vote and kept the colony in line. A cat-and-mouse game ensued with Gaullist adherents postering the town, publishing underground news sheets, and defiantly displaying the cross of Lorraine while de Bournat's Vichyites tore down posters, published their own propaganda sheets, and arrested those who sang the Marseillaise in public. The troublesome War Veterans Association was eventually banned and "unreliable" individuals dismissed from governmental employment.
   In those early days de Gaulle, Canada, the United States, Newfoundland (at that time a British colony apart from Canada), and the United Kingdom each had its own view of how best to deal with St. Pierre and Miquelon and the large fishing fleet from metropolitan France temporarily sheltering there. De Gaulle wanted to occupy the islands and the British for the most part supported his claim. Newfoundland preferred to assume direct administration for "protective custody" and remained suspicious of Canadian designs for long-term territorial gains; indeed, military officials in Ottawa wanted to seize the islands for bases. The American position insisted that, under the Monroe Doctrine, there could be no intervention in the hemisphere by anyone other than the United States—and this extended to the occupation of St. Pierre and Miquelon by Canada, Newfoundland, the United Kingdom, or the Free French.
   De Gaulle's intentions were frustrated in some measure by "political considerations" on the part of the British, who had no desire to upset the Americans, and in some measure by the presence of the Ville d'Ys. When the sloop sailed for Martinique as a result of Canadian threats to cut off supplies and re-freeze funds—and under a guarantee of safe passage from the British—only American policy stood in de Gaulle's path.
   In the spring of 1941 jockeying began in earnest among the US, Canada, and Newfoundland over the fate of the islands, with military contingency plans, much diplomatic posturing, and no small amount of confusion and contention. At the same time, Free French corvettes on North Atlantic convoy duty often came within easy striking range of St. Pierre and Miquelon. A civilian group in Quebec plotted its own landing to rally the colony. Canadian troops of the Lake Superior Regiment were held in readiness as "Q Force" to land on the island at short notice. Economic pressure—notably withholding food and coal—was threatened in retaliation for real or imagined deeds by de Bournat such as tipping the Axis about Allied convoy routes and using the colony's powerful radio transmitter to send coded messages.
   While these wheels spun, Vice-Admiral Emile Henri Muselier of the Free French arrived in St. John's, Newfoundland, on 9 December 1941 with de Gaulle's directive to take the islands. The next day de Gaulle sought Churchill's approval for the move. The British readily assented but on 15 December asked the French to postpone the operation long enough that American and Canadian approval could be secured; it was "clearly assumed that this would be readily granted now that the United States was a full belligerent in the war."
   In the event, Cordell Hull, the Secretary of State, strongly disapproved and the Canadians and British accepted the American decision. Muselier and de Gaulle reluctantly agreed to cancel the operation. While preparing to return to London, however, Muselier received a sudden and unexpected signal from de Gaulle to occupy the islands without first notifying the Allies.
   Early on the morning of 24 December 1941 the Free French flotilla of corvettes Mimosa, Alysse, and Aconit and submarine Surcouf arrived off St. Pierre with a detachment of marines who proceeded to land and occupy the island without resistance.
   The next day the long-delayed plebiscite was finally conducted and the populace overwhelmingly voted to rally to Free France. De Bournat was taken into protective custody and a few of the most vociferous Vichyites detained, but Muselier proved remarkably lenient and there was little bitterness or strife between the rival islanders. A new Gaullist Administrator was appointed. However, reaction was not favorable from any quarter. Among other penalties, it was no longer possible to deposit "unblocked" funds from frozen Vichy accounts for use by the new colonial regime. With economic pressure, talk of an American blockade, and constant rumors of a counter-invasion to be mounted from the Vichy French West Indies, by the Americans, or even by the Canadians, the islands were prepared for defense.

   Accordingly, Muselier erected rudimentary defences throughout the territory, organized three mobile "combat groups" and a small home guard, improvised four armoured cars, manned and armed two tugboats and various small craft including two high-powered motor launches—legacies of rum-running days—constructed a makeshift harbour boom, extinguished all lighthouses, and banned air and naval reconnaissances near the islands. Nevertheless, it was obvious that the islands were in no position to put up more than a token resistance. The Surcouf and the corvettes were no match against a cruiser or battleship attack. In any case, they remained under Canadian operational control and over-all American command. Besides, on December 26, both the Alysse and Aconit returned to convoy duty, as Muselier had previously promised, and the other warships sailed shortly afterwards.
   ...
   The whole situation was extraordinarily paradoxical: while the Free French were protecting the American and Canadian coastline, guarding Allied ships, and offering them shelter from enemy submarines, they were at the same time preparing to ward off a possible American attack and struggling to overcome the effects of a partial economic blockade.

   The British, while peeved at de Gaulle's duplicitous behavior, continued to believe Free French occupation the best solution to the question of St. Pierre and Miquelon. The United States, suspecting Canadian involvement in the affair, insisted Ottawa should take military action to eject Muselier. Cordell Hull in particular was incensed at de Gaulle's effrontery and demanded an immediate and harsh response. Canada, which had dutifully played along with British and American policy, was embarrassed and alarmed. De Gaulle vowed to defend the islands by force if necessary, and Muselier cabled de Gaulle that he would not abandon the islands even if de Gaulle should order him to do so. Furthermore, by prior agreement with de Gaulle, the British government was obligated "to defend against all attacks by naval forces, colonies which rallied to the Free French movement."
   The author sorts through the uproar and explains the positions of all those involved as well as the larger issues at stake. In the end, the diplomatic crisis abated, largely due to its own insignificance, especially in the perspective of global war, with no action: no blistering communique, no blockade, no punitive expedition. The change in regime was not officially recognized, but the Free French were tacitly allowed to remain in control. Anglin points to the affaire as one source of the enduring distrust with which de Gaulle was treated by many Allied leaders, particularly Hull, for the remainder of the war.

   The St. Pierre and Miquelon affair has been variously referred to as a "teapot tempest," as "a fleabite," and as "trivial to the point of ridiculousness." It was certainly all of these. Nevertheless, at a critical point in world affairs, this curious episode succeeded in engaging the attention of the leading statesmen of the Western alliance, and complicating their relations. That this should have happened is surely a sobering commentary on the role of the human personality in history.

   Although occasionally disjointed, Anglin's book is an interesting and enjoyable account of this "teapot tempest". Recommended to anyone who likes obscure little gems.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Penny Black Publishing.
   Thanks to Penny Black for providing this review copy.