ISBN 0-7006-0944
421 pages

Introduction; maps; photos; Notes; Selective Bibliography; Index

Appendices: From the Archives: Selective Orders and Directives from Operation Mars; Rd Army Command Personnel in Operation Mars; Orders of Battle; Comparative Data on Operations; Postscript on Losses

   Colonel David Glantz manages to produce high quality books about the Russian Front at a pace that makes other authors envious. How does he do it? He doesn't reveal the secret of his productivity here, but his newest book—simultaneously one of his best, one of his most challenging, and one of his most frustrating—does reveal other secrets, in this case secrets intentionally hidden away by Soviet military men and historians during and after the war.
   Operation Mars (also known as the "Rzhev-Sychevka offensive") was, as Glantz tells us, an operation mounted on a scale as lavish as Operation Uranus (the Soviet offensive that surrounded German 6th Army in Stalingrad) and planned with an equally ambitious goal: to isolate and destroy German 9th Army in the Rzhev salient.
   While Uranus was largely planned and supervised by Colonel General Aleksandr Vasilevsky, Mars was Marshal Georgi Zhukov's pet project. Originally designed to be launched in October 1942 to complement Uranus and draw German reserves away from Stalingrad, bad weather and administrative delays caused Mars to be postponed until 25 November. While Stavka continued to hope that the onslaught of the Mars armies would prevent the Germans from reinforcing their forces in the south, Zhukov in particular believed that the timing of the twin operations would permit him not only to successfully execute Mars, but would also—just as Uranus was expected to set the stage for the larger Operation Saturn (the drive to Rostov)—enable his exploiting armies to launch a further offensive to encircle Army Group Center.
   Uranus was a smashing success, trumpeted by the Soviet High Command, memorialized in countless books, and led to even greater successes. Mars was a costly failure, intentionally covered up by Stavka, ignored by historians, and led to the cancellation of its ambitious follow-up operations.
   By combing through newly accessible Soviet archives and studying unit histories and obscure memoirs from both sides, Glantz has been able to assemble an account of the original planning and the course of Operation Mars. Unfortunately, some of the material remains elusive and fragmentary. For example, when he discusses the planned follow-up to Mars, Glantz can only say "The second phase of Zhukov's operation was possibly code-named Jupiter."
   The book sets the stage for Mars with a lengthy Prelude (70 pages) which describes the planning and takes the reader to all the army group, front, army, and corps headquarters along the Rzhev salient to explore terrain, dispositions, and the role each HQ and its subordinate units will play in the battle. This Prelude—written in a style unusual for Glantz with a rather choppy narrative, a disconcerting amount of quoting the inner thoughts of the generals, and some disconnection between what is seen from the Soviet perspective and the German perspective (sometimes without the author's omniscient viewpoint to tie the two together)—is the least successful portion of the book.
   Once the offensive is launched on 25 November 1942, however, Glantz revs up the narrative and produces an enthralling account of a battle notable for its magnitude and ferocity as well as its utter unfamiliarity.
   Readers familiar with the Russian front probably know Barbarossa and Typhoon and Stalingrad and Kursk and Berlin frontwards and backwards. While new books about those old battles might bring a few new facts to light, or put old facts in new perspectives, for the most part the stories have been told and the endings thoroughly rehearsed. With Operation Mars, on the other hand, the course of the battle is probably unknown to the reader, a situation that works to Glantz's advantage.
   Zhukov's Greatest Defeat places the offensive in the larger context of the war on the Russian front and describes the action at every level, from HQs in the rear down to combat in the snow. In addition to the rather academic detachment with which the higher direction of the campaign is treated, Glantz in some cases indulges in fairly lurid descriptions of the actual grunt's-eye view of the battlefield.

   Only desultory German artillery, machine-gun, and small arms fire had greeted the advancing penal battalions, as if the gunners pitied the sacrificial bands. Now, as the mass of the Soviet main force advanced, the rain of fire intensified, blindly tearing gaping holes in the ranks of the infantry and hurling bodies and body parts into the air on the river's surface. A tank shuddered violently as a shell glanced off its turret, tossing aside the infantry riding on its back like broken rag dolls. The stricken iron beast rolled violently and disappeared into the black waters of the frozen river. Others followed as the assaulting host picked up its pace and broke into a run toward the river's far bank. From the collective mouths of thousands of Soviet infantry, the guttural cries of "Urrah" reached a crescendo as the brown masses reached the Vazuza's far bank. New ranks of infantry emerged from the shadowy outline of the river's near bank, forcing, as if by their sheer mass, their predecessors on the far bank to lunge deeper into the German defenses.

   This kind of vivid, camera-like description (probably perfectly accurate, but no source is provided) is something of an exception; for the most part, Glantz writes solid, workmanlike prose as he reconstructs the movements and clashes of battalions, regiments, and brigades along the perimeter of the salient.
   The first chapter, "The Red God of War Unleashed", deals with each of the Soviet army-level thrusts—and German reaction—in turn from the opening of the offensive through 28 November. The next chapter covers the second phase of the campaign, "The Red God of War Contained", through 4 December. The inevitable conclusion is reached in "Frustration, Fury, and Defeat" as the final hopeless Soviet assaults are halted and the German defenders counterattack.
   Unlike Uranus and Saturn (actually downsized to "Little Saturn"), Mars achieved little in the way of tangible, permanent success. Although German forces lost some ground—most of which was recovered by successful local counterattacks—the cost to the Soviets in manpower and equipment, especially tanks, was outrageously high. Because of their failure, most of the army commanders involved in the operation were sacked. Zhukov, the driving force behind Mars and the man who insisted the bloody, futile attacks continue even when there was no further hope of success, managed to remain in Stalin's good graces and managed to preserve his reputation unblemished. The official documents pertaining to the disaster were sealed away, most generals ignored the battle in their memoirs, and Soviet historians turned a blind eye to any evidence of fallibility on the part of the marshal who became the greatest Soviet hero of the Great Patriotic War.
   Thus Operation Mars became one of the largest "unknown" battles of the war. How large was it? Glantz devotes considerable ink to comparing the magnitude of Mars and Uranus.

   The scale and strength of forces operating in the twin offensives were also similar (see Appendices). In November 1942, the Kalinin and Western Fronts and the Moscow Defense Region numbered 1,890,000 men, 24,682 guns and mortars, 3,375 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,170 aircraft. The Southwestern, Don, and Stalingrad Fronts counted 1,103,000 men, 15,501 guns and mortars, 1,463 tanks and self-propelled guns, and 1,463 aircraft. In Operation Mars Zhukov committed about 668,000 men and almost 2,000 tanks to his main assaults and had another 415,000 men and 1,265 tanks ready for commitment to Jupiter. In Uranus Vasilevsky initially committed about 700,000 men and 1,400 tanks and, thereafter, another 400,000 and 1,200 tanks in the altered Saturn phase.
   Not counting the offensive at Velikie Luki, which was designed to support his Mars effort, Zhukov's two fronts employed seven armies in their offensive (the 41st, 22nd, 39th, 30th, 31st, 20th, and 29th) and Vasilevsky's three fronts employed seven (the 5th Tank, 21st, 65th, 24th, 64th, 57th, and 51st). This amounted to 36.5 Soviet division equivalents participating in Mars and 34.5 in Uranus. Zhukov committed six mobile corps (the 1st and 3d Mechanized, 5th, 6th, and 8th Tank and 2d Guards Cavalry) in support of Operation Mars (and a seventh at Velikie Luki), while Vasilevsky committed eight (the 1st, 4th, 13th, 16th, and 26th Tank, 4th Mechanized, and 4th and 8th Cavalry) in support of Uranus. In terms of mobile brigade equivalents, Zhukov committed 39 in Mars and Vasilevsky 33 in Uranus. In terms of engineer and artillery support, Zhukov supported Mars with 48 artillery regiments, 21 antitank regiments, 15 antiaircraft regiments, and 21 engineer battalions, while Vasilevsky supported Uranus with 54 artillery regiments, 34 antitank regiments, 21 antiaircraft regiments, and 29 engineer battalions. Thus, in terms of numbers and strength, the two operations were roughly equivalent.

   By comparison, in the Battle of the Bulge, one of the most dissected engagements of the war (at least in English), the German armies massed "only" 400,000 men and 1400 tanks, a significantly smaller force.

   A final yardstick for measuring the significance of Operation Mars with respect to Operation Uranus is the human and material cost of the operation. During the three weeks of Operation Mars, Zhukov's forces lost about 100,000 soldiers killed and missing and 235,000 wounded. On the other hand, through the entire duration of his operations (19 November through 2 February 1943) Vasilevsky's fronts lost 154,885 killed and missing and 330,892 wounded. In addition, Zhukov's forces lost over 1,600 tanks, more than the total number of 1,400 tanks that Vasilevsky committed in Operation Uranus. Such catastrophic losses, which were matched by few Soviet offensive operations in the war, help explain why Soviet forces along the Western axis had such difficulty resuming successful offensive operations in the future.

   On a somewhat less serious note, Glantz also presents in the endnotes those documents he has unearthed pertaining to Soviet vodka rations, concluding:

   In terms of vodka ration and consumption, the Western and Kalinin Front also outstripped the three Stalingrad fronts. This unusual indicator also clearly demonstrates the relative importance of Operation Mars.

   At this point in his career, Glantz's credentials have been thoroughly established and there is no question of his credibility. However, when uncovering such an unknown battle and further asserting its hitherto unsuspected size and importance, it behooves any author to be especially careful about documenting his material.
   For the most part Glantz carefully annotates his reconstruction of Mars with references to archival records. In some places, however, no endnotes are provided for passages which are key to understanding the genesis, magnitude, and significance of this otherwise hidden battle. For example, the author makes the point that Zhukov, to preserve his reputation, intentionally distorted the way in which Mars was planned, explaining how Zhukov's memoirs state that he told Stalin in November he would command Operation Mars. Contradicting those memoirs, and showing how Zhukov was at the center of Mars all along, Glantz quotes the exact words of Stalin on 26 September as "You may continue to plan your offensive. Conduct two efforts. Zhukov will control the Rzhev operation and Vasilevsky the operation at Stalingrad." Unfortunately, he offers no source for this statement.
   Stalin's unattributed quote is indicative of a larger and somewhat frustrating phenomenon which is especially noticeable in the Prelude. Unlike his earlier books, Glantz uses in Zhukov's Greatest Defeat the literary device of quoting the inner thoughts of his characters, such as these further ruminations of Stalin:

   Stalin smiled to himself over the competition he had generated among his two leading commanders. ... Zhukov's fears, thought Stalin, were unfounded. I know that Army Group Center is the pivotal German force, and I know where Smolensk lies. And Malinovsky's army still awaits its orders. Yes! He understood. Competition is healthy, especially if it produces wholesale German defeat. But the time has come for Zhukov to produce that promised victory for which he has yearned so long.

   While it certainly leavens the text with interesting passages, this device also lends a certain pop flavor to a subject that some readers might feel deserves a more scholarly approach. Fortunately, it is employed less generously after the lengthy Prelude.
   After that uneven beginning, Zhukov's Greatest Defeat turns into a topnotch effort with the added bonus that, rather than rehashing the same old campaigns, it breaks new ground and brings a fresh sense of discovery and satisfaction while dispelling officially-induced amnesia. Vigorous descriptions of the tactical conduct of the campaign are carefully balanced with analytical discussions of the strategic setting as well as the personal perspectives of cold, frightened riflemen and tankists on the ground. Similarly, the action is described from both the Soviet and German sides of the line. The Epilogue highlights the long-term results of the offensive and provides information on the fates of its leading officers. Well-chosen photos. Nicely executed maps in a distinctive style (although in a few cases they suffer from having the names of key features obscured or omitted). Very strong appendices, including extremely detailed OBs for the Stalingrad operations as well as Mars.

   The history of Operation Mars served its master, the Soviet state, well. What was important to remember was remembered; what was not was forgotten. Stalin saved from disgrace those commanders whom he judged could still make valuable contributions to the war effort. And, as required, Soviet historians wrote and rewrote history to preserve their reputations. Unfortunately for many commanders below front level, ideology and necessity did not require their salvation.
   ...
   History, however, has a long memory and a terrible vengeance. Soviet authorities could not eradicate the thousands of German accounts and the treasure trove of archival documents that chronicled the operation. Nor could the stifling controls of the authoritarian system utterly silence man's inherent yearning for the truth. Despite the system, enough fragments of the truth leaked out in memoirs and unit histories to substantiate the German information. Today, after the Soviet system has perished, the veil of secrecy has finally been lifted on Operation Mars. Archival evidence clearly indicates the truth of the German reports and has vindicated those Russian veterans who strove to expose the truth in spite of the system that suppressed it.
   History also rewards the patience of those who wait in silence. Today it vindicates those who served in Operation Mars by remembering what was long forgotten and by finally listening to the silent cries of the dead and the entreaties of the forgotten survivors. At last, Operation Mars has assumed its rightful place in the galaxy of Soviet military operations.

   Despite a few imperfections, very highly recommended. Zhukov's Greatest Defeat looks like a strong candidate for our Top Ten list for 1999.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from the University Press of Kansas.
   Thanks to UPK for providing this review copy.