ISBN 0-89096-807-1
307 pages

Preface; Introduction; maps; Conclusion; Notes; Bibliography; Index.

   Norman Goda's Introduction opens his new book with an arousing contention:

   ...historians of the Second World War have traditionally argued...that Adolf Hitler's Germany had no more than an ephemeral interest in Northwest Africa and no global designs against the United States. This study will examine this very issue and will argue otherwise. From the capitulation of France in 1940 to the Allied North African landings of 1942, the parameters of this book, Hitler's Germany tried consistently to develop German bases in French North Africa and the outlying Spanish and Portuguese islands. The bases were to be employed in a future struggle with the United States.

   Goda then proceeds in measured, scholarly fashion to review the political, diplomatic, military, and economic policies of Germany, Vichy France, Italy, Spain, and Portugal as they jousted to gain or maintain control over French Equatorial Africa, French West Africa and Dakar, French Morocco, Spanish Morocco, Tangier, Gibraltar, the Cape Verde Islands, the Canary Islands, Madeira, and the Azores. Despite the unorthodoxy of his premise, Goda exhibits a firm grasp of his subject and—both by gathering fresh material and by placing familiar information in a new context—delivers a praiseworthy, thought-provoking account.
   As early as June 1940, various Kriegsmarine studies called for establishing naval and air bases in such far-flung outposts as Trondheim, Iceland, Madagascar, Dakar, and the Spanish and Portuguese island groups off the coast of Northwest Africa, all with the intent of protecting anticipated German colonies in Africa following the end of the war. Hitler rejected most of the Kriegsmarine studies, but retained an interest in the Azores, Canaries, Cape Verde Islands, and French Morocco. Before long, Germany was in a position to begin acting upon those interests.
   When France fell, pending a permanent peace settlement—which Hitler expected "in the shortest time"—Vichy France found itself bound by a pair of armistice documents (one concluded with Germany, the other separately with Italy) which very imperfectly and incompletely spelled out Axis terms and the enforcement mechanisms for those terms. Although defeated and even humiliated, these "temporary" armistice terms provided enough flexibility for Vichy to haggle, temporize, and obfuscate when presented with unpalatable Axis demands.
   The first of these was not long in coming. On 15 July 1940, Petain's government received Hitler's demand for eight airfields near Casablanca in French Morocco on the Atlantic—with additional land for anti-aircraft defenses plus unrestricted use of ports, French shipping, and French North African railroads. Although rejected by Vichy and not immediately pursued by Germany, Goda proposes this as the first overt evidence of Hitler's quest for not merely temporary or tactical advantage in what was to be a quick finish of the British, but rather a permanent and strategic position from which to wage war against the American hemisphere. Why else, Goda asks, would Hitler, at a time when London was expected to capitulate momentarily, demand not existing French facilities, but space for the long-term project of constructing new bases?
   Although the demarche of 15 July was dropped quietly enough, the issue of bases was far from dead.
   In September 1940 Hitler issued a new directive aimed at supplementing and supplanting Italian administration of armistice terms in French colonies, making clear his ongoing interest in the North African theater and the Atlantic coast of Africa in particular.

   The original draft of Hitler's policy order charged the Luftwaffe Command "with the preparation of German air bases in Dakar and Casablanca." Hitler deleted this comment from the final draft, perhaps to prevent the possibility of a leak to the French or the Italians. Nonetheless, the Luftwaffe Command began preparatory work for the occupation of these bases, discussing problems of ground defense and preparing reconnaissance missions to Casablanca and Dakar.

   By the end of September, advance parties of a German commission were in Casablanca en route to Dakar, collecting intelligence on potential Luftwaffe airfield sites as well as political and economic information.
   De Gaulle's failed Anglo-French assault on Dakar and successful rallying of Equatorial Africa, however, disrupted the smooth unfolding of German plans. Among other things, the German commission in Casablanca returned without having reached West Africa. More importantly, the threat of losing French colonies to the Gaullist movement in some ways worked to Vichy's advantage, softening Berlin's heavy-handedness in Africa.
   Other avenues presented themselves for reaching Hitler's destinations. Spain, anxious to protect its interests and further its own territorial aspirations (Gibraltar, Tangier, French Morocco) offered to enter the war on the side of the Axis and cooperate in assaulting the British base of Gibraltar in exchange for an assortment of favors, concessions, and guarantees from Berlin.

   It would take Berlin nearly six weeks to act on the Spanish offer of 19 June and array itself for an operation against Gibraltar. Historians have not fully examined the reasons for this delay, but Berlin's wandering path to the Gibraltar operation provides an important key to understanding Hitler's war aims. Gibraltar became important to the Germans not because its capture would lead to victory over Britain, but because the Strait of Gibraltar provided a speedy route into Northwest Africa. Once Gibraltar had fallen, Germany could protect Northwest Africa from either a Gaullist coup or an American strike, while developing bases on the coast for the demands of global warfare.

   Goda goes on to conclude that Franco's offer (and the price he demanded in return)—interpreted by most historians as no more than a ploy to keep Spain out of the war while avoiding hostilities with Germany—was a genuine, serious bid to enter the war in the second half of 1940. According to Goda's review of the evidence, Hitler was willing to pay all of Madrid's price, but agreement was finally scuttled over territorial issues. The Fuehrer was fully prepared to trade French Morocco to Spain for a single island in the Canaries—to be developed as a German air and naval base for projecting power toward the western hemisphere—but Franco demurred.
   Goda delves deeply into this subject with new research in Spanish archives, revisiting the story of the meeting between Hitler and Franco at Hendaye (and dismissing the myth of Franco's intentionally late arrival), measuring Spain's economic demands against Germany's willingness to provide them, and evaluating Spanish military preparations in the islands and in Spanish Morocco as well as Portuguese defenses in the Azores, Cape Verde Islands, and Madeira.
   Similarly, the book investigates German military planning for seizing and holding the Atlantic islands under varying diplomatic conditions but always with an eye to future needs and future enemies.

   "The Fuehrer," wrote [Major Sigismund Freiherr] Falkenstein [Luftwaffe liaison to Warlimont in OKW] to the Luftwaffe operations staff when requesting data [in November 1940], "is engaged in the question of occupation of the Atlantic Islands in the view of a future war against America."...Hitler called upon them to take the islands by force in a hostile sea.

   The original military studies revealed the cold, hard facts. It might be possible to take the main islands, and only those, by force of arms, but it would be impossible to take the many smaller islands. It would be equally impossible to supply German garrisons in the Atlantic by air or sea and the British would inevitably use their naval superiority and bases in the smaller islands to win back any German outposts. Subsequent studies by the Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe, assuming military cooperation with Spain and Vichy (including German use of French bases and cargo ships) and Portuguese submissiveness, all to be gained through diplomatic means by Berlin, were considerably more optimistic.
   From June 1940 through June 1941 Hitler pursued a start-and-start, twist-and-turn path toward the coast of Northwest Africa and the Atlantic islands. As the wider strategic situation evolved, so his plans and ideas evolved. Willing in turn to deal with Italy, Vichy, and Spain at the expense of the others, he was ultimately unable to reconcile the overlapping and competing claims of all the players in the diplomatic game. By the spring of 1941 Hitler reasoned that upon completion of his brief campaign of conquest against the Soviet Union he would turn back to the question of Africa and the islands to settle the issue once and for all.
   In the end, all of Hitler's grand designs failed. There would be no colonial territory for Germany in Africa. No bases in the Atlantic islands. No airfields in French Morocco or Dakar. Not even sufficient Vichy military strength and political will to defend French North Africa. Thus, in November 1942 Operation Torch made Morocco a base of offensive military operations not for the Wehrmacht, but for the Allies.
   Although it cannot be said that the book indisputably proves the thesis that Hitler intended to build and use bases in Northwest Africa and the Atlantic islands against America when his war transformed into one for global supremacy, Goda's grand tour of Hitler's planning at least demonstrates how Berlin attached more importance to the theater than is generally recognized. In that sense, the factual underpinnings of Tomorrow the World far, far outweigh its more speculative aspects.
   A splendid book, perfect for those who enjoy studying World War II rather than having it spoon fed to them.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Texas A&M University Press.
   Thanks to Texas A&M for providing this review copy.