ISBN 1-55750-390-7
287 pages

Preface; photos; maps; Bibliography; Index.

Appendices: Directive No. 16: On the Preparation of a Landing Operation against England; Directive No. 17: On the Conduct of the Air and Sea War against England; Appeal to the Population of England

   Author Egbert Kieser makes two main points. First, according to his calculations, the combined air, land, and sea preparations for Operation Sea Lion, the abortive German invasion of England in 1940, amounted to the largest Wehrmacht operation of the entire war and more: "...in terms of the dimensions of its preparations [the] greatest operation in German military history...." Although he never defines his terms or provides comparative measurements, it's clear from his description that the planning, construction, diversion of resources, training, refitting, and deployment for Sea Lion required a monumental effort in a surprisingly brief period of time.
   More controversially, Kieser concludes that the entire operation was in fact nothing more than a gigantic bluff. "However, there is not a single clue that Hitler ever really did intend to occupy the British Islands. There is much evidence that in a complete misapprehension of the actual situation, he intended from the outset to force Britain into concluding a peace agreement by means of a massive threat, in order thereby to clear the way for his attack upon Russia."
   An intriguing conclusion, but not a new one. Other authors (Michael Glover in Invasion Scare 1940, Peter Fleming in Operation Sea Lion) have rejected it. Ronald Wheatley scrutinizes and dismisses the notion in his Operation Sea Lion: "Yet there can be no doubt that Hitler seriously meant to invade Great Britain if this was possible. ...all these considerations make it exceedingly hard to believe that the invasion plan was not conceived with a view to execution and was merely intended to act as an empty threat to Britain from the Continent."
   Hitler on the Doorstep opens at the time of the Phoney War and offers several scene-setting chapters (operations in France and the Low Countries, birth of the British "Home Defence Force" and other plans for defending the UK, and the Dunkirk evacuation) before finally reaching the meat of the book with the evolution of German planning and preparations for S-Day. The branches of the Wehrmacht bickered, dismissed each other's plans and requirements, and generally wasted away precious time. The Kriegsmarine recited its litany of requirements: "1. Weather, moon and tides had to be favourable. 2. In the Channel, German command of the sea had to have been established. 3. German command of the air over the sea and coast must also have been achieved. 4. The English south coast was to have been 'ploughed over by bombs several times'." The Heer, convinced the voyage across the Channel would be no more complicated than a river crossing, wanted only for the Navy to send boats and barges to get them across the water on the broadest front possible. Goering, said by Kieser to be the only service Chief who realized the invasion was merely a scam, kept his distance from the operation and played his hand so badly that the Luftwaffe squandered its early advantages against the RAF.

   Quite the opposite, the British [bombers] were now coming over every day and night and attacking the ships marshalled in the Channel ports.... Schniewind had warned of the dangers such attacks posed for 'Operation Sea Lion': 'Given the deadline now set, there is no time reserve available...a materiel reserve to any degree worth mentioning cannot be provided, so that any damage to or any loss of transport space will have a weakening effect already on the first wave of the landing.'
   The Admiral made use of this statement to again point out the urgency of 'achieving command of the air quickly' over England, urging the Luftwaffe on even before the expected Adlertag, so to speak. None of this had any effect. After British air reconnaissance had discovered the growing number of ships in the Channel ports towards the end of August, Bomber Command had received the order to systematically bomb these assemblies. The attacks began around 13 September and produced surprising results because without radar, German fighter defence could not be forewarned and regularly came in too late. Only with flak could one hit back during the day. On 15 September alone, the Royal Air Force sank four steamers in the harbour at Antwerp. Army Group A's war diary notes 'substantial' or 'heavy' damage for each day. Many ammunition dumps, including much captured ammunition, were blown up, the fires in the port facilities lit up the night far and wide. The British bomber crews called these night sorties the 'Blackpool run', because the coast was so brightly and colourfully lit up as had formerly been the pier of the Lancashire holiday resort of Blackpool. Within a few weeks the invasion fleet lost almost ten per cent of its transport space: 21 steamers, 194 barges, many tugboats, coastal motorboats, and motorboats fell victim to the enemy air attacks. In order not to lose the whole fleet, the naval commands were directed to move the vessels into the hinterland via the canals connected to the ports and also to ensure that they were loaded there.

   The Kriegsmarine, which most clearly saw the dangers of an amphibious landing and remained the biggest opponent of Sea Lion, nevertheless performed miracles of improvisation to assemble sufficient shipping to meet the needs of the Heer. The Army, busily waterproofing its panzers, was quite prepared to cross at the earliest opportunity and was willing -- and expected -- to sacrifice 50% of the troops in the first wave of the landings. But the Luftwaffe was not able to gain control of the skies.
   In mid-September all the men and material assembled for the invasion began to disperse "to immediately prevent such grave results of enemy air attacks." The original ten day warning period for S-Day was extended to fifteen days. By the end of September, the fifteen day warning period would have put the landing and its followup waves (exercises indicated it would require a full month after the assault to complete ferrying all thirteen divisions to England) in the midst of autumn storms in the Channel. On 12 October Sea Lion was postponed until the spring or early summer, but it was never officially cancelled. "On 5 February 1944 Naval Command pulled itself together for a final 'Sea Lion' order: 'Construction (but only these) in preparation for "Sea Lion" are to be discontinued for the time being.'"

   In retrospect it appears that 'Operation Sea Lion' only became the victim of a Luftwaffe that was poorly led and not properly equipped for its task. If one considers how close the Luftwaffe came to winning command of the air over England, and was only prevented from doing so by the senseless attacks on London, then the question arises whether a timely planning and coordination within the OKW would not have brought the battle to a different conclusion. As early as June none of the three branches of the Wehrmacht had the slightest interest in an invasion; on 13 June Raeder was convinced that he had buried 'Sea Lion' for good. And then the unbelievable occurred: within a matter of days, the Heer had drawn the military deduction from the preceding triumph over France and elicited agreement for an invasion plan from Hitler. Two months later, 150,000 men and many seagoing vessels stood ready to cross over to the English coast. Had the three commanders-in-chief been able to agree on a plan in early July, and instead of letting it sink ships in the largely senseless 'Channel Battle', had the Luftwaffe be[en] concentrated against radar stations, fighter bases, and aircraft plants from 10 July on, 'Operation Sea Lion' would have already become a campaign in England by August.
   Left to themselves, the three commanders-in-chief would certainly never have reached an agreement, only a Fuehrer order could have forced them to do so, but in June Hitler was thinking even less about an invasion of the British Isles than Raeder, von Brauchitsch and Goering. And once it had been set afoot, 'Operation Sea Lion' remained the only one of all the major operations during the war for which he showed no interest and which he did not attempt to improve on personally. While he had imposed each of the preceding campaigns on his generals against their will and interfered on even the minutest details, this time the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht was content to accept the plans in their totality and only to provide the political background music, that is to shower the British with threats. Hitler never had the intention to invade Great Britain!

   A readable and thought-provoking book, but one that sometimes wanders into tangential matters (rather much on Mers el Kebir, evacuation of children from England, the "golf course" platoon, and social aspects of the British Home Guard) and fails to rigorously document all its facts and figures. Best read in conjunction with a more focused, scholarly analysis such as Wheatley's Operation Sea Lion.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Naval Institute Press.
   Thanks to NIP for providing this review copy.