Nipe Jr., George M. Decision in the Ukraine: Summer 1943, II SS and III Panzerkorps. Winnipeg, Canada: J.J. Fedorowicz Publishing, Inc, 1996

ISBN 0-921991-35-5
390 pages

Acknowledgements; Notes on Sources; Terminology and Abbreviations; SS Ranks and U.S. Army Equivalents; List of Maps; Preface; Introduction; maps; photos; Footnotes; Bibliography

Appendices: OB of Soviet Tank Army; Typical Organization of Soviet tank corps; Tank strength of II SS Panzerkorps during Kursk; OB of III Panzerkorps, August 1943; Organization of Totenkopf in summer 1943; Soviet OB for Operation Rumyantsev

George Nipe's Decision in the Ukraine was one of the leaders in our Top Ten balloting for best books of 1997. (Although dated 1996, it did not actually appear in print until 1997.) The book is written with three objectives:

(1) To study the operations of II SS Panzerkorps and III Panzerkorps in the southern Ukraine in July and August 1943. (Specifically Prochorovka, the defense of the Mius, and the Bogodukhov sector during the Fourth Battle of Kharkov.)

(2) To provide an accurate account of the misunderstood and mis-reported engagement at Prochorovka.

(3) To observe the part played by the Waffen-SS panzer divisions in these actions.

The book's introduction recounts the German invasion of the Soviet Union and traces the campaign through the loss of Sixth Army at Stalingrad. The first chapter then sets the stage by outlining the subsequent operations, Manstein's recapture of Kharkov, and the onset of the muddy season and the stabilization of the front in the Ukraine. The chapter concludes with a detailed explanation of the terrain along the Mius and the layout of German defenses, setting the stage for further action there.

The scene then shifts to the Kursk salient. Nipe describes the situation and diligently quantifies AFV strengths of German units based on war diaries of the forces involved. (These numbers form the basis for computing losses and debunking some earlier histories of the battle.) On 5 July Model's 9th Army opens the offensive against the northern shoulder of the salient, choosing to have his infantry lead the assault in an effort to open a path for the waiting panzer divisions. The Soviets manage to hold onto their fortified villages and hills, however, leading Model to feed his tanks into frontal assaults on prepared positions. Only ten miles have been gained when, a week later, offensive operations on this part of the front are suspended.

Given the objectives of his book, Nipe zooms in for a much closer look at operations on the southern shoulder of the Kursk salient, in particular the climax at Prochorovka. The combat is described for the most part from the German point of view, but the Soviet side of the line is by no means ignored. In the course of approximately 50 pages the events are played out: the advance of II SS Panzerkorps through successive Soviet defensive belts; the less successful advance of III Panzerkorps on the right flank; commitment of Soviet reserves; and the dramatic charge at Prochorovka.

The remaining 300 pages are devoted to a thorough and vivid reconstruction of the panzer battles on the Mius and at Bogodukhov during the Battle of Kharkov. Nipe paints the overall strategic picture and follows the tactical action with presentations of precise numerical reports of strengths and losses as well as detailed examinations of the field of the battle, the abilities of the opposing weapons and formations, and the critical positions, decisions, and outcomes. This is the kind of meaty work that won for the book recognition as one of the best of the year.

Leaving that aside, though, it's interesting to compare Nipe's treatment of Kursk in general and Prochorovka in particular to that of Walter Dunn's Kursk, another book honored as one of the best of the year.

Dunn includes more material from the Soviet perspective. Nipe, by design, focuses more on the German side of the line. Dunn spends a much greater amount of his considerably shorter book examining the larger context of the war and the opposing war machines, with much emphasis on rail capacities, manpower reserves, production, and overall AFV inventories. Nipe, as shown above, includes Operation Citadel only as a subset of the ongoing campaigns in the Ukraine in the summer of 1943. The amount of text expended on the actual combat at Kursk and Prochorovka, and analyzing the results, is therefore roughly equivalent in the two volumes.

Both authors begin their analyses of the engagement afresh and spend considerable effort debunking much of the traditional view of the battle. Both agree that failure of III Panzerkorps to keep pace with the advance resulted in dissipation of II SS's schwerpunkt. Both quote new figures from primary sources to assert that the number of tanks involved has in the past been much inflated and that, similarly, German losses were nowhere near the levels usually claimed. Both authors agree that the cumulative process of chewing through the prepared Soviet positions was more costly for the Germans in terms of panzer losses than was the ultimate tank "melee". Both agree that the attack of II SS Panzerkorps did not cease after Prochorovka on 12 July, but continued, albeit in a slow and costly fashion.

Certainly there are also some differences between the two in quoting exact numbers of tanks, locations, times, and the underlying decision-making, but by far the most interesting difference concerns the ability of the Germans to successfully continue the battle after it was in fact halted on Hitler's order.

Dunn presents evidence that the Soviet position remained much stronger than the Germans knew at the time, with reservoirs of troops and tanks as yet uncommitted. In particular, he relates, the Soviets possessed large numbers of replacement AFVs and crews ready to quickly rebuild weakened formations, and these assets are seldom weighed in the balance. In his opinion, Manstein's assertion that he could still win the battle was based on a lack of knowledge about the actual balance of forces.

Nipe takes the view that heavy Soviet tank losses and absence of local reserves, coupled with the tactical superiority of the German panzer divisions and relatively light losses, gave the Germans a considerable advantage.

Because of the losses inflicted upon Soviet armor, the battle of Prochorovka resulted in local numerical tank superiority of at least 2 to 1 in favor of the Germans south of the Psel on 13 July. Considering that SS panzers of "Das Reich" and "Leibstandarte" and the attacks of III Panzerkorps inflicted losses on the magnitude that 5th Guards Tank Army suffered in one day of fighting at Prochorovka, this situation clearly presented an opportunity for the Germans. The nearest significant uncommitted Soviet armor was located at Kursk and consisted of the 4th Guards Tank Corps and elements of the 4th Mechanized Corps. Less than two armored corps would have been hard pressed to stop the full panzer strength of Manstein's two armies in an all out attack on Kursk. It is evident by Khrushchev's comments regarding the importance of stopping the Germans south of the Psel, that the Stavka did not have confidence in their ability to prevent the loss of the city if Manstein wasn't stopped on the river.

The losses of 1st Tank Army early in the fighting and III. Panzerkorps approach toward Prochorovka had alarmed the Soviet leadership sufficiently to force them to commit Rotmistrov's tank army, their strategic reserve. Since the primary task of this army was offensive in nature, the gravity of the situation is evident. Following the destruction of 2/3 of the 5th Guards Tank Army, the opportunity was then at hand on the day after Prochorovka to push fresh troops up to the front and break out into the flat land to the north of the Psel. It was clear to Manstein that this was the time to commit the panzer divisions of XXIV. Panzerkorps, the Heeresgruppe Sud reserve. These fresh German panzer divisions, attacking over the open steppe south of Kursk, would have been in their element and the Soviets were obviously not yet capable of defeating the Germans in a mobile battle of this type. In spite of the marked improvement in the organization, command and logistical support of the Soviet armor formations, they remained inferior to the German panzer troops.

...

By contrast, the Russians temporarily had no other significant armored reserves to commit in the immediate Prochorovka-Psel sector. That situation would be remedied within weeks, a remarkably short time, but on 13 July, a German breakthrough north of the Psel would have had little but open country between it and Kursk. The only Russian tank reserves of any size were the 4th Tank Army and the 3rd Guards Tank Army in the area north of Orel, but these forces were scheduled to be committed against Heeresgruppe Mitte. The nearest of the two, the 3rd Guards Tank Army, was nearly 100 miles away and was thus in no position to furnish immediate help on that date. A successful breakout over the Psel by 4. Panzerarmee and Armee Abteilung Kempf toward Kursk thus would have been unopposed by a Soviet strategic armored reserve. Such a German advance would have cut off the Russian armies in the western section of the bulge which included the remnants of 1st Tank Army and the 6th Guards, 40th, 60th, 65th, and 38th Armies.

Which view of German prospects is on the mark? We'll probably never know the answer with any certainty, but both these books are highly recommended.

Decision in the Ukraine is available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from J.J. Fedorowicz.

Thanks to Fedorowicz for providing this review copy.