Kaufmann, J.E. and H.W. Kaufmann. The Maginot Line: None Shall Pass. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.

ISBN 0-275-95719-5
151 pages

Acknowledgments; Introduction; maps; diagrams; Conclusion; Glossary; Bibliography; Index.

Kaufmann, J.E. and H.W. Kaufmann. Maginot Imitations: Major Fortifications of Germany and Neighboring Countries. Westport, CT: Praeger, 1997.

ISBN 0-275-95720-9
154 pages

Acknowledgments; Foreword by Gunther D. Reiss; Introduction; maps; diagrams; Conclusion; Bibliography; Index.

The Kaufmann husband and wife team have done several previous WWII-related titles (including Hitler's Blitzkrieg Campaigns and The Sleeping Giant) but this pair of books represents their best work yet. It seems clear that in these two the Kaufmanns are working on a subject about which they are very knowledgeable and which interests them very much. The two books are reviewed here together because they would have fit together nicely as a single volume, encompassing as they do the WWII-era fortifications of most of the nations of western Europe.

The first chapter of The Maginot Line discusses the evolution of French fortifications, particularly leading up to and during World War I. Much attention is paid to describing the strengths and weaknesses of French fortifications (such as Verdun) which took part in the war. The Kaufmanns compare designs of the little-known German "feste" forts near Metz and Strasbourg ("probably the best designed forts of the period" although they never saw action) which were acquired by the French at the end of the First World War and inspired many changes and improvements in French designs, especially the Maginot Line.

The next chapter covers the military, political, bureaucratic, and financial wangling over the Maginot Line, pointing out that "Despite the name of the new line, most of the planning for this new system of fortifications had actually be done under the administration of [Minister of War] Paul Painleve, who was replaced by [Andre] Maginot in 1929."

Kaufmann and Kaufmann reveal the considerable divergences of opinions in the military about how best to defend France (including the "offense-minded" minority), the compromises over design and actual construction of the Line, and differences among the various geographical sectors. Each of the component elements -- the assorted gros ouvrages, petit ouvrages, bunkers, casemates, and so on -- is carefully defined, and the extent of the different positions delineated. In all of this, they emphasize, it is important to remember the differences between the Maginot Line "Proper", the Maginot Extension, the various "interval" positions, and the "Little Maginot Line".

These differences were subject to an intentional French campaign of disinformation to cloak the reality (and certain weaknesses) of the Maginot Line, generating myths which endure to this day. One of the chapters surveys the popular books and magazine articles of the era (and also reviews German intelligence efforts), most of which played a part in distorting the facts.

The book describes a typical gros ouvrage -- the largest and most complex kind of position, and the kind that is usually (and incorrectly) identified as making up the entire Maginot Line -- and then carefully walks the reader through the details of two specific gros ouvrages. Each of the components is defined and described: block, cloche, turret, casemate, weapons, optical systems, filters and ventilators, and so on.

In addition to the gros ouvrages, the Kaufmanns cover the petit ouvrages and lesser works. In doing so, they sketch not only the Maginot Line proper but also the Rhine defenses, the "New Fronts" (extensions along the Belgian border), and the very strong clusters of ouvrages covering the passes of the Alps between Switzerland and the Mediterranean.

The troops manning the Line were, although garrison forces, generally built around regiments and battalions of first-quality men, with strength tripled by activation of reservists during mobilization. (The Kaufmann's speculate that the skimming of so many qualified men into the static garrison units might have been an important factor in the overall lowering of the quality of the "mobile" French divisions.) Interestingly, the French referred to the men in the ML as "crews" due to the warship-like duty.

   In the French literature, the garrisons of the ouvrages are referred to as "crews" because they were organized on the same pattern as the navy. About one third of the men came from the infantry, another third were artillery men, and the remainder came from engineer units. The infantrymen mostly manned the infantry blocks, whereas the artillerymen served the casemates and turrets, mounting 81-mm mortars, 135-mm howitzers and 7-mm guns. The various types of engineers were in charge of most of the supporting and logistical functions within the ouvrage, such as operating the usine, handling communications, and so on. After many problems surfaced during the 1936 mobilization in response to German occupation of the Rhineland, the army sent some officers from the ouvrages to observe and train with naval units in order to learn how to handle men from different services working together in the same unit.

The Maginot Line was fully and immediately manned in September 1939. Because many had not been permitted to fire in peacetime (for fear of frightening civilians, disrupting local communities, and disclosing their positions), the first test firings of guns revealed a number of problems (such as loosening at least one gun from its mounting). Some of the ouvrages did manage to support the abortive French advance on 7-8 September.

The last few chapters of the book describe the actual combat operations in which the various portions of the Line were involved during the 1940 campaign. (Only brief mention is made of the role the Maginot Line played against the Allies while in German hands in 1944 and 1945.) In some cases the Germans carefully arrayed howitzers, heavy mortars, AA guns, Stukas, and assault engineers against the French fortified positions. Some of the smaller positions fell, but the Maginot Line Proper held out.

   As the battle raged over Lembach on June 19, a German 420-mm howitzer placed several well-placed rounds on Schoenenbourg, hitting the concrete surface of a combat block and gouging a 70-cm deep crater, which represented the greatest damage inflicted by any heavy-artillery piece with a single round against the Maginot forts. Other shells bored as much as 20 meters deep into the loamy soil surrounding the ouvrage and detonated as close as five meters from the underground galleries of the combat blocks. According to the French, the shock was perceived merely as a harmless tremor in the passageway. On June 19 and 20, Stuka dive bombers also dropped 500 kg (1,100 lb) bombs on the fort, placing forty percent on or near the target. In the course of the following days some bombers also dropped 1,000 kg (2,200 lb) bombs. The Luftwaffe continued its attacks on Schoenenbourg until June 22. Schoenenbourg absorbed all this punishment but gamely fulfilled its supporting missions during the bombardment. The big 420-mm howitzer returned to bombard Schoenenbourg on June 21, adding fourteen more rounds that morning to the effects of the air attacks....[The artillery] continued to pound Schoenenbourg until the very day of the Armistice.

Of special interest is the chapter on the Italian offensive against the gros ouvrages of the "Little Maginot Line" in the Maritime Alps. Little documented outside the Italian official history (and sometimes too sketchy there), K and K include a remarkable account of the duel of French ouvrages and a 280-mm mortar battery against the Italian Fort Chaberton (at 10,430 feet the highest fort in Europe). Another memorable episode is the duel along the coast between French ouvrages and an Italian armored train.

Italian forces failed to make much of a dent anywhere, but they did make at least one notable assault.

   Showing great determination, they advanced right up to the ouvrage [at Cap Martin] in the afternoon. Block 3, a casemate for two 75-mm and two 81-mm mortars, suffered some direct hits including some on its embrasure, but it remained effectively in action, having sustained only minor damage. The Italians reached the surface of the fort, and all attempts to dislodge them failed until, late in the day, the other forts in the vicinity were called to direct their fire on to the ouvrage of Cap Martin. This finally forced the Italians to withdraw. The ouvrage incurred some minor damage from the supporting French 155-mm guns. This was as close as the Italians came to ever taking a gros ouvrage, which was better than their German comrades ever did.

Although lighter positions were captured, no gros ouvrage of the Maginot Line fell during the campaign. Kaufmann and Kaufmann conclude:

   Fortress lines do not have a very good track record since virtually every one of them was pierced during World War II. The Maginot Line, on the contrary, held out well and was not penetrated until after the interval troops had been withdrawn in June of 1940. Further, in the south, the Little Maginot Line withstood the test of fire admirably well. There can be no hesitation to characterize the Maginot Line as the most successful gun-bearing fortified line of the twentieth century even though the French army was unable to take full advantage of it.

The companion volume, Maginot Imitations, surveys in much the same manner the fortifications of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The text covers the evolution of fortification design and engineering in each country (including the considerable influence of the Maginot Line), how the fortifications fit into overall strategy, locations of positions, differing types of works, and even comparisons of construction techniques.

   [The German and]...the French methods for preparing and pouring concrete and the use of iron bar reinforcement were quite distinct. Without going into technical detail, the French technique required less water, producing a thicker concrete, which was tamped down with pneumatic hammers. This method produced a concrete that dried quickly. Before the entire wall and roof slabs could be completed, sections would have already dried, precluding the creation of a true monolithic concrete slab. In addition, this technique required less iron bar reinforcement, which was more economical but produced less solid results than a grid network.
   The German procedure, on the other hand, used more water, keeping the concrete fluid for a longer period of time, thus creating a more uniform slab. This method allowed the use of a grid network, which, though more expensive, produced stronger walls. As a result, the German technique produced a concrete slab with stronger resistance capabilities. Thus, a French 3.5 meter wall or roof could only withstand a 420-mm round, while a German wall of the same thickness could resist a 520-mm round. The German Type B fortification with 1.5 meters of concrete could withstand 210-mm gun fire and a single hit from a 300-mm weapon, while the lightest French protection of 1.5 to 1.7 meters could only hold up against 160-mm rounds. The next higher protection of 2.0 to 2.5 meters could survive 240-mm caliber artillery.

The maps, schematics, and diagrams are somewhat disappointing, and both books could have profited from photographs (neither has any-- all this seems to have been imposed by production constraints). Overall, though, the two volumes are probably the best English-language sources on the subject. We can only hope the Kaufmanns produce a third volume covering the rest of Europe with the Stalin Line, the Metaxas Line, the Mannerheim Line, Italian forts such as Chaberton, and so on.

Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Praeger.

Thanks to Praeger for providing these review copies.