ISBN 1-885119-44-5
314 pages

Acknowledgments; Introduction; Senior Dramatis Personae; Prologue; photos; maps; Epilogue; Bibliography; Index.

Appendices: Orders of Battle (German and Allied); Chains of Command (German and Allied); Guide to Abbreviations and German Words

   Michael Reynolds, retired Major General in the British Army and author of a biography of Jochen Peiper, has produced one of the best accounts of WWII operations to appear in 1997 with equally valuable discussions of the strategic picture, the tactics of beachhead and bocage, and even the "worm's-eye view" of individual soldiers. With the subtitle "I SS Panzer Corps in Normandy", he focuses on the actions of 1st SS Panzer Division Leibstandarte Adolf Hitler and 12th SS Panzer Division Hitlerjugend, but this is by no means a one-sided account. Reynolds also provides a great deal of material on the Allied forces—usually British, Canadian, and Polish—facing the SS and on the larger Allied situation and strategy. In this way he successfully builds a broad and detailed picture of operations in the eastern sector of the Normandy front from the D-Day landings to the collapse of the Falaise pocket.
   He begins his book with an overview of the origins and formation of the LAH and HJ divisions, in particular bringing into focus the individuals who will emerge as the key commanders during the Normandy campaign. He thoroughly explains the strengths and weakness of the weapons and equipment of the SS divisions as well as that of the Allied forces poised to land in France. Further sections explicate in considerable detail the TOEs of the opposing divisions. Reynolds also devotes pages to comparing the training and tactics of each side, with some emphasis on the shortcomings of Allied doctrine even at this late stage of the war, including some fairly damning excerpts from contemporary Allied documents and reports.
   The next section describes the deployment of German forces in the West on the eve of invasion and dissects the rather clumsy German chain of command and the resulting compromises and inefficiencies which left units out of position, generals without operational control, and the whole subject to the whims and wishes of the Fuehrer. Reynolds also reviews the Allied invasion plan and Field Marshal Montgomery's intentions with regard to Caen, in the process dismissing Carlo D'Este's main thesis in Decision in Normandy. He then undertakes an interesting excursion through the state of the Allied armies, explaining along the way such obscure facts as the anomalous pay differentials between enlisted men and officers in the US and British armies.
   The book does not duck the issue of SS atrocities in Normandy, particularly the murder of Canadian POWs. In this matter Reynolds rises to the occasion with a well-reasoned and well-written chapter describing the battlefield facts as best they can be ascertained and outlining the controversial trials and their outcomes. He then goes a step further to cogently place all this into the context of warfare in general and Normandy in particular, eloquently posing point and counter-point, offering no pat answers, blanket condemnations, or easy exonerations, but concluding with a firm and undeniable admonition.
   Despite all the preliminary and tangential exposition—nicely done though it is—this is a book about combat. When the Allies land on 6 June, Reynolds begins his blow-by-blow account of the conduct of battle as the SS divisions are moved to the front and time after time play the leading role in frustrating enemy intentions. Here too Allied actions are studied along with the movements, attacks, and defensive stands of I SS Corps.
   Reynolds readily and gratefully acknowledges his indebtedness to other histories of the campaign including, notably, the LAH and HJ histories from J. J. Fedorowicz. Sources such as the memoirs of Kurt Meyer (commander of 25th SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment on D-Day and then 12th SS Panzer Division from 16 June) provide much of the vivid, on-the-spot color of Steel Inferno, but no sources are relied upon uncritically. Reynolds checks everything for discrepancies and often finds alternative explanations in other accounts from both Axis and Allies. This process also reveals some telling instances of events that loom large on one side of the front but barely register on the opposing side.
   The same cross-checking also permits the author to point out earlier accounts of the campaign that contain inaccuracies and distortions; these range from the British official history volume to various unit histories to eyewitness testimonies.
   The Introduction states "These thoughts [the military accomplishments and outstanding resilience of the SS units] led me to look again at some of the more remarkable achievements of the German Army and at the extraordinary casualty rates they seemed to be able to sustain without a collapse of morale." Consequently, one of the recurring themes of cross-checking is the matter of SS casualties and strength returns. While at the very heart of this book is the undeniable fact that the men of the 1st and 12th SS Divisions proved themselves uncommon warriors, Reynolds examines archival records and concludes that the two units were never as weak and undermanned during the campaign as some of their champions have contended.
   After thoroughly discussing the important role it played in Normandy, Reynolds closes the book with a thoughtful effort to answer the question of how and why the Corps managed to perform so well.

   The officers and men of the Leibstandarte and Hitlerjugend Divisions were indeed extraordinary men—considered heroes and revered by some, judged as criminals and reviled by others. Not all of them acted bravely—there are plenty of examples of terrified youngsters surrendering to Allied soldiers. But they can as a whole be equated to the men of Caesar's finest Legions and to Napoleon's Old Guard. They have also been compared to Ghengis Khan's scourging hordes and Attila's invading Huns! But whatever else they were, they were remarkable soldiers—the like of which we may never see again.
   And now we must ask ourselves what made them as they were? And here we face a number of contradictions. That they were motivated by what turned out to be a thoroughly evil system did not prevent them from being fine leaders and soldiers, and the fact that they came almost entirely from Christian homes and schools did not prevent them from acting brutally and without mercy. But then they did not believe that war was a "game" to be played by "rules"; it was instead a contest which had to be won. The other contestants were seen as inferior and therefore it was unthinkable that the opposition could or should be allowed to win.
   Despite flawed strategic direction from the Supreme Command (Hitler), which often placed the soldiers of the LAH and HJ in almost impossible situations, at the tactical level their officers usually managed to select the vital ground on which the soldiers had a reasonable chance of performing well. And despite the short and often inadequate training which many of the soldiers received before being committed to battle, their motivation, discipline, natural instincts as soldiers and intense loyalty to each other, enabled them to achieve remarkable results. The combined effect of skilled officers and senior NCOs and brave, dedicated soldiers made for an extremely formidable military machine. Wounds were to be borne with pride and never used as a reason to leave the field of battle; mercy was seen as a sign of weakness and was normally neither offered nor expected.
   The willingness of the members of the Waffen-SS to go on fighting when it was clear that the war was lost can only be a source of wonder to today's generation. However, their experiences in the East undoubtedly added to their resolve to protect their homeland for as long as possible and at whatever cost.
   The fact that these men were part of an elite organization which was stamped with their charismatic leader's own name was an important influence on their outlook. But attractive uniforms, fine weapons, abundant quantities of meaningful medals worn even in battle to single out the proven brave, a strong emphasis on comradeship—these were all factors which played a part in making these men unique. Perhaps, though, the most significant thing which singled out the men of these Divisions was their obvious pride in being soldiers. It is strange that in post-war years the former Allies have spent so much time criticizing each other's performances in WWII but admiring that of the enemy—particularly the Waffen-SS. At the end of the day it has to be said that the soldiers of the I SS Panzer Corps excelled in what is still, in some circles, called "The Art of War".

   Finally, after nearly three hundred pages of fighting and suffering and dying, Reynolds' Epilogue provides a sensitive, almost nostalgic summary of the post-war lives of the SS commanders, no longer warriors, but merely truck salesmen and holiday park managers and insurance men and cattle breeders.
   A few minor lapses in editing, but certainly one of the best books of the year. It's also very gratifying to see Reynolds developing into such a strong historian and writer. We look forward to more excellent books from him.
   Available from online booksellers and local bookshops or directly from Sarpedon.
   Thanks to Sarpedon for providing this review copy.