ISBN 780891-415299
415 pages

List of Abbreviations; List of Important Persons; Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction; photos; maps; Notes on Sources; Notes; Index.

Appendices: Documents; Structure and Organization of the Red Army and the German Wehrmacht in 1941.

   In 1984 Bryan Fugate's Operation Barbarossa: Strategy and Tactics on the Eastern Front, 1941 was published by Presidio to a mixed response. In that book Fugate presented his theory that Stalin, using Zhukov's brilliant strategic plan, had intentionally sacrificed Soviet border defenses—notably General D. G. Pavlov's Western Military District and the Bialystok salient—in order to lure the German armies to their doom deeper inside the Soviet Union. Fugate's ideas, persuasive but controversial, provoked considerable debate among historians and military analysts, and were far from universally accepted. In some circles Fugate and his theories were labeled crackpot.
   Now Fugate is back, teamed with Lev Dvoretsky, Russian historian and retired Soviet colonel, and in this new book from Presidio restating and enlarging the original theory.
   Bolstered by fresh research in Soviet archives and careful scrutiny of the war diaries of German units, the authors reiterate the central thesis that Stalin was not deceived by the Germans, was not unprepared or paralyzed when Barbarossa struck, and was in fact executing a carefully devised strategy that actually served to save the Soviet Union. While that strategy—costing hugely in manpower, equipment, and territory—may seem more like a muddled, incompetent reaction to events beyond Soviet control, Fugate and Dvoretsky explain the genesis of the plan.
   The two Soviet high command wargames of January 1941 are well known among historians and students of Russian Front literature. In them, Zhukov first destroyed the defending Soviet team, then switched sides and demonstrated an effective strategic defense. Shortly afterwards, Zhukov was appointed by Stalin as the new chief of the general staff. Stalin had taken a close personal interest in the pair of wargames, and the authors point out:

   Western historians have never made mention of the fact that Zhukov's appointment as chief of the general staff indicated that Stalin had become a convert to his ideas. In point of fact, Zhukov's victory in the first war game, coupled with the startling demonstration of his skill in the second, left no doubt in Stalin's mind that his horse was the one that would have to be ridden.

   Then, according to Fugate and Dvoretsky, came the hitherto secret and unsuspected February wargame which they reveal here for the first time. Realizing that the Soviet defense strategy as it then existed would crumble under the hammer blows of the German blitzkrieg and that the Soviet Union would almost certainly collapse, Stalin gave Zhukov the opportunity to demonstrate and hone the strategic concept destined to save the Motherland. As a result of this secret session, Zhukov's plans were put clandestinely into effect.
   A key element in the plan was that, in order to slow the onrushing enemy advance—and in particular to tie down the German infantry and separate them from the panzers—the Red infantry masses defending the border must stand and be sacrificed while the reserve echelons were assembled in their proper places. Critical weapons and equipment such as T-34 and KV tanks, artillery, aircraft, and even communications gear were quietly withdrawn "for training" or withheld from the frontier. Pavlov himself, in order to more believably play his unsuspected role, was not informed of the scheme. He was in fact, like his troops, intentionally written off.
   The authors go on to describe the actual operations of both sides, how the risky defensive strategy was implemented, how the Germans fell into the trap, and how nevertheless the plan very nearly failed. Still, as Zhukov intended and Stalin required, the encircled remnants of Pavlov's armies went down fighting and delayed the German infantry while the carefully husbanded second Soviet echelon began to strike the exposed flank of the unsupported German panzer spearheads at Yelnia. There, according to the authors, the entire Russian campaign was ultimately decided. And Pavlov? True to the role he did not even realize he was playing, this hapless pawn was arrested, "interrogated", and executed on the orders of Stalin.
   How has all this been kept secret? In the post-war years, we are told, it was to Khrushchev's political advantage to paint Stalin as unsuspecting and unprepared, and those few high-ranking officers and officials who knew of the existence of the February wargame and the truth of the pre-war plans to sacrifice the border armies were compelled to remain silent.
   While more fully developed and with more evidence—notably the previously undisclosed February wargame—this is basically the same story told in Operation Barbarossa in 1984. It's a compelling story, and perhaps more believable here than it was 13 years ago, what with the new evidence and the new co-author. Still, the footnotes and sources remain somewhat thin, and parts of the book are heavy on speculation and light on documentation.

   ...Statements in a Soviet historical journal claim that the Soviet military attache in Berlin came into possession of either a detailed document describing the Barbarossa Directive, which was signed by Hitler on December 18, 1940, or a draft copy of the plan itself. Although no copy of it has been found anywhere in the Soviet archives, it is probable that such a document did exist. What probably happened was that the Soviet dictator called together his closest military and security advisors after the conference and told them in general terms what he knew, not revealing the exact German timetable. Then he asked them for their opinions on what do.
   Giving Stalin a direct answer for a question such as this was not easy. Zhukov and Timoshenko no doubt restated their objections to the forward strategy and pointed out the Bialystok salient's unsuitability for defense, but still Stalin would not give up his cherished offensive plan. Zhukov and Timoshenko, probably acting out of sheer frustration, offered a compromise—put the current simulation on a map board and play it out with the Germans beating the Red Army to the punch. By now it was obvious to Stalin that this was the only way he could ever know if the strategy needed to be revised. The chief of the general staff, Meretskov, agreed. At this time Meretskov and Pavlov were allies, and it is likely that the foregoing discussion took place in a heated, even angry, manner with caustic verbal exchanges ensuing between the opposing Meretskov/Pavlov and Timoshenko/Zhukov camps.
   Then, with a nod of his head, Stalin ordered Meretskov to revise the game plan and assemble the necessary people. In the back of his mind, Stalin already knew that Pavlov would command the Russian side defending the Bialystok salient and Zhukov would play the German aggressor. What better choice? The advocate of the springboard and the armored warfare expert, Pavlov, would play against the premier commander of offensive operations, Zhukov.
   The victor in the wargames, determined by crushing blows both on the offensive and defensive sides of the board, was Zhukov, and it was his views that succeeded in winning over Stalin. The loser, Pavlov, was sacrificed almost in a ritualistic manner.

   Which is not to say that the authors' central premise is wrong. While still controversial, this is an intriguing idea that once again motivates valuable discussion and debate. If nothing else, it shows that too much emphasis has been placed on the German side of Barbarossa, with little heed to Soviet planning, strategy, and operations.
   While the details of the hypothesis may be open to question, the allure of this book is not. True or false, the story of the secret wargame, Zhukov's desperate, nick of time strategy, the cold-hearted sacrifice of Pavlov and his men, and the bloody battle at Yelnia make this an absorbing book.
   Available from mail order booksellers, local bookstores, or directly from Presidio Press.
   Thanks to Presidio for providing this review copy.