ISBN 978-1-932033-92-2
x + 590 pages

Preface; Acknowledgments; photographs; maps; chapter notes; Command Structures; Code Names; Bibliography; Index

   While it's almost impossible to find a new book about a hitherto unexplored WWII-related subject, it's almost as unlikely to discover a new book that turns out to be the best yet written on the topic. Surprise, surprise. Henrik Lunde's new Hitler's Pre-Emptive War is certainly not the first book about the 1940 invasion of Norway and the battles around Narvik, but it sure looks like the best.
   Having been born in Norway and subsequently serving as an officer in the post-war US Army provides Lunde a unique perspective to chronicle and analyze the campaign. For example, given the plethora of books about British participation and the relative dearth of English-language volumes devoted to other combatants, it would be easy to forget that most of the ground operations against the German invaders were conducted by French, Polish, and Norwegian forces. In particular, although a highly detailed set of official histories has been published in the native tongue, Norwegian actions seem scarcely mentioned in Anglo-centric accounts. Lunde, however, approaches the battle in a manner that accomplishes the seamless integration of operations of all nationalities, including Norway's forces.
   The Prologue, in fact, concentrates on the composition of the Norwegian armed forces, the sad state of the Navy, the unreadiness of air units and coastal fortifications, and the unrealistic expectation that Norway could defend itself based strictly on its rugged terrain and severe weather conditions. Interestingly, Lunde points out the minister of defense "was a conscientious objector and had been arrested for pacifist agitation." It seems likely such a minister did little to facilitate maximization of Norway's military. The author also notes how a large proportion of the defense budget went unspent in 1939 because it became increasingly difficult to purchase weapons from abroad.
   The first chapter of Hitler's Pre-Emptive War reviews Allied plans ("Flawed, Inadequate, and Hesitant"), including Operation Catherine, Winston Churchill's outrageous scheme to push the Royal Navy into the Baltic, ostensibly to bring the Scandinavian states into the war on the side of the Allies. Lunde goes on to demonstrate how all of Churchill's schemes for the northern theater always systematically had one underlying goal: to provoke Germany into becoming militarily ensnared in Scandinavia. That included plans for supporting Finland, demand for Royal Navy access to Norwegian waters, requests for Norwegian minelaying operations, and plots for preventing shipment of Swedish iron ore to Germany via Narvik in northern Norway. As to the latter, Berlin had already made arrangements for alternative transportation routes. In any event, by the time the Allies sailed in early April, they found the German reaction Churchill intended to provoke was already underway.
   In his chapter on German plans ("Bold, Imaginative, and Reckless"), the author indicates that to a considerable degree Churchill was successful in his effort to goad Hitler. While other factors certainly applied, Hitler and Admiral Raeder seemed relatively content to leave Scandinavia alone—until they caught wind of Allied intentions to intervene in the north, at which point pre-empting those plans became imperative, hence the title of the book. A rather curious and convoluted process of planning ensued, culminating in a complicated and chancy stratagem that stretched Kriegsmarine resources to the breaking point.
   Speaking of catching wind of Allied intentions, Lunde goes on to review security leaks and intelligence issues, with neither side winning any awards for maintaining military secrets. Regardless of these various breaches of secrecy, and despite the multitude of on-the-scene reports from neutral observers, aircraft, and RN warships, in early April the German invasion force made its way northward, for the most part unmolested. Hitler's Pre-Emptive War deals with these naval ops in considerable detail.
   The fourth chapter of the book devotes 28 pages to "Narvik Area Defenses" and the local Norwegian reaction to the confusing series of events as the British commenced minelaying operations and the Germans drew near. The following chapter, on the landing at Narvik, gives, based largely on official Norwegian sources, practically a minute-by-minute account of the activities of the defenders. The same chapter also explains how General Dietl's mountain troops managed to capture Narvik and environs (including the Elvegardsmoen army depot with its critical weapons and supplies) without loss. As to Colonel Sundlo (the Norwegian commander on the scene), while many other histories call him a quisling and speak of his treachery in surrendering Norwegian defenses at Narvik, Lunde makes clear that—whatever his political leanings—the defenders were completely out-maneuvered and the town already effectively in German hands when Sundlo capitulated to Dietl at approximately 0615 on 9 April. Furthermore, although the colonel was convicted after the war of collaborationist crimes committed during the occupation, he was specifically acquitted of all charges relating to the loss of Narvik. The kinds of nuance brought out by the author about the defense of Narvik and Sundlo's behavior are nowhere to be found in other accounts, including, for example, Derry, who simply says—although Lunde doesn't explicitly quote him—"Colonel Sundlo, who was one of the very few followers of Quisling in occupation of a key post, at the critical moment refused to fight."
   Unlike his very detailed treatment of events at Narvik, the author condenses most of the concurrent military operations in the remainder of Norway into a chapter mostly encompassing strategic and political issues. For example, in some senses the events transpired exactly as Churchill had expected when he originally planned to provoke a German reaction to British initiatives, although the German invasion was not strictly speaking a response to the Royal Navy's minelaying operations in Norwegian waters. Despite the fact that minelaying occurred first and represented a warlike act against neutral Norway, Oslo promptly responded to the ensuing German landings by requesting from London "...strong and quick assistance before Germans establish firm footing on Norwegian soil." In the meantime, the Norwegian government and armed forces bungled mobilization by quibbling over the meaning and means of full versus partial mobilization. In the end, incredibly, the notification of military activation was to go out to troops by mail rather than radio, with an effective date of 11 April. In terms of narrative, the author in this chapter alters his voice somewhat jarringly, utilizing some lazy first-person phrases such as "I have shown that," "When last we looked," and "We have gotten a little ahead of ourselves...."
   Two chapters focus on the naval battles of Narvik that sank the German destroyer force and left Dietl's troops isolated. Lunde rightly notes how the first engagement in particular might have taken an entirely different course had one of the refuelled Kriegsmarine destroyers been dispatched to patrol the entrance to Ofotfjord. In any event, the loss of ten destroyers meant more than 2000 German sailors suddenly became available for the defense of Narvik. Dietl's earlier capture of the depot at Elvegardsmoen made it possible to equip them as infantrymen.
   The loss of the destroyers and isolation of Dietl's force at Narvik threw Hitler into "a state of frightful agitation" and the Fuehrer wanted the mountain troops and stranded sailors to withdraw, perhaps into Sweden. At that point, General Jodl offered a piece of advice: "One should give something up as lost only when it is lost." Such a recommendation would, as it turned out, serve Hitler well in Norway, but readers might wonder if it was also at the root of Hitler's stubborn refusal to cede ground later in the war, an obstinacy that would in the long run cost the German army dearly.
   Meanwhile, as the Allies assembled their forces and the Norwegian 6th Division prepared to push toward Narvik from the north, Dietl attempted to expand the German perimeter and clear the rail line to the Swedish border. Here's part of Lunde's description of the operation:

   After withdrawing from Nordal Bridge, the Norwegian forces were positioned to cover further stretches of the railroad. Company 3, commanded by Captain Bjornson, had one machinegun platoon attached but was short one rifle platoon. The company was located on the high ground above a railroad tunnel a short distance south of Nordstromvann. There were security elements to the west and northwest of the main positions. The troops were quartered in cabins and railroad guard facilities during the night of 15-16 April. The planned line of retreat, if that should become necessary, was in a northerly direction between two mountain peaks, Rundfjell and Bjornefjell.
   Company 1, commanded by Captain Stromstad, was located at the Bjornefjell railroad complex. The troops were divided between the two main buildings. There was also a small guard detail at the tourist hotel, located between the two main buildings, to guard the 13 Germans captured on April 11. The company had a four-man outpost in the Katterat Mountains. The danger from Elvegardsmoen was considered most acute since the Norwegians believed they would have adequate warnings of a German advance along the railroad. The main German force set out from Hundal across the rough Katterat Mountains in the afternoon of April 15 while a smaller force (21 men plus the company trains), commanded by Lieutenant Trautner, advanced along the railroad towards Nordal Bridge. The Germans hoped the Norwegians would focus their attention on Trautner's men, allowing the main force to execute a successful envelopment.
   A 12-man German patrol encountered the Norwegian outpost on the Katterat Mountains on April 15. In the short encounter, one Norwegian was killed and another captured. The remaining two men made their way to Co 1. A larger force was sent out to recover the body of the fallen Norwegian and it did not encounter any Germans. For unknown reasons, the outpost was not reconstituted. This left the approach through the Katterat Mountains unguarded during the night of 15-16 April.
   The Germans had accurate information about the location of the Norwegian units, obtained either from patrols or perhaps from prisoners. The Germans launched almost simultaneous surprise attacks on the two Norwegian companies. Members of the machinegun platoon were the first to see the Germans around 0400 hours. Co 3 was unable to reoccupy its positions since the Germans had seized them and the company fought from the vicinity of their quarters. Attempts to assemble proved futile because the Germans had infiltrated some of the areas that separated their quarters. The positions of the scattered Norwegian units became untenable when the Germans began using mortars. Those who were able to do so withdrew to the north, linked up with the northwest security force, and continued the fight from a position north of Nordstremvann.
   Captain Bjornson became separated from his men and the company executive officer, Lieutenant Torgersen, assumed command. The withdrawal continued when the enemy threatened to envelop the Norwegian positions. The Norwegians heard firing from the direction of the Bjornefjell Railroad Station. Rather than following the planned line of retreat, Torgersen decided to go to Co 1's assistance. The Norwegians made a mistake in the route and when they eventually came within sight of the railroad station, they saw smoke rising from it and realized that it had fallen to the enemy. This was confirmed by a Swedish border post. The company turned north, intending to join Norwegian forces in Salangsdal, but the weather turned bad with heavy snowfall. The inclement weather and the exhausted condition of the troops caused Torgersen to cross into Sweden where the troops were interned.

   Lunde makes several notes about Sweden's role in the battle. In the very early stages of the campaign, some Norwegian troops seem to have individually travelled to northern Norway from the south via the Swedish transportation network. Some Norwegian troops withdrawing from the Narvik area apparently were allowed to pass through Swedish territory to elude German forces and escape to the north to continue the fight. And the Germans allowed some wounded Norwegians to be evacuated across the border for medical treatment. On the other side of the coin, as soon as Dietl took control of the rail line, Berlin pressured Stockholm to allow transport of "humanitarian" supplies to the mountain troops and sailors at Narvik. The first train arrived at Bjornefjell on 26 April with 34 rail cars containing 25 tons of medical equipment, 20 tons of clothing, 350 tons of provisions, and "30 intelligence personnel, apparently disguised as Red Cross workers." In addition, although he doesn't offer a source, Lunde reveals in a footnote that, in case of withdrawal, "...the Swedes held four trains in readiness near the border from the end of May until the end of the Narvik campaign" to evacuate all of Dietl's troops should it become necessary and transport them to the Gulf of Bothnia for repatriation to Germany.
   While the Allies continued to dither, General Fleischer's Norwegians north of Narvik completed their mobilization and movement to the front. On 24 April Fleischer's first big push toward Narvik ended without much success during a snowstorm. The author dissects the action and draws a number of conclusions. While the Norwegian troops were very tough and operating on home turf, they were almost completely inexperienced in combat. More than that, many of the officers displayed a dismaying lack of military knowledge. The Norwegian problems in their first big attack, according to Lunde, led to a pattern of very conservative, methodical tactics. Coupled with inaction on the part of the British, this provided Dietl further opportunity to consolidate his position.
   Chapter Ten discusses operations in southern Norway as they affected the situation at Narvik. As with earlier material on the initial landings in the south, this chapter doesn't contain quite as much tactical detail as the pages on the far north. However, Lunde does provide a good deal of information on Norwegian actions.
   Against three battalions of German mountain troops and seven weak battalions of shipwrecked Kriegsmarine sailors, by early May the Allies were assembling in the Narvik sector three British infantry battalions, three battalions of French mountain troops, two battalions of the French Foreign Legion, four Polish battalions, and six Norwegian battalions. By that point, other than the Norwegians, only some French forces had been involved in offensive operations against Dietl's garrison. The author carefully describes the incredibly difficult Norwegian attack—beginning on 29 April—across roadless, snow-covered mountains, then contrasts the hardship and achievement with the rather inaccurate and dismissive characterization in the British official history. Although he's very polite about it, Lunde also points out that the entire sum of British ground involvement in the battle for Narvik amounted to a very brief and none-too-glorious action by the South Wales Borderers.
   Meanwhile, elements of the German 2nd Mountain Division were relentlessly clearing Allied forces from the long, narrow stretch of Norway from Namsos to Bodo. The leisurely pace of battle in the far north became something of a race to see if the Allies could capture Narvik first, or if 2nd Mountain Division could arrive in time to reinforce the garrison. After much discussion and debate among the principals of the various Allied nationalities, when it sometimes seemed as though the British considered certain plans impossible for their own troops but tried to order their allies to undertake the same operations, on 13 May (three days after the German invasion of the Netherlands, Belgium, and France) the French landed at Bjerkvik while the Norwegians attacked from the north. That operation, a prelude to the assault on Narvik itself, succeeded. All well and good, but Lunde argues convincingly that the Norwegians were the only ones who understood Narvik should not have been the primary military objective. Instead, the Allied offensive should have focused on capturing the poorly defended German base at Bjornefjell near the Swedish border. Seizing Bjornefjell would have severed the rail link and completely isolated Dietl, forcing him to quickly abandon Narvik and escape across the border or surrender. Although that operation never materialized, the Norwegians on 15 May began an offensive on the high plateau north of Narvik, an attack meticulously described in Hitler's Pre-Emptive War although "only a passing reference to this achievement is made by British authors." By 22 May, exhausted Norwegian battalions had pushed back the Germans to the final defensive line and nearly broken through, but the focus of the campaign was shifting back to Narvik.
   Other factors also influenced the course of operations. Most importantly, the Allied front in France and Belgium had collapsed, with German panzers reaching the Channel coast on 20 May and the evacuation of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkirk commencing on 28 May. For British and French leaders, Norway and Narvik had become little more than a sideshow. In addition, the German 2nd Mountain Division, having driven out the last Allied forces south of Narvik in operations thoroughly described by Lunde, began marching troops northward across roadless mountain wilderness to reinforce Dietl.

   Planning and preparations for the last leg of the advance began when the Germans were still between Mo and Posthus. Three battalions of specially selected individuals were created by selecting a platoon of the best soldiers from each company in the division. These three platoons from each battalion would form a company. The three companies thus formed became a "Narvik Battalion." Each battalion was reinforced with three heavy machineguns, one infantry gun, and two mountain howitzers. The battalions consisted of about 600 men. Special equipment for high-mountain operations was ordered and delivered to Fauske.
   Lieutenant Colonel Ritter von Hengl, commander of the 137th Regiment and a future commander of the 2nd Mountain Division, was selected to command the "Narvik Battalions." He established his headquarters in Mo and began the detailed planning for the operation, code-named Buffel (Buffalo). According to Major Zorn, the 2nd Divisions operation officer, he selected this name because it used to be the battle cry of Dietl's downhill skiers when Dietl was a company commander in Munich.
   The route selected for the battalions avoided places where the troops could come under fire from British warships and any violation of the Swedish frontier was strictly forbidden. The advance would take place at night and the troops would rest during the day. Hengl selected the camps along the route during an aerial reconnaissance on May 29. He planned to complete the march to Narvik in nine to ten days, with the troops covering about 15 to 20 kilometers each night. The total force of about 2,500 men was to assemble when the Germans reached the Fauske area. Some of the troops would come from the lead units while others needed to be brought forward.
   The soldiers were instructed to leave sub-machineguns behind and to carry only rifles and pistols. Hand grenades, helmets, and gas masks were also left behind. Each man carried 30 rounds of rifle ammunition. Four boxes of ammunition for each machinegun and 15 rounds for each light mortar were brought along. Supply was entirely by airdrop at designated rest areas and the heavy weapons and their ammunition were to be air dropped to the advancing troops when they reached a point close to Narvik. Each man carried rations for four days but these were not to be used unless the planned airdrops did not materialize. Essential Alpine equipment was brought along, such as ropes, iron climbers, ice picks, about 50 skis per battalion, and snowshoes. The men carried light sleeping bags and an additional 10 sleeping bags and five 10-man tents were to be air dropped at each rest area. These were to be left behind and new ones dropped at the next area.
   The Luftwaffe was asked not to make advance airdrops since the Germans believed that a force of 500 Norwegian troops had taken the same route northward. Each company was assigned special medical personnel and litter carriers. In addition, one doctor and 25 litter carriers were to be stationed at the rest areas as these were reached, with five carriers at each location. The battalions were equipped with radios.

   While the "Narvik battalions" of German 2nd Mountain Division planned their trek, and after multiple postponements, considerable redeployment, and a surprising amount of discord among the Allies, the assault on Narvik began on 28 May. French forces with an attached Norwegian battalion attacked from the north and the Poles attacked from the south while the Royal Navy and Royal Air Force provided support. Despite a number of setbacks, the amphibious assault from the north succeeded in gaining a foothold and the defenders—mostly German sailors—began to withdraw eastward before their route was cut by the Polish attack, leaving Narvik to the Allies. The French commander gallantly allowed Norwegian troops—who in the larger scheme had done most of the fighting—to be the first to enter the town, where they were "greeted as heroes." Interestingly, according to Lunde, "Narvik holds the distinction of being the first city recaptured from the Germans in World War 2." Regardless—due to the dismal situation in France—the decision had been made four days earlier in London and Paris that all Allied forces would be evacuated from Norway.
   During the next few days the German force was inexorably pushed up the rail line toward Sweden, and Dietl was on the verge of withdrawing across the border. However, the situation changed rapidly and radically. The first Allied forces began departing at the end of May. More than 14,000 troops were ferried to waiting transports during the nights of 4 through 6 June. Another 9800 men departed on the nights of 7 and 8 June. King Haakon and the Norwegian government evacuated on 7 June. Remaining Norwegian units demobilized. As the Allies withdrew, pressure on Dietl ended. On 8 June, General Ruge, who remained in Norway as commander-in-chief, notified the Germans he was ready to discuss a cease fire. The next day Dietl's troops reoccupied the shattered town of Narvik. The campaign on Norwegian soil came to an end, but Norway, with its government and small armed forces in exile, remained at war with Germany on the side of the Allies.
   In his Epilogue, the author reviews the conflicting estimates of losses—air, land, and sea—on both sides made by other writers and attempts to reconcile the numbers and come up with the most accurate assessments. Among other points, he notes how, due in part to the difficulties in medical evacuations caused by terrain and climate, the ratio of killed to wounded proved unusually high. Lunde goes on to evaluate reasons for German success, long term effects of the campaign, and the achievement of objectives. Here's part of his analysis of that latter topic.

   French objectives, primarily to avoid or reduce the threat to their homeland by opening a new theater of war, were not achieved. The protracted war in Scandinavia and the consequent drain on German resources did not materialize. In divisional strength, only about five percent of the German Army was employed in Norway when Hitler attacked in the west. The conquest of Denmark was so quick that the combat forces employed there were available for use in the west by May.
   British desires to get the Germans involved in an operation in Scandinavia were achieved but the quick victories that had been envisioned were unrealized. The German source of iron ore from Sweden was in fact secured. Sweden came under the sway of Berlin and the supply route through the Baltic was safer than before the operation.
   Churchill did get Germany to react to earlier violations of Norwegian neutrality and the possibility that the Allies intended to establish themselves in Norway. However, rather than a reaction to the Allied mining, it was a full-fledged preemptive invasion that had been in planning for three months. The hope that quick victories could be achieved by enticing the Germans into an area where they would confront enormous British naval superiority was not realized. While the German Navy sustained heavy losses, the hoped for easy victories turned into a humiliating defeat.
   For Norway, its policy of neutrality backed by inadequate military resources brought disaster to the country and increased suffering to its people during a five-year occupation. It is doubtful if Hitler would have undertaken the invasion if Norway had possessed a military establishment on the scale and quality, which wiser political and military leaders had provided for in World War I.

   Throughout the book Lunde sprinkles his text with nuggets from authors such as Derry, Kersaudy, Moulton, Ziemke, and Adams, and he often refutes their conclusions. Notably, no one who reads Lunde is likely to look at Derry's official history volume in quite the same light again. Surprisingly, the author seems to have made no use of Fledgling Eagles by Christopher Shores, the most important English-language source on air ops during the Norwegian campaign. Perhaps because of that omission, aerial warfare is the aspect of the battle least covered here.
   Technically, a few nagging imperfections mar the book, mostly related to typesetting and copyediting. Furthermore, the quality of the maps doesn't measure up to the text. The only real disappointment, however, relates to the author's decision to focus his tactical account mostly on the engagements in the far north, especially around Narvik. That was clearly the most important—and most interesting—part of the campaign, but it's a shame Lunde chose not to deal with all the other actions in Norway in 1940 with quite the same level of detail. It also would have been nice to learn about German movements into northernmost Norway—and occupation of settlements there—following the Allied withdrawal and cease fire.
   In terms of what he accomplishes with his book, the author deserves a great deal of credit. Among his achievements, he reveals the magnitude and importance of Norwegian operations. To do so, he utilizes Norwegian sources rarely used in English-language works, he compares and contrasts many accounts from various nations and languages, he offers his own thoughtful analysis and conclusions, he thoroughly footnotes his pages, and he provides a solid bibliography. Hitler's Pre-Emptive War is an informative and engrossing account of the campaign in Norway, a detailed chronicle of the air-land-sea battle around Narvik in particular, an eye-opener regarding the Norwegian military contribution, a terrific debut for Lunde, and quite possibly one of the top new books of the year.
   Very highly recommended.
   Thanks to Casemate Publishing for providing this review copy.
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