ISBN 1-86227-236-0
x + 294 pages

Preface; maps; photos; chapter notes; Epilogue; Bibliography; Index

Appendices: Ten Commandments of the Parachutist; British and German OB for Crete

Note: The dustjacket shows a different subtitle: Britain's Involvement in Greece and Crete, 1940-41

   The campaign in the Balkans during 1940-1941 easily divides into four main topics: the Italo-Greek campaign, the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia, the German invasion of Greece, and the German landing on Crete. English-language sources on the first two campaigns are relatively scarce, more abundant on the third topic, and quite numerous on the final one.
   The German invasion of Greece has to date been covered in English mostly from separate national perspectives. For example, Blau deals with German operations and Papagos and the Hellenic Army deal with Greek operations while Playfair, McClymont, and Long respectively handle British, New Zealand, and Australian operations.
   The invasion of Crete has been the subject of a large number of accounts, most of a fairly integrated nature. For example, in addition to the British, Australian, and Kiwi histories, readers can turn to Beevor, MacDonald, and Stewart for strong, detailed works.
   So which phase of the Balkan campaign does Willingham emphasize in Perilous Commitments? Crete, which has least need for that attention. Concerning the Italo-Greek campaign and the invasion of Yugoslavia—which are both severely under-examined in the English-language literature of World War II—and the German invasion of Greece—which could use a solid, fully integrated account of air-land-sea operations from all national perspectives—Willingham has far less to say.
   In that sense, Perilous Commitments will be a disappointment to anyone who has been following the historiography of the Balkans campaign. On the other hand, taken entirely on its own merits, we hoped Willingham's book could be a reasonably attractive primer and might give some indication that the author would be able to move on to larger and more ambitious projects. Unfortunately, the book proves very derivative and littered with errors, puzzlements, and failures.
   That verdict gives us no pleasure. Indeed, we seldom publish unfavorable reviews, simply because we don't want to waste time reading and reviewing shoddy work when we receive so many good books, so we usually filter out the weak ones and don't bother to read them or write about them. However, this one initially fooled us. The topic is interesting, we haven't reviewed any books on the Balkans recently, and skimming through random pages seemed to reveal a reasonably well-written account of the campaigns. Despite approaching the book with an open mind and a favorable disposition, after committing to read it thoroughly from front to back it became increasingly apparent we'd be unable to produce a glowing recommendation. Here's what we found.
   The book opens with a chapter dealing with the diplomatic and political background to the Italian invasion of Greece, starting with pre-war British policy and guarantees to various continental nations as well as pointing out in particular that Hitler originally acquiesced to Mussolini's invasion, only complaining of Italian "criminal folly" when operations on the ground began to bog down. In Chapter Two, which begins with Willingham mistakenly identifying Grazzi, the ambassador to Greece, as the Italian foreign minister, the author condenses the Italo-Greek war from the end of October 1940 through March 1941 into twenty pages with little concrete information about unit IDs and battles. Most of the material on combat operations comes directly from Mario Cervi, and neither chapter notes nor bibliography give any indication that the relevant Italian or Greek official history volumes have been consulted. The chapter includes one sketch map which lacks unit deployments and most of the locales mentioned in the text.
   Chapter Three and Chapter Four turn from military action on the Albanian front to political and diplomatic developments in Rome, Berlin, London, Athens, and the Balkans during the winter. This material, focusing on Churchill's insistence on honoring the British commitment to Greece and Hitler's decision to strike in the Balkans, seems more suited to Willingham's skills than explaining military operations, but brings no great surprises or revelations.
   Chapter Five begins with Yugoslavia signing the Tripartite Pact and the coup d'etat in Belgrade. Little more than a week later, German forces invaded Yugoslavia and Greece. Once again, Willingham unfortunately shows little ability to deliver the goods when it comes to describing combat operations. Here he offers only generalities, writing of "...elaborate defenses such as tank traps...." in northern Yugoslavia, German forces "held up for some days" at Kacanik Pass, and "...Dalmatia, where German planes were diverted to blast Serb troop concentrations." The entire invasion of Yugoslavia, decidedly not the focus of the book, is shoehorned into two pages containing not one word about participation of the Italian Second Army.
   The author quickly moves to the bombing of Clan Fraser ("weighed down with munitions") at Piraeus (referred to as an island) and the German invasion of Greece. Regarding British deployments in Greece, Willingham remarks "...the New Zealand Division had to cover an impossible area of 23,000 square yards." Regrettably, he continues to demonstrate that he's not much of a military writer as he covers the German advance and the British retreat. He consistently writes in generalities, neglects to identify combat units, includes insufficient chapter notes, and fails to utilize key sources.
   The next chapter covers the British evacuation:

   In the evacuation a total of twenty-six vessels were sunk, including two hospital ships. One of the worst incidents occurred when the ferry Hellas was hit, killing virtually all of the civilians and wounded Greek soldiers below deck who were burnt to death. The Luftwaffe pilots seemed detached from the horror and savagery of their attacks. One pilot wrote of the destruction of the Hellas, that the passenger liner at anchor was a 'fascinating sight' and offered a 'unique target'. After the bombs had hit, the pilot recalled feeling 'relief after maximum tension, pride that a junior crew had been successful'.
   Captain Michael Forrester left Greece from Monemvasia in a sailing boat full of civilians and soldiers. As a Messerschmitt approached to strafe them, Forrester's quick thinking saved those on board. He moved all the soldiers below deck and asked the women to sit at the front of the boat and wave. The German aircraft swooped over the masthead, taking a close look, before turning back for a second run. The women continued to wave as hard as they could, as the plane approached for a second time. Seemingly satisfied, the pilot waved back and set off for other prey.
   For many troops the evacuation voyage from Greece was more harrowing than the battle itself. Planes appeared overhead, flipped over on their side, and then dropped vertically, nose first, screaming towards their target. The deafening crackle of rifle fire added to the din as troops on the deck took pot shots at the offending aircraft. Each near miss would send a huge column of seawater spiralling into the air, the whole vessel reverberated with a metallic clang as the shock-wave hit the side, and seaweed and other debris littered the deck. Some of the crew, who were determined to make the most of their situation, put nets over the side to catch fish floating on the surface that had been killed by the blast.

   Throughout the two chapters that cover the fighting in Greece and the evacuation, not once does Willingham cite Playfair, McClymont, or Long. Likewise, he ignores almost all the relevant unit histories. Similarly, at the end of his material on the fighting in Greece, the author devotes a couple of pages to the Italo-German combat on Cephalonia in 1943 and the massacre of Italian POWs—including exact figures on Italian officers killed—all without providing any references whatsoever.
   So ends the first section of the book. Instead of seizing the opportunity to delve deeply into the campaigns in the Balkans during this period, Willingham writes weak, error-prone pages that do little to enlighten readers about any aspect of the subject.
   The second section of the book begins with a few pages describing the background of German airborne forces and planning for the invasion of Crete. Willingham builds these paragraphs around commentary from books by Beevor, MacDonald, and Martin van Creveld. He then shifts focus to the Allies and the evolution of planning for defense of the island. Here he's able to add information about the impact of Ultra which was not available to some earlier authors. While this is one of the stronger portions of the book, the author spends much of his effort comparing and contrasting views of Freyberg's use of Ultra as offered by Beevor and the biography written by the Kiwi general's son. Interestingly, Willingham makes no mention of—and excludes from his bibliography—volume one of British Intelligence in the Second World War by F.H. Hinsley, Ultra and the Mediterranean Strategy by Ralph Bennett, and Intelligence in War by John Keegan, all of which have sections devoted to Crete, what Ultra sigint was delivered to Freyberg, and how it was used or misused. Nevertheless, parts of Chapter Seven provide the first indication that the author has done some of his homework for Perilous Commitments.
   After writing ten pages about the Allied forces on Crete—almost a social history of soldiers eating oranges and swimming in the sea while enjoying a vacation—Willingham uses Chapter Nine to describe the airborne landings and the first day of battle on the island.
   Here's an excerpt:

   The initial German attack focused on Maleme airfield and the Canea area. The glider-borne and parachute troops had suffered heavy losses at the hands of the defenders but they gained a foothold in two areas. There was a large concentration of paratroops in what became known as Prison Valley (due to the prominent white buildings of the Ayia jail). Substantial German forces had also landed in the undefended territory beyond the Tavronitis river, west of the airfield at Maleme. The common view was that if Freyberg had moved the desired troops beyond the Tavronitis, then the paratroops landed there would have suffered the same fate as the other detachments that landed directly on top of the defenders. At approximately 08:15 paratroops began dropping to the west, south and east of the Maleme airfield. Those paratroops who landed to the east and south of the airfield were heavily attacked. Paratroops were also landed near Hill 107; others came down near Maleme village on roof-tops and in narrow streets.
   At 10.55 Andrew sent Brigadier Hargest news that a total of 400 paratroops had landed in the area, 100 near the airfield with 150 to the east and 150 to the west. What Andrew did not know was that a total of 1,000 paratroops had landed unopposed on the pebbly bed of the Tavronitis river. A huge swirling cloud of dust had obscured Andrew's vision. lan Stewart likened the battle to the days of Wellington, when his foot-soldiers searched the slopes of Waterloo while French cavalry appeared and vanished in between the belches of cannon smoke which drifted across the battlefield.
   The first German troops on the ground were the 1st Battalion of the Assault Regiment's glider detachment. The elite Storm Regiment under General Eugen Meindl (Group West) was tasked with the capture of Maleme and had delegated three glider groups to lead the attack. Lieutenant von Plessen had 108 men with which to attack the west of the airfield at the Tavronitis river. One hundred and twenty men under Major Koch were to assault the slopes of Hill 107, and Major Braun led seventy- two men to seize the Tavronitis bridge. Captain Gericke landed with heavy weapons in the open ground west of the river, near the Tavronitis. Major Stenzler and the 2nd Battalion landed south of the airfield to act as a reserve force. The 3rd Battalion under Scherber landed beyond Maleme along the coastal road to attack from the east. It was intended that after Maleme was captured the entire force would join up with Centre Croup in Canea.

   The chapter goes on to mix personal recollections with the tactical flow of the battle. As usual, the author seems a trifle blase about sources and details. For example, he writes "Captain Witzig, a veteran of the landing on Eben-Emael, was shot through the lungs and lay in a ditch for three days before he was discovered." Although this was apparently Rudolf Witzig (commanding 9th Company of III/Sturm) who subsequently commanded a para-pioneer unit in Tunisia and went on to further adventures, Willingham offers no first name, no source for the information about his wound, no other mention of him in the book, and no entry for him in the index. (Callum MacDonald wrote a similar sentence: "Captain Witzig, the hero of Eben-Emael, whose company was to spearhead the attack, was shot through the lungs and lay in a bomb crater for three days before he was found.") Speaking of the first day's fighting, the author goes on to claim "One [German] battalion had all of their officers and two-thirds of their number killed." Again, he fails to identify the battalion and fails to cite a source. It's not so much that Willingham is incorrect. Rather, he mostly generalizes; when he's more specific he often fails to indicate his sources; and many of the anecdotes for which he provides citations nevertheless tend to sound like rumor, hearsay, and tall tales.
   Willingham's efforts to continue the story of the battle repeatedly seem a bit off kilter, fail to cite a source, or both.

   "According to some German reports, Hill 107 fell after fierce resistance in the morning. In reality the paratroops were fighting each other as they ventured up either side of the slope." What German reports? Where does that "reality" come from? The bibliography contains a shortage of German sources.

   "At Pirgos a German patrol encountered the New Zealand 23rd Battalion which left 200 Germans dead." Willingham never explains how a German "patrol" at this stage could have numbered 200 or more troops.

   "...the seaborne landing consisted of only nineteen caiques (long narrow rowing boats used in the eastern Mediterranean)...." Actually, the Greek caiques used by the Germans were not rowing boats at all, but motorized sailing vessels.

   "Having secured Maleme as a secure supply line of troops...."

   Although Willingham often fails to provide sources, sometimes it's possible to track them down. For example, regarding the withdrawal from Hill 107, Perilous Commitments states without attribution "The condition of each platoon varied greatly; some were running low on ammunition and had suffered heavy casualties, while others remained intact." Of the same situation, Beevor wrote "Conditions varied from one platoon to another. Some had suffered heavily and were short of ammunition, others remained virtually intact."
   Chapter Eleven contains ten pages about the naval battle in Cretan waters. Chapters Twelve and Thirteen return to ground combat and the British evacuation. While not flawless, these last two are probably the strongest chapters in the book, as though the author has finally hit his stride in the home stretch. Some of his words also sound familiar. Willingham writes without citing a source: "Most wandered off in search of food; a group of Australians slaughtered a donkey and began to roast it on a fire." Beevor wrote: "Most wandered off in search of food and water. A group of Australians killed a donkey, and began to roast hunks of meat on the fire."
   Willingham adds an Epilogue of around twenty-four pages. He offers a couple of sentences on the belated Italian landing on the eastern tip of Crete, but mostly covers treatment of POWs, escapes, occupation, partisans, the kidnapping of General Kreipe, and reprisals. The last part of the Epilogue is devoted to placing Crete into the larger strategic picture, assessing its impact on the war, and apportioning blame for the defeat. Of Freyberg the author writes "...apart from misreading the ULTRA signal regarding the seaborne invasion, the most serious errors of judgement were made by Freyberg's subordinates." He quotes participants who point the finger at Churchill for "putting us in this invidious situation" on Crete, but Churchill is quoted as saying "at no moment in the war was our intelligence more truly and more precisely informed" while Hinsley (co-author of the British official Intelligence volumes) claims the Ultra sigint contained all the information needed to win the battle. Paul Freyberg in turn insists that his father's freedom of action was fatally constrained by the need to avoid compromising the Ultra intelligence. "All speculation surrounding Ultra," Willingham concludes tamely, "is difficult to assess as the only men who knew the truth died before the security surrounding Ultra was lifted in 1974."
   Overall, Willingham's book proves surprisingly amateurish. He hasn't yet developed the skills for writing coherently about military operations in a style allowing readers to easily follow the action. He's better at piecing together personal snippets from veterans, but those anecdotes occasionally turn into jumbles of unlikely events. He further runs into difficulties when attempting to reconcile the scope of his book, trying to include technical niceties of the British guarantee to Poland in 1939 along with portraits of the slow, bloody deaths of individual soldiers in the dirt on Crete. Given his limitations as a writer, Willingham might have produced a better book by focusing on just the personal stories of men in battle instead of endeavoring to integrate diplomatic, strategic, and tactical material with personal anecdotes. That's especially true due to his difficulties utilizing and citing relevant sources.
   In addition, the book seems oddly put together. Given the relatively high level of detail he writes about the smaller, briefer action on Crete, it's possible Willingham later prepended the much sketchier section on Greece simply to expand his work to book length. In any event, the finished product delivers a distinctly unbalanced feel.
   Despite all those problems, this isn't a terrible book, and Willingham offers a few interesting angles. Newbies approaching the campaign in Greece and Crete for the first time will probably enjoy reading about man-to-man infantry combat—Willingham describes plenty of body parts being blown off—and should come away with a basic idea of what happened in the Balkans from the end of 1940 through May 1941. Anyone who reads Perilous Commitments carefully, however, will note many flaws, and the accumulation of minor inaccuracies makes it impossible to completely trust Willingham on larger issues. Had we known about all those flaws beforehand, we wouldn't have expended so much time reading the book and penning this unflattering review.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Spellmount or its US distributor Casemate.
   Thanks to Casemate for providing this review copy.