ISBN 0-9761034-0-0
400 pages

Foreword; Acknowledgements; Introduction; photos; color profiles; map; Symbols; Glossaries; Sources and Bibliography; Index

Appendices: Wilde Sau Training Program; Loss Lists; Victory Lists

   The JG 300 history from Lorant and Goyat, translated from the original French, is certainly one of the most earnest and meticulous volumes to arrive here recently. While those traits don't always automatically correspond to topnotch quality, in this case the authors have also produced one of the most impressive air unit histories we've seen in a very long time.
   As with most Luftwaffe units, few of JG 300's written records survived the war. Fortunately, Lorant first began meeting with the unit's veterans in 1977 and was able to begin assembling information before the passing of more years had taken its inevitable toll. For at least twenty years Lorant interviewed veterans, gathered letters and tapes, borrowed logbooks and personal photos, combed through fragments in the Bundesarchiv, and compared German sources with Allied records.

   This work cannot hope to claim to be the whole story, based as it is on written records, logbooks, personal diaries, old correspondence, loss and victory reports and on oral testimonies related forty to fifty years after the event. Our memories are fallible and tend to become forgetful and selective with the passage of time, which is why I have endeavored to check my sources rigorously. Unfortunately I have been obliged to disregard doubtful accounts contradicted by written sources or other primary documentation. This approach has likewise revealed that there are some glaring errors in the official archives! Certain aspects of the operations carried out by the Geschwader will remain forever obscure. The extensive use of footnotes serves the dual aim of facilitating the reading of the text and demonstrating to the reader just how complex a historically objective analysis is.

   To begin with, the authors in a three-page Introduction review the Luftwaffe's aerial victory confirmation process. That leads to a discussion about the reasons why it's impossible to completely reconcile Luftwaffe victory claims with Allied loss records, and why the authors base their figures on Allied archival records. The first chapter then looks at the early stages of Bomber Command's campaign in western Europe, the Kammhuber Line, and the efforts by Major Hajo Herrmann to introduce single-engine fighters into the battle against RAF bombers in the night sky above Germany. The difficulty preventing the 109s and 190s from intercepting attackers involved anti-aircraft fire. Unless such fire was restricted, it would chew up the night fighters as well as the bombers, but the Luftwaffe remained unwilling to restrain its flak batteries in favor of the unproven tactics of a handful of single-engine aircraft.
   In April 1943 Herrmann began setting up the experimental Nachtjagdversuchskommando to test his concepts for cooperating with flak against bombers at night. The authors track various test flights in May and June.

   During the night of 11/12 June 1943, four Focke-Wulf 190s took off from Monchen-Gladbach and attempted individually to intercept British bombers approaching Dusseldorf. The Royal Air Force had dispatched 783 bombers to this target and an additional 72 aircraft raided Muenster. It is likely that the attack carried out by Ofw. Heinz Lonnecker in his Fw 190 A-5 went unnoticed amidst the usual twin-engine night fighter interceptions, but was no less effective. At 00:20, Lonnecker claimed the destruction of a Lancaster that went down in flames over Dusseldorf, and followed this at 00:34 by shooting down a British twin-engine aircraft north-west of the city. He was met and congratulated at the dispersal by Hauptmann Friedrich-Karl Mueller. He was later, in his combat report, to reaffirm the soundness of Major Hajo Herrmann's night fighting concept. Orbiting a city ablaze with fires which served as beacons, a fighter could easily pinpoint and shoot down an enemy bomber without recourse to any electronic aids whatsoever. The only instrument that might have needed any refinement was the pilot's night vision!

   As a result of Allied bombing successes and internal Luftwaffe politics more than any firm proof of Herrmann's theories, by July the Nachtjagdversuchskommando had transformed into Jagdgeschwader Herrmann (later more formally designated JG 300) with three Gruppen each of three Staffeln. Flying independently and without radar guidance, these were the first Wilde Sau (wild boar) fighters. Herrmann's pilots took off without necessarily knowing where they were going, headed toward cities under attack, sought targets visually, and stayed in the air as long as possible to attack the bombers. If a fighter ran out of fuel or could not find an airfield for landing, the pilot was simply ordered to bale out—this under the expectation that trading a single-engine fighter for a four-engine bomber was an equation favoring the Luftwaffe. Crews of twin-engine fighters equipped with specialized radar and navigation aids for night fighting often joked that JG 300 pilots had more parachute jumps than air-to-air victories. In any event, from this point Lorant and Goyat provide a virtually day-by-day record of the unit and its operations. This proves to be a non-stop succession of scrambles, intercepts, shoot-downs, and adventurous night flying.
   The authors provide the bulk of the text in their own words, but they also include quite a few quotes (sometimes amounting to a stretch of several pages) from veterans of the unit, groundcrew as well as pilots. The pages are fully illustrated (but not overwhelmed) by photos which contribute to the material rather than simply diverting the reader's attention. The photos are also fully captioned. In addition, the authors take pains to footnote their text with further information about unusual, obscure, or controversial matters. While most of the material revolves around individual fighter sorties—sometimes successful, sometimes not, sometimes with the pilot returning safely, sometimes not—the authors also devote some space to related matters such as the progress of the air war as a whole, evolution of electronic measures and counter-measures, restructuring of the Geschwader, comings and goings of pilots, training incidents, and to a lesser extent the lives of the airmen of the ground (including a late-night graffiti expedition in Bad Worishofen). As expected in a unit history, besides sticking strictly to a single Geschwader, Lorant and Goyat focus much more on individual aircraft and pilots than, for example, Peter Hinchliffe in The Other Battle which contains plenty of night fighter action but devotes more attention to larger issues of strategy and technology, such as the evolution from "wild boar" to "tame boar."
   Here's a fairly typical account of one night's action as charted in Jagdgeschwader 300:

   JG 300 was again ordered up during the night of 22/23 March 1944. At Rheine and Wiesbaden, 13 Fw 190s and six Bf 109s took off from 21:26. Ten minutes later, the order to take off was transmitted to Bonn-Hangelar, from where 16 Bf 109s lifted off. It appeared that the target of the English was Braunschweig. Lt. Kurt Gabler, who had taken off from Wiesbaden at 21:33, never forgot this sortie:

   I was flying "Black 10", a 109 G-6 armed with three 20 mm cannon. There were only six pilots flying in our group that night. The sector controller vectored us over Braunschweig. After ten minutes fight time, I decided to take a look at the Wiesbaden region from a height of about 3,000 meters. I made a 90° turn. It was then that I saw "Christmas trees" falling on Frankfurt. A particularly violent bombardment had already started. Such a sight made me furious! Why had we been sent to Braunschweig? Straight away I turned back and climbed away in the direction of the fires. At 6,000 meters, a bomber flew right in front of me, totally oblivious to the danger that I represented. I had just to fly it into the center of my sight and unleash a torrent of fire from my cannon and machine guns. At 21:57, the bomber caught fire and went down strewing flaming debris in its wake. It all happened so quickly! I landed at Mainz-Finthen at 22:15, as there was no fuel flowing from my incorrectly attached auxiliary tank.

   Flying at a height of 7,000 meters, Fw. Franz Knoll came too close to a bomber. The powerful eddies churned up by the propellers caused him to lose control of his Messerschmitt. When he finally succeeded in righting the aircraft, his altimeter was indicating a height of barely 2/000 meters
   In the air from Wiesbaden at 21:30, Lt. Willi Trabert reached Frankfurt as bombs were falling on the city. He was unable to discern the slightest trace of enemy bombers. He landed at Mainz-Finthen at 23:15, suitably chastened.
   Flying a 9. Staffel Messerschmitt, Fw. Wilhelm Stillger shot down two Lancasters over Frankfurt. Stillger's nerves had been sorely tested during this sortie. Having entered the circuit over the airfield at Wiesbaden, he orbited for some ten minutes, coming under fire from a twin-engine Messerschmitt 110, having inadvertently left his navigation lights on. He finally put his undamaged 109 down at 23:06 and promptly forgot to lower his undercarriage. The pilot, with a slight wound to his face, climbed out of an aircraft with 40% damage.
   At 22:40, Lt. Helmut Ortelbach (II. Gruppe) fired on what he thought was a Lancaster to the north of Limburg. The bomber disappeared into the cloud deck at a height of 3,000 meters, port wing ablaze. Ortelbach was flying a Fw 190 A-7 equipped with Neptun radar and it was the performance of the Neptun that enabled him to locate his victim and shoot it down.
   With the three four-engine bombers shot down by Lt. Arnold Doring (III. Gruppe), Hptm. Gerd Stamp and Fw. Karl-Heinz Sarhage (I. Gruppe), JG 300 claimed seven victories during the night of 22/23 March 1944. Bomber Command struck off 35 four-engine bombers (27 Lancasters and eight Halifaxes). German fighters had damaged another ten aircraft, one of which was scrapped. No JG 300 pilots were reported missing the following morning.

   In May 1944, Hermann Goering ordered JG 300 to convert from its pioneering role of single-engine night fighters to become "assault fighters" by day against American bombers. By night, of course, JG 300's war had been strictly an affair of individual fighters versus single bombers, but now the Luftwaffe pilots would be tested against USAAF fighters. At this point the story shifts dramatically to coordinated daylight attacks on massed bomber formations and dogfights with aggressive American escorts.

   Fifteen III./JG 300 Messerschmitts had departed Juterbog nearly two hours prior to this attack, before forming up with thirteen II. /JG 5 fighters and two of the Stab/JG 4. This force of thirty Bf 109s was engaged at 11:35 by numerous Mustangs between Ludwigslust and Lake Muritz. At least seven Messerschmitts of III./JG 300 were shot down. Five pilots were able to escape unhurt. One pilot who took to his parachute was Uffz. Heinz Eiselt (8. Staffel). Gfr. Wilhelm Dungen (7. Staffel) crashed in his "White 12" at Malchow/ between the Plauer See and Lake Muritz. His Schwarm comrade, Fw. Wolfgang Duhne, crashed at Haar/Dorchau. On the credit side, Lt. Knorle of 10. Staffel managed to shot down [sic] a P-51, which went down 7 km south-east of Parchim.
   Shortly before 12:00, Uffz. Hansotto Nehls (8. Staffel) set a B-17 on fire near Luneburg. A few seconds later he realized his engine was running harshly. The American gunners [sic] aim was true. With its engine faltering the Messerschmitt went down in a dive. Slightly wounded, Nehls misjudged the trajectory of his 109, which had now become a glider. He came down on a field dotted with bales of hay. The Messerschmitt mowed down several of these before coming to rest. As the aircraft started to burn, Nehls scrambled quickly out. He had only got a few meters clear when the ammunition magazines exploded. Evidently farm workers and curious spectators drawn to the scene took him for an enemy airman. Nehls drew his pistol to protect himself, before managing to identify himself. He was able to telephone his Gruppe. His wounds were not serious and did not require hospital treatment.
   From high altitude down to ground level, the Mustangs hunted down the last remaining Luftwaffe fighters in the sector where combat had taken place. Ofhr. Otto "Bubi" Kohler claimed the destruction of a P-51 D over Pritzwalk at 12:28. The young 9. Staffel pilot had to put down at Juterbog-Waldlager with his gear up. His Bf 109 G-6/AS "Yellow 5" was 15% destroyed.
   III./JG 300 flew two more sorties during the afternoon. At 13:35, a single Messerschmitt 109 took off from Juterbog to try and head off the last 8th Air Force aircraft still in German airspace. At 15:47, two Bf 109 G-6/AS were launched in pursuit of a Lightning flying over the Schwerin sector at 8,500 to 9,000 meters altitude. All three 109s returned, having failed to make contact with the enemy.
   The heavy losses of 6 August were exacerbated by the accident that befell a young 6. Staffel pilot. Uffz. Werner Biesenbach had taken off from Bayreuth in order to ferry a Fw 190 A-8 to Holzkirchen. The aircraft crashed just seconds after lifting off. Biesenbach was taken to a hospital.
   During the course of the next two days, the only operation mounted by American heavy bombers over the territory of the Reich was carried out by the 15th Air Force. None of the three Gruppen of JG 300 were ordered up to counter this particular raid directed against petroleum industry targets in Upper Silesia. Although no combat sorties were flown against American bombers, fighter aircraft on strength with JG 300 were nonetheless airborne.
   On 7 August 1944, a particularly senseless drama cast a shadow over the day at Bad Worishofen. The parents of Gfr. Gunter Kruger (1. Staffel) arrived on a visit. During the afternoon, he volunteered for a radio check flight (Y-Flug) in the environs of the airfield. In front of Kruger's on-looking parents, the aircraft flew some low level maneuvers... and smashed straight into a barn. Engine failure or dare-devil flying at too low a speed? The precise reason for the accident was never determined. Gunter Kruger lost his life in the crash of his "White 16".

   Despite their willingness to press home attacks against bombers again and again, tangling with the four-engine aircraft and their numerous fighter escorts by day meant that the Geschwader suffered increasingly heavy losses. The battle of attrition continued throughout the summer of 1944, with Lorant and Goyat seemingly tracking every sortie, every dogfight, every accident, every victory, and every loss. The authors continue the history through September 1944, at which point they pause, with the remainder of the tale of JG 300 to come in volume two.
   The final seventy pages of volume one contain further information: more color profiles; seven pages of remarks about the training of Wilde Sau pilots; approximately twenty pages of dense, tabular data listing personnel and aircraft losses of JG 300 from 22 April 1943 through 16 September 1944 with date, name, unit, fate, aircraft, and cause/location of loss/damage; an equally extensive list of victories claimed by JG 300 for the period with date, time, location, name of pilot, unit, type, and remarks; Staffel colors and Gruppe symbols; glossaries; bibliography; and index.
   Some excellent histories of Luftwaffe units have already been published in English. For example, Jochen Prien's three-volume history of JG 53 comes readily to mind. Even measured against such sterling work, based on this initial volume it looks like Lorant and Goyat's history of JG 300 will become a benchmark of quality for air unit histories for the forseeable future. Absolutely recommended for anyone with any interest whatsoever in the Luftwaffe.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Eagle Editions.
   Thanks to Eagle for providing this review copy.