ISBN 1-874622-72-8
79 pages

Preface; Foreword; photos; maps; List of Abbreviations

Appendices: Distribution of Principal Dutch Forces; Order to II Battalion of the 65th German Infantry Regiment; Radio Speech of the Commander-in-Chief; Order of the Day of the Dutch Commander-in-Chief

   Originally published as Military Operations in the Netherlands from 10th-17th May, 1940 in 1944, the reprint of P.L.G. Doorman's slender book has been a long time coming. The contents are unchanged, but the title has been slightly revised to better reflect the subject matter of the book. The most complete account of that subject matter is almost certainly Louis de Jong's Het Koninkrijk de Nederlanden in de Tweede Wereldoorlog, vol 3: Mei '40, weighing in at almost 500 pages; however, the Dutch text will prove impenetrable to most English-speaking readers and to the best of our knowledge has not been translated. Another highly regarded work covering the campaign in the Netherlands is The Battle for The Hague, 1940 by E.H. Brongers, but it deals only with airborne operations around The Hague. In terms of the broader operations in the Netherlands in 1940, even at only 79 pages the Doorman book offers the most thorough description of any English-language work of which we're aware, despite excluding air and naval action.
   Doorman devotes an entire chapter to "The Forces at the Disposal of the Kingdom" which, in conjunction with the first appendix, provides a good order of battle for Dutch ground forces. While it doesn't delve into detailed TOE information, this material allows for reconstructing the army and its dispositions in May 1940. Doorman also includes a few sentences about Dutch air forces, but they're quite limited and neglect even to specify with what aircraft the squadrons were equipped. Dispositions of Dutch ground forces are further displayed on a map that turns out to be the only disappointment of the book. Where the map in the original edition folded out to about 11" x 14", the new edition reduces the same map to about 4.5" x 6", making it very difficult to read without a magnifying glass.
   The next chapter surveys in three pages "The Geographical Character of the Netherlands from the Military Standpoint." Here Doorman dispels any notion that the nation is universally flat and bare. He describes the various features, explains the potential lines of defense considered by the Dutch, and points out some important facts in particular about the drawbacks of using various waterways for defensive lines due—for example—to the ground being higher on the eastern bank than on the western bank, and the dikes canalizing the flow which if broken could easily cause flooding of the low-lying defensive positions along the rivers.
   "The Netherlands Plan of Operations" goes even further with information about how the Dutch attempted to reconcile their limited military strength with various political imperatives as well as the advantages and disadvantages of the terrain comprising the potential defensive lines. This was made even more difficult by the strict neutrality of the Netherlands which meant there could be no pre-invasion consultation with neighbors or potential allies. Determining how to tie the southern flank of the defense of the Netherlands into the northern flank of the defense of Belgium could be done only by conjecture. Doorman extends this discussion in chapter five, "Considerations in Relation to the Netherlands Plan of Operations," in which he responds to criticism (real or imagined) that the Dutch failed to deploy a sufficient portion of their army in the decisive sectors of the German invasion. Among other issues, he explains that it was found necessary to heavily defend South Limburg (the "Maastricht appendix") because "...it would have been inadmissible to leave this part of the country undefended and open for a German advance against the Belgian system of defense."
   Interestingly, Doorman remarks that on 7 May 1940 all military leaves were cancelled "...and at the same time the order was given that all frontier and coast troops were to occupy their fighting positions in full strength." Because this is strictly a military history, the author doesn't provide any further information about what prompted this step, but apparently it was a result of the secret contacts between Colonel Oster of the Abwehr and the Dutch military attache in Berlin, Major Sas.
   In any event, with chapter eight Doorman begins a day-by-day exposition of the operations of the Dutch Army in the face of the overwhelming German invasion. This amounts to about thirty-five pages for five days of action. Here's a typical example from part of the fighting on 11 May:

   After a night march during the night of the 10th-11th May, the troops occupying the Raam-Peel position, reinforced by some units, which had remained intact, of the troops which originally held the Meuse, reached the Zuid Willemsvaart on the early morning of the 11th May, and occupied the west bank of this canal.
   The retreat took place without interference by the enemy, who, probably misled by the screening force left behind in the position till 4 am, did not discover until the morning of the 11th May that the Raam-Peel position had been abandoned by the Dutch troops.
   In order to cover the retreat the First Battalion of the Forty-First Brigade of Infantry had also taken up a position on the eastern border of Helmond.
   Notwithstanding the fact that the troops had been in actual operations uninterruptedly for nearly thirty-six hours, they immediately set to work to put the west bank into a state of defence, and proceeded to destroy the bridges over the canal.
   As was already pointed out when dealing with Dutch geography from the military point of view, the Zuid Willemsvaart is unfavourable as a position. Not only do the dykes restrict the field of fire extremely and make it necessary to arrange the guns in a straight line, without depth, but in addition to this there are extensive built-up areas on the east bank.
   A strength of about twelve battalions was still available to hold this position. Here, just as in the Raam-Peel position, anti-aircraft defence and anti-tank defence were entirely lacking, and again, as regards artillery, only a few batteries of 8 cm (steel) were available. If, in addition, it is taken into consideration that the length of the section to be defended was about 70 km, no great hopes could be entertained as regards the length of time the resistance might last.
   On the morning of the 11th May the Germans drew near chiefly along the axes:

   Grave-'s Hertogenbosch;
   Mill-Uden-Vechel;
   Venlo-Helden-Meyel-Asten; and
   Roermond-Weert.

   At 11 am German patrols appeared on the east bank.
   Little by little the pressure increased, especially in that part of the position which lay between Someren and Stiphout.
   The Dutch troops tried to prevent passage of the canal with all the weapons at their disposal. Several armoured cars were disabled by the 6 cm light artillery.
   The attackers, taking advantage of the very much greater strength of artillery which they possessed, the fire of which they directed particularly to those parts of the canal where there were conglomerations of tall buildings, were able shortly after noon to reach the west bank at several points, among others at Someren and south of Vechel, whereupon they began to roll up the Dutch position.
   In these circumstances a retreat was again ordered, with a view to falling back successively on the lines formed by the Dommel and the Wilhelmina Canal. Meantime, conditions had become very unfavourable for the Dutch forces fighting here.
   The supply trains of several sections of the forces had fallen into German hands. Other units, which reached the Zuid Willemsvaart at the moment when the bridges over this canal had already been blown up, had thrown their vehicles into the canal in order to prevent them falling into the hands of the enemy. Finally, columns of vehicles belonging to the various units had been broken up by the persistent German air attacks.
   When it was found in the course of the retreat that the bridges over the Wilhelmina Canal had already been blown up, while in addition there was no longer any sense in taking up a position behind this canal, because the Germans — having crossed the Zuid Willemsvaart near Vechel — were already in the rear of the proposed new position, the orders were altered, and the line Tilburg-Breda-Roosendaal was laid down as the general line of retreat.
   The main roads were exposed to continuous attacks by German aircraft, and were littered with burned and destroyed vehicles. The troops in question, therefore, endeavoured as best they could to reach the western part of North Brabant by moving in small numbers along the inner roads.
   Motorized parts of the seventh French Army, which had reached the line Tilburg-Best in the course of the afternoon, also fell back to the west on Breda.
   In this way, on the evening of the 11th May, the way to Zeeland and the south front of the Holland Fortress lay practically open to the attacker.

   No matter which defensive line they chose as their main line of resistance, no matter how wisely they deployed their battalions, and no matter how bravely they fought to defend their kingdom, the Dutch were doomed by the simple equation of overwhelming German force applied to a small, old-fashioned army. After charting every clash, movement, and attempt to halt the enemy advance, Doorman explains the decision to lay down arms. Even this proves not quite as straightforward as some might think. Prior to announcing that Dutch forces under his command would cease operations, General Winkelman transferred some units to the Commander of Naval Forces, ensured that naval vessels would depart immediately for the UK where they could continue the struggle, and made it clear that Dutch ground units in Zeeland—where they were still in contact with Allied forces and continued to hold part of the main front—were not under his command and therefore not included in the ceasefire order. Chapter twelve covers the story of the defense of Zeeland, including the arrival of French units on 11 May and the final Dutch withdrawal; elements of the Dutch force in Zeeland retreated to Belgium and France and eventually evacuated to England where they formed the nucleus of the Princess Irene Brigade which returned to the continent as part of the Allied Expeditionary Force in 1944.
   The final chapter reviews some of the salient points of the five day campaign and highlights what the Dutch forces achieved. While it's true that the Germans rolled over the Netherlands rapidly, Doorman reminds readers that given the disparity of forces the Dutch have nothing to be ashamed of. Among other successes, the defense of South Limburg delayed the German attack into the flank of Belgian positions. Elsewhere the Dutch likewise deployed forces in a manner that sacrificed their own security in order to help protect the Belgian flank, otherwise the results there could easily have been even worse. Without a hint of rancor, Doorman also points out that although relatively strong French forces arrived in the Netherlands on 11 May, they also proved unable to stand up to the German assault. "If these [French] troops had succeeded in arresting the German advance on the line Turnhout-Tilburg or Turnhout-Breda...the campaign in Holland would have taken an entirely different course."
   Most English-language accounts of the German invasion of the west in 1940 barely mention the struggle in the Netherlands, and the meager paragraphs on the subject are generally devoted to the bombing of Rotterdam. Here that bombing is mentioned only in passing, and only as it relates to the overall military situation and Winkelman's final decision to surrender.
   Given publication of the original edition of this book during the war years, readers might expect the author to adopt a tone both highly critical of the Germans at every mention and highly laudatory of every Dutch success no matter how minor. Not the case. Doorman writes in a very balanced and responsible manner, pointing out Dutch shortcomings when necessary and treating the whole affair in quite a detached fashion, without, for example, exploiting the bombing of Rotterdam for anti-German purposes. While it's true the author wrote without the benefit of Dutch or German records, he seems to have done a sound job of assembling an accurate, blow-by-blow account that's both interesting and entirely matter of fact. Despite its wartime publication, this is not by any means a simple-minded propaganda tract.
   Recommended, and an inspired choice by Helion. It's also a pleasant surprise to have a second good book about the Dutch in 1940 arrive so soon after reviewing The Battle for The Hague, 1940 by Brongers. Now how about an English translation of De Jong's volume about May 1940?
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Helion and its US distributor, Casemate.
   Thanks to Casemate for providing this review copy.