ISBN 1-59114-479-5
x + 348 pages

Preface; Acknowledgments; photos; maps; Works Consulted; Index; About the Author

Appendices: US 5th Air Force Wewak Strike Force; Organization of Japanese 4th Air Army; Identified JAAF Losses; Chronological Arrangement of Identified JAAF Fighter Losses; JAAF Aircraft Numbers

   Australian author Lex McAulay has already written two similar books about air operations over New Guinea and the Bismarcks, Into the Dragon's Jaws and The Battle of the Bismarck Sea. The new volume continues the story as Allied air forces pound Japanese bases and push to the west along the coast of New Guinea.
   McAulay opens with "Preliminaries" in which he describes the general situation, introduces the main characters, and lays out the topics he'll be covering. The author displays little reluctance when it comes to expressing strong opinions. For example, here's what he has to say about Douglas MacArthur:

   Destruction of those B-17s altered the strategic equation in the western Pacific. Much of the subsequent struggle in the South West Pacific, with all the pain and grief, the sacrifice, and the loss of life, health, and treasure, was caused by Douglas MacArthur's indecision and inability to perform on that morning. He later lied repeatedly and deliberately to those appointed to investigate the tragic events at Pearl Harbor about his foreknowledge of Japanese intentions, acquired through decoded radio messages.

   McAulay proves considerably more respectful of George C. Kenney, commander of the US 5th Air Force in the Southwest Pacific. When it comes to the opposing forces, the book repeatedly denigrates the abilities of Japanese aircraft designers, the Japanese high command, and Japanese support services and facilities in the field. On the other hand, McAulay is highly complimentary when it comes to American (and Australian) air forces, praising their training, resilience, aggressiveness, and constant willingness to solve problems with field expedients. Given the manner in which the opposing forces are described as polar opposites, it sometimes seems surprising that the Japanese continued to offer resistance for as long as they did.
   That Japanese resistance in this book mostly manifests itself as the ability to absorb blow after blow. Based on McAulay's pages, by this stage in the war the Japanese air forces seemed to do little more than attempt to defend their airbases without conducting much in the way of offensive missions. Meanwhile, Kenney's air units seemed to fly offensive mission after offensive mission. Indeed, in some ways the campaign unfolds like a game of solitaire in which the Allies simply endeavored to find the most effective means of destroying a passive enemy.
   For Kenney, the preferred method for destroying Japanese aircraft mostly involved clobbering airfields. The Japanese on multiple occasions played into Allied hands. Unaware that their fields were within range of the 5th Air Force, aircraft were often lined up densely along runways in highly vulnerable concentrations. Attacking forces repeatedly took advantage of inefficient early warning systems, insufficient AA defenses, and unready fighters.

   A few miles away, the Grim Reapers of the 3rd Attack were harvesting. Before reaching the Wewak area, Col. Don Hall took the Group down to the treetops, 8th Squadron leading and 13th Squadron one minute behind. On Hall's signal, the squadrons shook out into wider formation, with the elements almost abreast of the leader to avoid shrapnel from his bomb bursts, and spread out a little to allow the wing men to fishtail while strafing across the target area. Hall led the 8th and 13th Squadrons over Boram while the 90th hit Wewak itself. Eight B-25s had turned back, but twenty-seven arrived at the targets to find they achieved complete surprise, with Japanese aircraft massed, as the U.S. crews thought, ready for takeoff.
   At Wewak, running and yelling futilely, Captain Yamanaka reached the middle of the airfield amid Japanese aircraft with engines turning and crews working on them. When he looked around he saw B-25s coming over the treetops and flung himself to the ground.
   The Japanese airfields presented a strafer's dream: they were crowded with airplanes preparing to attack after the inspection; there were more aircraft present from the air base at Lae, and yet others there because Wewak was the end of the ferry route from Japan through the Philippines. Col. Koji Tanaka was one of the staff officers from Rabaul at Wewak as the attackers roared in. When interrogated post-war, he said many unserviceable planes had been collected at the Wewak airfields, and although the airfields were too small, with no room for dispersal, the Japanese believed they were out of Allied fighter range and that there would be no daylight attacks.
   To add icing to this cake presented to the U.S. crews, there was no Japanese fighter-cover over the strips and the antiaircraft defenses were not ready. Hollywood could not have produced a better film scene for the time: fueled and bombed Japanese planes being lined up by blissfully unaware line crews for inspection by equally unaware senior officers, all crowded into the open as the Americans roared over the trees toward them, and the frantic lone officer unable to warn anyone of the looming disaster. But it was fact, not fiction.
   Hall brought the 8th Squadron onto a westerly heading along the airstrip and they opened bomb bay doors. Bill Webster, on Hall's right, looked ahead after holding formation in the turn "and there was a whole line of Jap bombers parked wingtip to wingtip on the edge of the runway, with aircrew and ground crew nearby."

   In his many paragraphs for each mission, McAulay describes the swirling air combat and high-speed bomb runs in minute detail. He gives types and numbers of aircraft participating, times over each target, numbers and types of bombs dropped, amount and accuracy of flak, numbers of interceptors, effectiveness of the bomb runs, etc. Even with all that, most of his text is expended on the view from the cockpit as the attackers fly through AA fire and/or tangle with enemy fighters. In particular he describes fighter vs. fighter engagements and keeps track of scores for pilots.
   Here's an example of how McAulay writes:

   So confident were the Allied planners and commanders that the strike force simply repeated the mission of the previous day. Approach, bombing height, and timings were the same. Four B-24s turned back, but the other sixty-seven paraded up the Markham, Ramu, and Sepik valleys and sailed over Hollandia. This time, after Japanese watchers on the coast flashed the alert to Hollandia, a warning was broadcast and seventy minutes' notice was given. The Japanese were still clearing damage from the day before when another 140 tons of 100-pound demolition bombs rained down; another carpet of destruction rolled across the airfields.
   Still not recovered from the battering of their 28 March flight through the storm, the Morgan Terry crew in the Jolly Rogers Group flew this mission. Like the other crews, they were woken at 0345 hours, briefed, and took off on the eight-hour flight. They were carrying forty 100-pound demos and led an element of the 319th. In his rear turret, Dick Grills looked down at Hollandia as the bombs "really blew the hell out of it; biggest fires and most damage I have seen. A big bomb dump explosion was worst. AA not too bad; aircraft was hit. Fighters attacked after leaving the target; fired; missed." He also noted, after landing, "very tired."
   For many 90th Group veterans, the bombing that day was the best they had seen. Fires sprang up among the parked airplanes. Three B-24s were damaged by antiaircraft fire, as when Lt. Paul Bundick's B-24 took a shell or material from other aircraft through a bomb bay door—an incendiary from another B-24 damaged an engine cowling.
   Three hundred sixty bombs were dropped by ten 64th Squadron aircraft of the 43rd Group, and crews saw them all explode on the target. They also reported a diving P-38 with its left engine on fire and saw a Dinah fall into Humboldt Bay. This Japanese plane was shot down by Corky Smith of the 80th Headhunters. The second flight in the 65th Squadron formation was entirely RAAF, led by Squadron Leader (Major) O'Brien. The 65th dropped their frags and incendiary clusters, watched waves of explosions blossom below them, and saw three planes shot down by P-38s—one fell into the water about five miles offshore and two fell onto the land.
   The bomber crewmen had grandstand seats for the spectacle, and all squadrons reported watching explosions march through the parked aircraft. They used phrases such as 100-pound demos through the dispersal areas; three aircraft received direct hits; another fifteen burning; direct hits on three twin-engine planes; twelve aircraft in revetments burning; a large oil fire north of the strip; large fires, smoke to seven thousand feet; thirty aircraft in the bomb pattern, fifteen burning; good bombing; covered the south side of the wooded area where many planes were parked.
   Some of the bomb pattern roared across 68 Antiaircraft Battalion and killed thirty-two men and wounded thirty-three. Many other casualties were caused, and wounded began arriving at the hospitals. The doctor who quickly dug a bombshelter the day before watched the raid, saw the fighter interception, and then saw the airfield ablaze with gasoline fires. Of sixty fighters nearby he counted forty-two destroyed, and two of sixteen antiaircraft guns were also destroyed.
   Among the parked aircraft destroyed were the Tonys of 68 and 78 Sentai. As well as airplanes, the bombs destroyed most of the mechanical and maintenance equipment. It was the end for both Sentai. The 63 Sentai had only eight Oscars serviceable after this attack. At the air depot, twenty-two Oscars of 77 Sentai awaiting repair were all destroyed.
   Corporal "Fukuda," a twenty-three-year-old air-gunner in 208 Sentai, was impressed with the bombing "which destroyed everything except the campsites in the jungle. All our forty serviceable planes and another twenty under repair were smashed. I had a high regard for the B-24s, but was terrified of B-25s, and regarded highly the P-38, which was better than any Japanese fighter."
   The antiaircraft fire this time was a little more accurate and damaged two bombers, leaving minor holing in Red Raiders aircraft.
   More Japanese fighters were airborne, but fifty-two P-38 escorts engaged them. The U.S. pilots thought the Japanese seemed disorganized and dispirited, just as they had been the day before. About twenty-five Oscars were counted, scattered over the sky.
   The 80th Headhunters attacked. Jay Robbins climbed left onto an Oscar and fired—many flashes were seen on the engine, left wing, and cockpit; the Nakajima went down and crashed. Robbins had problems with his fuel system and had to leave the combat area. Louis Schriber and his wingman, Jesse Corallo, continued the chase after an Oscar that Robbins had to leave. Schriber shot it down and was in time to see another hit by Corallo impact the ground a few hundred yards from his own victory.
   Meanwhile, Ken Ladd flew through other flights ahead, brought his flight up to the fight, closed on the tail of an Oscar, and fired from such short range that Japanese oil sprayed back onto his windshield. Ladd saw the Oscar diving steeply near the water. After a few passes with another Japanese, Ladd also had to leave, conscious of the long return flight.
   Capt. Corky Smith brought the fifth flight in, dived on some Oscars, which evaded the attack, and then Smith saw a Dinah overhead, and climbed after it, The Japanese saw the P-38s and decided to run for it. The P-38 was just able to close on the twin-engine airplane, but then Smith found his illuminating bulb for the gunsight was burned out. Smith fired and corrected by watching his tracers, to bring the hail of shot onto the Dinah. Hits sparked on the left engine. Some Oscars intervened, and Corky had to turn to cope with them, but when he was able to swing back to the Dinah, it was plunging seaward trailing smoke and flames from the left side and was confirmed by the bomber crews.
   As the Headhunters left the target area, they could see one large column of smoke reaching to eight thousand feet and many smaller fires throughout the target area.

   As anyone even passingly familiar with aerial combat understands, claims made by fighters based on what they saw—or what they think they saw—in the heat of battle tend to be inflated, and over-claiming is simply a fact of life. One of the strengths of McAulay's book is a determined effort to match 5th Air Force claims with documented Japanese losses. The author has carefully sorted through original Japanese reports as well as Allied decrypts of intercepted enemy transmissions. Surprisingly—at least to those of us who don't know any better—the numbers in these primary sources are all over the map and display an amazingly limited degree of internal consistency. The Japanese officers on the scene didn't really know what was happening to their aircraft and pilots, and/or they simply did a terrible job of compiling numbers, and/or they were intentionally misleading their superiors, and/or the decrypts and translations are screwed up. In any event, while the documentary evidence shows a steady hemorrhage of Japanese strength, the confusing reports generally make it tough to gain more than a general confirmation of Allied success and usually impossible to corroborate exactly which opposing pilots were involved in precisely which victory or loss. Even so, these numbers go far to validate the overall efficacy of the air offensive. As McAulay indicates in one of his few nods to enemy abilities, the numbers also show that despite their huge losses the Japanese were feeding aircraft into the theater at a rapid pace and their replacement system functioned more efficiently than the lengthy American aircraft replacement pipeline.
   In addition to documents regarding Japanese strengths and losses, McAulay also brings to his book a large number of captured Japanese letters and diaries. He quotes freely from these papers, adding a great deal of immediacy and flavor to the predicament of those trying to survive under the bombs. He further utilizes some Japanese histories, but rates them as inaccurate, especially because of descriptions of large air battles which never really occurred.
   The author repeats this recipe of plane-by-plane descriptions, personal accounts, and number-crunching throughout the book as the 5th Air Force hammers the Japanese at Wewak and then Hollandia in a steady stream of bomber attacks, fighter escort, flak suppression, and air-to-air combat. Given this approach, it's fair to say that McAulay describes many, many trees, but the nature of the forest—or perhaps in this case the jungle—remains elusive. Putting it another way, the author devotes far more attention to the action over the target than he does to a wider view of the aerial campaign. When it comes to the broader air-land-sea situation, the overall balance of forces, strategic alternatives, the evolution of planning, etc, McAulay has far less to say. In line with that approach, the book features only a couple of poor maps, no OBs, no comprehensive listing of air units arriving or departing the theater, no tabular summaries of quantitative results, and little else designed to fit the daily missions into a larger perspective. Despite all that's new, useful, and interesting in McAulay's book, it's safe to say that it will probably prove more valuable if read in conjunction with a volume focusing on broader air-land-sea strategies and events in the theater. (See, for example, MacArthur's Airman by Thomas Griffith, Jr.)
   A series of five appendices, amounting to about seventy pages, comprise a significant proportion of the book. These appendices include:

• Two pages listing the US 5th Air Force squadrons participating in the attacks on Wewak in August 1943
• Two pages describing the organization of Japanese 4th Air Army in late July 1943
• Twelve pages compiled from a variety of Japanese sources listing on a unit-by-unit basis all Japanese pilots identified as lost in New Guinea from August 1943 to April 1944
• Twenty-four pages providing exactly the same information, but organized on a day-by-day basis
• Thirty-four pages showing on a daily basis the numbers of aircraft dispatched to units from depots at Manila

   As a very minor postscript, in one tangential area the author seems to be slightly off base. That is, on at least two occasions he compares 5th Air Force surprise attacks against unsuspecting rows of Japanese fighters on the ground to Luftwaffe surprise attacks against unsuspecting rows of Polish fighters on the ground at the beginning of the war. Scholars of air operations during the 1939 invasion of Poland actually seem to be in unanimous agreement that the Polish Air Force had already been hidden away prior to the German invasion, and the PAF suffered minimal losses on the ground to Luftwaffe attacks at that time.