Porch, Douglas. The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2004

ISBN 0-374-20518-3
xiv + 799 pages

Preface; Introduction; maps; photos; Notes; Selected Bibliography; Index

   Douglas Porch—who has also written several other big, solid books on other topics, including the French Foreign Legion—offers a big, solid book about the war in the Mediterranean from the Italian entry in 1940 through the surrender of German forces in northern Italy in 1945. Along the way, the author's excursions include all the main campaigns as well as lesser actions like the early rounds of the Greek Civil War, partisan operations in Yugoslavia, the invasion of the Vichy Levant, and the siege of Habbaniya.
   In every case, Porch holds the focus at the strategic level. While he sometimes describes operational and tactical aspects of specific battles, this is really a much broader, high-level view of the Mediterranean, mostly concerned with why certain campaigns were fought, how governments and high commands made their plans, and and how they marshalled their forces.

   Anglo-American leaders gathered in sumptuous requisitioned villas in Casablanca's upscale seaside suburb of Anfa in January 1943 to discuss the future. Roosevelt arrived via a circuitous route that had taken him through Miami, Trinidad, Brazil, and Gambia before his plane touched down in Casablanca. The bomber that brought Churchill had flown a more prosaic route straight from Britain. Casablanca teemed with Patton's soldiers. The air was fragrant with lemon and mimosa. But the future was clouded by the present. For American planners in particular, Torch had come to symbolize "the ad hoc, opportunistic nature of Allied planning in the Mediterranean," a "periphery pecking" strategy that selected targets because they were considered soft options rather than because they advanced Allied strategic goals. American historian Stephen Ambrose calls Torch "a strategic failure." Dispersed and unbalanced Allied forces had been landed too far west to guard against an imaginary German thrust through Spain and Gibraltar to North Africa. Patton in Morocco had monopolized armored forces that should have gone to Anderson's First Army. The Axis had rushed an army into Tunisia, prolonging a campaign that should have been concluded by Christmas. The invasion of Europe was postponed. Rommel, who should have been smothered in a defensive pocket at Tripoli, was alive, reinforced, and as dangerous as ever. The Darlan deal kept the "kettle" of French politics boiling, sowed dissension among the Allies, and rattled confidence in Eisenhower's political judgment and military leadership. Ike's future as Allied commander was thrown into doubt.
   Yet no obvious alternatives to Torch existed in 1942. Even the fiercest opponents of the Mediterranean strategy, like Marshall, were made aware that adversaries less divided and better equipped than the Vichy French would have turned the invasion into a bloodbath. An assault on Northwestern Europe would not be practical before the spring of 1944. Nor was Torch devoid of strategic gain for the Allies. It had outflanked Rommel in Egypt, thus guaranteeing his withdrawal and eventual retreat. It led to the resignation of Admiral Erich Raeder. A battleship admiral who had dreamed of resurrecting Germany's World War I high seas fleet, Raeder had been one of the few senior German commanders willing to plead the strategic value of the Mediterranean to Hitler. The loss of the French Mediterranean fleet had placed Raeder's dream beyond reach. Raeder's January 1943 replacement, Grand Admiral Karl Donitz, was a submariner, a guerre de course warrior whose primary trait was loyalty to Hitler. Donitz resisted committing U-boats to the Mediterranean, especially after he lost fourteen German and Italian submarines in the Mediterranean, at the very moment that Axis land and air resources poured into the Tunis bridgehead. The Axis continued to fight a seaborne campaign with a dwindling stock of maritime assets, in the process vindicating Churchill's Mediterranean strategy and his war leadership. The British prime minister had drawn his American ally into the Mediterranean, the only place where, practically, the Allies could fight a ground war against the Germans and Italians in 1942 and 1943. Roosevelt had pursued his "Europe First" policy and dampened down demands for a strategic shift to the Pacific. Eisenhower had not proven particularly adept at dealing with the French. But he had been saddled with Roosevelt's prohibition on dealing with de Gaulle and the Free French. At least the French had been brought back into the Allied fold. The Anfa agreement of January 1943 would begin the process of France's rearmament and its reentry into the war, an important prerequisite to the invasion of France, to France's contribution to the defeat of Germany, to the future stability of post-liberation France, and to its role in the postwar world.

   Although not exactly scintillating or blindingly original, The Path to Victory proves to be a very successful and satisfying account while covering a great deal of ground and making some interesting points. It's the best single volume charting the strategic flow of the entire war in the Mediterranean, and well worth reading for anyone who has the time to work through almost 800 pages.

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Tomblin, Barbara Brooks. With Utmost Spirit: Allied Naval Operations in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2004

ISBN 0-8131-2338-0
xiv + 578 pages

Acknowledgments; Introduction; maps; photos; Notes; Bibliography; Index

   The subject matter of Barbara Brooks Tomblin's book might not seem too far removed from that of Douglas Porch. However, Tomblin limits herself to the period of time from Torch through "mopping up in the Mediterranean" and further limits her book to strictly naval matters, and only from the Allied point of view at that.
   Furthermore, the Tomblin book looks at those events from an entirely different persepective. While Porch follows the war in the Med at the strategic level, With Utmost Spirit strongly emphasizes tactical actions and the stories of men carrying out their individual duties to determine success or failure of those actions. Relatively little is said about the making of decisions or the higher direction of war, but Tomblin provides a steady litany of shells fired, vessels sunk, sailors lost, and beaches assaulted. In doing so, the author manages to seamlessly integrate vignettes from dozens of veterans in a manner that consistently complements and strengthens her text.

   "All men got out of the forward engine room," Portent's commanding officer, Lieutenant Plummer, reported. "The remainder of those missing were last seen on the main deck aft.... Ships' boats and small craft quickly came to the assistance of survivors. Their prompt action was responsible for saving the lives of men temporarily injured. All injured men were gotten off the ship by the ship's crew." LCI(L)-10, the Red Beach salvage group flagship, was among those who came to assist Portent's survivors, rescuing a group of them including three wounded men and seven suffering from shock. After rendering first aid to the men, LCI(L)-10's skipper, Lt. (j.g.) W.A. Drisler Jr., took them over to LST-358 for further treatment.
   Minesweeper Squadron 6 commander Alfred Richards, recalling the Portent's loss, wrote, "At this time the general location of the minefield was determined and all ships were warned again to remain outside the 20-fathom curve. About 0930 my Chief Signalman said he thought he could make out the Portent through the haze in toward the beach 6 or 7 miles away." The chief informed Portent by voice radio that she was in "an extremely hazardous area," but before Richards could receive a reply, the sweeper struck a mine. Richards was incredulous. Portent, he insisted, was supposed to be on patrol along the southeast line of the area along the Yoke-Nan line outside of the twenty-fathom curve, yet when mined she was in thirteen fathoms and in an area known to be dangerous. Lieutenant Plummer later stated that he was trying to furnish the Mayo with "every protection at his command" by carrying out an efficient sound search in the area of the fire support vessel because he had been warned of "the dangers of two-man submarines, human torpedoes and [limpet] mines."
   Many years after the war, a retired Rear Admiral Richards said, "I do not yet know why she was in that location except possibly to see what was happening on the beaches.... For the remainder of the operation her bow, which extended about 15 feet above the surface of the water, was used by all of us as an excellent radar navigation beacon and also served as a sad reminder of what happens to those who go astray in shallow unswept waters."
   Damage to the fighter director ship, HMS Palomares, also struck by a mine on D-day, clearly confirmed the presence of a heavily mined area off Anzio. HMS Hornpipe was ordered to escort the crippled cruiser, under tow, to Naples. "The sweepers have cut several mines, and one damaged the A.A. [antiaircraft] cruiser Palomares, which we are about to escort to Naples under tow," George Dormer wrote in his diary.
   Noting enemy minefields offshore, Commander Richards sent Roy Messmer's Unit 2's minesweepers back into Anzio's small harbor to clear it of any mines. They had been chased off earlier in the day by enemy gunfire but now found the harbor quiet and by 1310 had cleared a channel, making the port safe for traffic. Port clearance operations began promptly, and by 1700 Anzio was available for unloading. LST-410 and two LCTs carrying antitank guns and half-tracks were among the first to enter the oddly peaceful port of Anzio. When the ships were not fired upon, the sailors thought Anzio was the Allies' if they could keep it.

   Too many books of this nature turn out to be confusing jumbles of murky, unreliable recollections claiming to offer immediacy and authenticity but ultimately achieving little in the way of explicating events. Tomblin, on the other hand, does a splendid job selecting the most telling comments from a wide range of participants—almost always using their own first-hand knowledge as opposed to repeating scuttlebutt, relying on what a buddy heard from an unknown source, or speculating about aspects of the war far outside their own range of experience—and using those comments to put a very human face on a long series of exciting naval and amphibious actions. Quite good, and an excellent companion to Porch's strategic point of view.

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Sweeting, C.G. Blood and Iron: The German Conquest of Sevastopol. Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc (US), 2004

ISBN 1-57488-796-3
xxii + 201 pages

Foreword; Preface; Introduction; maps; photos; tables; charts; diagrams; Notes; Glossary; Index

   For months we looked forward to Blood and Iron, expecting a great addition to our Russian Front library. Regretably, this book utterly failed to live up to expectations and will probably go down as the biggest disappointment of the year. The fascinating siege of Sevastopol has been crying out for a thorough, informative, and entertaining book, but this isn't it. Instead, C.G. Sweeting delivers a brief, derivative, and bland package.
   In the first place, the book as a whole is relatively short at 200 pages. Of those, almost 80 are devoted to very generic descriptions of ranks, uniforms, insignia, medals, and weapons in the appendices. Another 30 pages are expended in setting the scene from the beginning of Barbarossa until the Germans reach the Perekop isthmus. Deducting the Epilogue, Notes, glossary, and index, that leaves about 50 pages covering operations in the Crimea from September 1941 through the beginning of July 1942, with just over 20 pages focusing on the actual siege of Sevastopol. Brevity aside, Sweeting's text gives every indication of having been thrown together without any depth of research or any great understanding of the battle.

   Von Manstein received a top secret teletype from Hitler emphasizing that it was imperative that Sevastopol be captured as soon as possible because Operation Blau, the German summer offensive of 1942, was scheduled to begin on June 28. The VIII Air Corps and other Luftwaffe elements would be required for action in support of the summer offensive.
   In late May, von Manstein had a close call when a small Italian motor torpedo boat in which he was riding on an inspection trip along the south coast was strafed by two Russian fighter planes. He was unhurt, but his longtime aide and driver, Sergeant Fritz Nagel, was killed. Von Manstein, greatly saddened, presided personally at a military funeral for his loyal and devoted comrade.
   At this time officers and men from von Manstein's staff, supervised by his chief of staff, Colonel Theodor Busse, established a forward command post in a small Tatar dwelling on a hill by the small village of Yukhary Karales. The general moved in early in June and found that he could observe much of the battlefield through a large observer's telescope. This included the Belbek Valley and northern sector, the Sapun Heights positions, and even the Severnaya Bight. This was one of the few times during World War II that a commander could actually view the battlefield with his own eyes.
   By June 1 all was in readiness and von Manstein gave the order to launch the offensive on June 2, beginning with the preliminary artillery barrage before dawn, followed by heavy air attacks. It was now or never for the Eleventh Army, and Operation Stoerfang (Sturgeon Haul) was underway!
   The boom of heavy artillery again echoed through the hills, and shells of all sizes began falling in and on the Soviet defensive positions. Artillery was under the direction of "Harko," the 306. Hoeheres Artillerie Kommandeur. The two experienced chiefs of artillery were Lieutenant General Johannes Zuckertort, Chief of Artillery for the LIV Corps, and General of Artillery Robert Martinek, Chief of Artillery of the XXX Corps. The intense and sustained bombardment continued day and night for five days, making Stoerfang resemble World War I on the Western Front.
   Mortars of all calibers also played an important role in the bombardment. Two Moerser (mortar) regiments were on hand, the 1st Heavy Mortar Regiment and the 70th Mortar Regiment, and the 1st and 4th Mortar Battalions which were concentrated in front of key fortresses. They were under the command of Colonel Niemann, with a total of twenty-one batteries with 576 guns, including the heavy mortars in the 1st Heavy Mortar Regiment.
   The continuous rain of shells, bombs, and rockets had a considerable effect on the Russians' morale, as destructive as the shells' physical effects. The constant whooshing of shells and missiles, and the nerve-racking whistle of bombs, combined with the loud detonations, can only be imagined. The explosion of a heavy shell, or several exploding together on a target, often burst the soldiers' blood vessels. Even the men lying a short distance away from the point of impact were demoralized by the deafening noise, flying debris, and paralyzing pressure of the explosions.

   The best thing that can be said about Blood and Iron? As far as we can tell, it's the only English-language book devoted to the siege of Sevastopol and operations in the Crimea during 1941-1942. Given its weaknesses, however, we can only hope that David Glantz turns his attention to the battle in the near future. In the meantime, most readers will learn more about Sevastopol by reading Manstein and Hayward, with both those books also offering a great deal more on other topics as well.

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Rikmenspoel, Marc J. Waffen-SS Encyclopedia. Bedford, PA: Aberjona Press, 2004

ISBN 0-9717650-8-1
xiv + 285 pages

Introduction; About the Author; Rank Equivalence Chart; Guide to Tactical Unit Symbols; photos; charts; Annotated Bibliography

Appendix: Weapons Tables

   The Waffen-SS, unlike the siege of Sevastopol, is a topic on which a large number of books have been published. Many of them amount to little more than what John Ellis has referred to as "unhealthy fetishism." Thankfully, Marc Rikmenspoel's Waffen-SS Encyclopedia—reprinted by Aberjona after being originally published as a Military Book Club exclusive in 2002—doesn't fall into that category. Indeed, Rikmenspoel's work is one of the best efforts around on the SS.
   The first section of the book outlines the organization and history of each SS army, corps, and division, followed by lists of independent SS brigades, regiments, and battalions. The second section details the structure of panzer, panzer-grenadier, mountain, cavalry, and infantry divisions with ample TOE organigrams. The next three sections in aggregate cover in country-by-country fashion the raising of SS formations and the recruitment of SS troops from more than thirty nations, including Iceland, India, and so on. The next section of the book provides brief biographies of thirteen important SS officers, followed by a section on weapons used by the SS.
   Here's one of the shorter entires from the first part of the book:

25th Waffen-Grenadier Division of the SS "Hunyadi" (Hungarian no. 1)

Waffen-Gruppenfuhrer der SS Josef Grassy (10 October 1944-8 May 1945)

   Waffen-Grenadier Regiment of the SS 61 (Hungarian no. 1)
   Waffen-Grenadier Regiment of the SS 62 (Hungarian no. 2)
   Waffen-Grenadier Regiment of the SS 63 (Hungarian no. 3)
   Waffen-Artillery Regiment of the SS 25 (Hungarian no. 1)
   Waffen-Fusilier Battalion of the SS 25
   Waffen-Signal Battalion of the SS 25
   Waffen-Anti-Tank Battalion of the SS 25
   Waffen-Combat Engineer Battalion of the SS 25
   Waffen-Ski Battalion of the SS 25 (fought independently)
   Waffen-Field Replacement Battalion of the SS 25

First planned in late October 1944 after the Szalasi regime took power in Hungary, the details for the creation of a Hungarian Waffen-SS were finalized by 24 November 1944. The Waffen-SS was to train and equip four infantry divisions of ethnic Magyars as a solid base for the reestablishment of the Royal Hungarian Army (Honved). The formation of the first had already begun on 2 November, and it took the patriotic name, "Hunyadi." It was formed around Honved veterans, civilian volunteers, and the latest group of conscripts. First collected in Hungary, the division relocated to Neuhammer, Silesia, in late November 1944. On 27 November 1944, 800 men were killed and another 650 wounded in an American air attack on the train in which they were being transported. The division, still in training and awaiting most of its authorized equipment, evacuated Neuhammer on 8-9 February 1945, leaving behind two combat-ready battalions. These saw heavy combat up to 14 February before rejoining the division, which relocated to Bavaria, and then to Austria by the end of the war. The division surrendered to American forces after sporadic combat with American advance units.

   Although it lacks an index, the book's organization makes it relatively easy to find just about any fact about the SS. Rikmenspoel presents everything in a low-key, matter-of-fact manner without pandering to fetishists, fanatics, or those who think the war will never end. The concluding section in the original edition, "Myths about the Waffen-SS," has been renamed "Misconceptions and Controversies about the Waffen-SS," and the book gains two new chapters in that section: "The Waffen-SS, Einsatzgruppen, and Concentration Camp Guards" and "The Waffen-SS and War Crimes." While it might not earn him a degree in moral philosophy or jurisprudence of war crimes, the author in his concluding chapter attempts to fit SS atrocities into the larger context without denying or excusing them. For what can sometimes become a controversial topic, Waffen-SS Encyclopedia mostly succeeds in treating the military aspects of the SS in the same way, for example, that Gordon Rottman treats the US Marines. For a single volume reference work on the SS, this is probably the best book to put on your shelf.

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   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from the publishers.
   Thanks to the publishers for providing these review copies.