ISBN 1-59114-061-7
viii + 248 pages

Preface; Introduction; footnotes; Index

   Although the title seems to indicate this might be a book of biographies, actually it's a compilation of post-war papers written by German admirals while in Allied custody. In many respects Hitler's Admirals resembles the books recently assembled by David Isby from documents composed by captured German generals, including Fighting the Invasion: The German Army at D-Day and Fighting in Normandy: The German Army from D-Day to Villers-Bocage. In those books, however, each individual document is presented as a separate chapter, the accounts are mostly tactical and operational in nature, and Isby provides little in the way of corrections, clarifications, or commentary. Bennett and Bennett, on the other hand, take a different approach to the naval material, which tends to be more in the realm of strategy, politics, and even philosophy. First, they intersperse quite a few of their own remarks among blocks of text written by the admirals. Second, instead of presenting each original document as a whole, Bennett and Bennett have chopped the essays into pieces and reassembled them as a series of topical chapters:

1. The Prewar Period
2. The First Year of War
3. Operation Sea Lion
4. Ocean Warfare against Merchant Shipping, 1940-1941
5. War in the Mediterranean, 1940-1941
6. Germany Marches Eastward, 1941
7. Ocean Warfare against Merchant Shipping, 1942-1943
8. Decision in the Mediterranean, 1942-1943
9. Seeking Victory on the Russian Steppes, 1942-1943
10. Ocean Warfare against Merchant Shipping, 1943-1944
11. Invasion and the Long Retreat
12. Fortress Germany and Unconditional Surrender
13. Some Conclusions and Verdicts

   With this approach, for each chapter the editors are able to include at least a few remarks from most of the admirals, thus permitting a variety of perspectives on each topic. The following officers contribute to the book as a whole:

Karl Doenitz
Herman Boehm
Theodor Krancke
Hellmuth Heye
Hans Meyer
Eberhard Weichold
Otto Schulz
Otto Schniewind and Karl-Georg Schuster (working together)

   Although the editors don't include separate biographical sketches of the admirals, the Introduction outlines their careers, and comments throughout the book keep the reader abreast of each admiral's position and responsibilities, which helps clarify all the individual perspectives. For example, the chapter on the first year of the war includes this paragraph from Admiral Heye.

   The measures that had been taken shortly before, in case of a possible war with England, were largely defensive as far as the navy was concerned. U-boats alone had the task of carrying on offensive warfare by attacks on trade and by minelaying. In the first few weeks the armored ships were to operate against trade in order to tie down enemy forces. It was estimated that this war against trade would soon have to cease when defensive measures had been organized. Valuable time was lost because, as far as I know, attacks on trade were only allowed after some time had elapsed, since the [German] government clearly had hopes of coming to an understanding with England, or at least with France.

   However, Heye was not involved with the U-Boat campaign, so Bennett and Bennett immediately point out an error in Heye's remarks before they go on to present Doenitz's point of view on how the U-Boats were utilized in the early going:

   Heye's final sentence above is, in fact, incorrect. The first British merchant ship, the passenger liner Athenia, was torpedoed by U-30 on the day war was declared. By the end of the first month twenty-five other British merchant vessels had suffered the same fate, with three more lost to mines. From the earliest days, therefore, the German navy determined to strike at what it identified as the most vulnerable aspect of British sea power. Directing U-boat operations was Karl Donitz, a U-boat commander from the First World War, who had been in charge of training the new U-boat service since 1936. At the outbreak of war he was promoted to rear admiral with the title Befehlshaber der U-boote. His 1945 essay recalls the thinking on which German strategy was based....

   Two oddball chapters cover the Russian Front. Although some of the post-war essays address German naval operations in the East (for example, Admiral Schulz served as naval commander of the Crimea, so he has some insight into fighting in the Black Sea), the admirals also seem anxious to make their own points about why Germany lost history's largest ground campaign.
   On the other hand, most of the chapters emphasize naval matters, and all these men are eminently qualified to discuss the manner in which Germany waged its war at sea. Naturally, they don't always agree, but that's part of the value of this compilation. The following more or less random excerpts from various chapters should serve to illustrate typical contributions.
   Here, writing in September 1945, Doenitz admits B-Dienst was breaking Royal Navy codes, but he fails to grasp that Enigma had been compromised:

   In 1942 the German Cipher Office was fortunate enough to read various convoy ciphers. The German U-boat command thus had at its disposal the place and time of convoy meetings and also gathering points for convoy stragglers. This valuable assistance to attacking U-boats ceased in the early months of 1943. It was, of course, possible, granted a sufficiently large number of W/T messages, to break down the code, but advantage could no longer be derived from this, as the enemy was now changing the code at shorter intervals than formerly so that the wearying labor of breaking it down had to be recommenced each time.
   The secondary reason for this reduction in the tracking of convoys during the winter of 1942-43 may be that, at this time, the enemy grasped the U-boat reconnaissance patrol tactics and took avoiding action. This possibility had already [posed problems for] the surface warfare, that is, mobile operations employing the so-called wolf pack system, in order to achieve the desired concentration on one convoy. If this principle were given up, no great results could be achieved. In this respect the same conditions apply to sea warfare as to land warfare. Here also no decisive results can be obtained by static trench warfare, but only by mobile operations.

   Here we have two different views of the Italian Navy:

   Weichold: The Italians had no tactics and they could not operate at sea. They had learnt no lessons from the last war as they had no naval engagements. The commanders of Major Units were unable to handle their ships unless an Admiral was present.... I do not think the Italians are afraid but they lack experience. Some of the Italian Admirals are good friends of mine and they are capable men but they have the Latin temperament. The Italians cannot handle ships.

   Schulz: I would...like to stress that the Italian E-boat flotillas commanded by the able and skillful Captain Mimbelli enjoyed an excellent reputation with the German navy in the Black Sea, and their return to Italy..., before the change of regime, was generally regretted.

   Although writing at the behest of the British, Schniewind and Schuster (who seem to have collaborated on their paper) found the war's decisive factor on the far side of the Atlantic:

   The entry of a nation like the US.A. into the war, as may be concluded in the light of subsequent knowledge, but that was definitely not recognized at the end of 1941, really meant the final overthrow of Germany's prospects of victory Tests were indeed made—partly at the instigation of the naval war staff and based upon research carried out during the 1914-18 war—to determine the arms potential of the US.A., how much her steel production could be increased under war conditions, and how her achievements in the construction of warships and merchant ships, in the production of arms and ammunition, her potentiality for building up an army and obtaining the necessary manpower could he estimated.
   In making these appreciations and researches everything that was unfavorable for Germany was purposely taken into account. In spite of this, however, the immediate and unfavorable result of the research was far below the actual achievements of the US.A., which came to light later in the war. It is the opinion of the authors that in the 1939-45 war, as in the war of 1914-18, the entry of America into the war with her enormous arms potential was the decisive factor that brought about Germany's defeat.

   Of course, given that the admirals were writing while in Allied custody—some facing prosecution, some attempting to curry favor, some obfuscating their roles, all without access to their wartime files—not every word can be taken at face value. Blame is often apportioned elsewhere, but seldom do any of the writers admit to making mistakes themselves. Even at the end, in the final chapter, when the admirals assess reasons for defeat and lessons learned, only one man suggests that possibly National Socialism was at the root of the problem. More typically, the admirals seem to think that others let them down, that Hitler was right all along, and that the Allies would soon require a reborn, strengthened Germany to stand against the "Asiatics." Skipping most of his distasteful racial and cultural assessments, here's what Boehm has to say:

   [This] English statement, two months after the end of the Second World War, that one is face with a Third World War is the best proof, even if it is undesired, that Germany is not the disturber of world peace but that it is an entirely different problem—Asia versus Europe. The real fact is that National Socialism wanted nothing more than to secure for Germany and her compressed population a clearance of her eastern frontiers and more Lebensraum in that direction after the Treaty of Versailles had taken all from us. And, even here, an extension of her territory toward the east could never have constituted a warlike threat to the British Empire, such as now exists from Russia. With this thought in mind, Hitler's words, "I cannot imagine that any British statesman would bring England into the war in these circumstance" are quite comprehensible.
   World history sometimes moves very fast. The statesmen of our time have got to utilize the time they have—and that before it is too late. Natural forces such as the Asiatic pressure to expand will not he held up by treaties but only by force. For many centuries Germany was the wall against this pressure; now the wall is down. England alone cannot hold up the danger but only with the help of Germany, if that is still possible (which I almost doubt). If that which is still remaining to Germany is finally physically and spiritually smashed, then this factor will be eliminated from the balance of nations. Discernment and action are necessary, for it is not only for Germany, but also for England, that these words apply:

   To be, or not to be,
   That is the question.

   As Isby's books already prove, writings by German officers in Allied hands need to be treated carefully, but Bennett and Bennett (unlike Isby) provide ample counter-point to the admirals when needed. The editors also succeed very nicely—dare we say admirably?—in allowing the writers to have their say while fitting their thoughts into a larger, annotated context. Anyone who wants a window into the thinking of the upper levels of the Kriegsmarine, or at least what they wanted their captors to believe they were thinking, will appreciate Hitler's Admirals.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Naval Institute Press.
   Thanks to NIP for providing this review copy.