Glantz, David. August Storm, volume 1: The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003 ISBN 0-7146-5279-2 xxviii + 451 pages Introduction; Preface; Abbreviations; Symbols; Introduction; tables; OBs and TOEs; maps; photos; Bibliography; Index Appendices: Kwantung Army OB; Actual Strength of Kwantung Army Components; Operational Strength of Kwantung Army Forces; Soviet Far East Command OB; Operational Indices of the Manchurian Offensive; Soviet Documents on Operations in Manchuria; Soviet Documents on Operations on Southern Sakhalin, the Kuril Islands, and Hokkaido; Japanese Maps Showing Daily Development of Operations

Glantz, David. August Storm, volume 2: Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945. London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003 ISBN 0-7146-5300-4 xvi + 368 pages Introduction; Abbreviations; Symbols; Introduction; tables; OBs and TOEs; maps; photos; Bibliography; Index Appendices: Soviet Documents on the Sakhalin Operation Combat; Soviet Documents on the Kuril Amphibious Assault Operation

   When reviewing a new book, we always try to compare it to previous works on the same subject. In the case of this pair of books about Soviet operations in the Far East in 1945, there's not much available for comparison except a couple of Japanese Monographs and the original editions of these two books by the same author. Colonel David Glantz initially wrote these two twenty years ago as Number 7 and Number 8 of the Leavenworth Papers, August Storm: The Soviet 1945 Strategic Offensive in Manchuria and August Storm: Soviet Tactical and Operational Combat in Manchuria, 1945. Both have been out of print for quite awhile and it's nearly impossible to track down secondhand copies.
   Earlier this year Frank Cass published greatly revised and expanded versions of both of Glantz's Leavenworth books with slightly altered titles. The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945 has increased from 243 pages to 451 pages while Soviet Operational and Tactical Combat in Manchuria, 1945 has similarly increased from 193 pages to 368 pages. In both cases, the expansion results from adding considerably more depth and detail, which in turn results in large measure from the wealth of new Soviet sources that became available in the closing years of the twentieth century. As always, Colonel Glantz has thoroughly mined these resources to produce an excellent pair of books. In fact, these two tomes might very well represent his best output to date in a long and productive career of research and writing. (As an aside, it should be mentioned that these two books would certainly be very strong candidates for our Top Ten awards for 2003 were they entirely new works rather than revised editions.)
   The books cover a relatively brief period of time—operations commenced on 8 August 1945 and fighting had mostly ended several days prior to Japan's formal surrender on 2 September in Tokyo Bay—but encompass a vast chunk of geography with a total frontage of more than 3000 miles stretching from Mongolia to the Sea of Japan and including objectives on the Kuril Islands, Sakhalin Island, and Hokkaido. As the titles indicate, Glantz divides his books so that one examines the entirety of Soviet operations from a strategic (and even geo-political) perspective while the other delves more deeply into tactical combat.
   The strategic volume opens with more than 120 pages devoted to setting the scene: Soviet preparations for the Manchurian offensive; the geography of the theater; the organization, strength, and disposition of Japanese forces; and the organization and doctrine of Soviet forces in the Far East. As an example of how Glantz has expanded the material, the original edition included about fourteen pages on Japanese forces while the new edition more than doubles the size of that section. Part II, "The Conduct of the Offensive," begins with a chapter concerning Soviet planning for the operation (which has been increased approximately five-fold compared to that chapter in the first edition), and then goes on to review the conduct of the offensive by each of the three Fronts in turn. The chapter for each Front runs to about twenty to thirty pages.
   Here's an example of how Glantz describes the operations:

   At 2300 hours on 10 August, the lead tank brigade of Savel'ev's 5th Guards Tank Corps finally reached Tsagan Obo, the highest point during its passage through the Grand Khingans, and the 21st Tank Brigade approached Khorokhon. In darkness and intermittent rain, that made the march route even more challenging, Savel'ev's corps continued on to the eastern exits from the mountain pass. His tank corps managed to cover a distance of 25 miles (40 kilometers) through the winding pass in only seven hours, a feat made possible only by the fact that his column consisted primarily of tracked vehicles. To the north, Katkov's 7th Guards Mechanized Corps, impeded by its large number of wheeled vehicles, completed its passage of the mountains during the evening of 11 August.
   Kravehenko's army suffered greatly from fuel shortages during the mountain crossing. The falling rain and difficult road conditions increased fuel consumption, and the army's vehicular columns, which included the fuel trucks, lagged as far behind as 186 miles (300 kilometers). Because of fuel shortages, by the time they crossed the mountains, the 46th Guards Tank Brigade consisted of only 18 tanks and the 30th Mechanized Brigade, seven tanks and two motorized infantry companies. Katkov's 7th Mechanized Corps had to remove the 36th Motorized Rifle Division from its first echelon and place it in second echelon because it ran out of fuel. Both columns then entered the central Manchurian plain and continued their advance eastward as rapidly as possible. At 1800 hours on 11 August, the forward detachment of the 5th Guards Tank Corps reached Lupei.
   Malinovsky attempted to assist Kravchenko in overcoming his logistical difficulties by supplying his marching columns with fuel and ammunition by air. To this end, the front commander ordered the 12th Air Army to employ its transport aviation in to support Kravchenko. Khudiakov assigned this mission to his 54th and 21st Guards Transport Aviation Divisions. In extremely difficult weather (rain, fog, and low ceilings) and without adequate landing sites, the transport aircraft flew 1,755 sorties, dropping 2,072 tons of fuel and 78 tons of ammunition to the advancing forces.
   On 12 August Japanese aircraft appeared for the first time above Kravchenko's advancing march columns. Although they were few in number, they attempted to bomb the columns, and when the bombs ran out, they conducted suicide attacks in futile efforts to halt Kravchenko's advance. For example, on 12 and 13 August, 12 aircraft launched suicide attacks directly against the 5th Guards Tank Corps but caused no damage in the process.

   The invaders also faced Japanese infantry kamikazes who strapped explosives to their bodies and threw themselves at Soviet tanks. The Russians called those suicidal soldiers "smertniks." According to Glantz, although the overall quality of the Kwantung Army had declined precipitously during the war years, Japanese combat units mostly performed well when allowed to stand and fight. However, Japanese units were poorly equipped, especially in regard to tanks and anti-tank weapons, and unable to stand up to Soviet armor. Furthermore, the upper levels of the Japanese command structure generally performed quite poorly. Vain attempts to shuffle their forces in the face of Soviet blitzkrieg tactics meant that on more than one occasion Japanese generals lost control of subordinate units which in turn were caught out of position and overrun by fast-moving Russian spearheads. In some ways, reading Glantz's account makes it appear that Japanese complacency and slow reactions mirrored the French experience in 1940 while Soviet speed and boldness matched and exceeded the German performance.
   "Operations in Korea, Southern Sakhalin, and the Kuril Islands, and the Aborted Hokkaido Offensive," the fifth chapter in the second part of the book, is especially interesting (and covers topics about which the original edition has little or nothing to say). Glantz describes the Soviet amphibious landings mounted from Vladivostok against the northeastern coast of Korea, and it appears that these landings—capturing the Korean ports through which the Kwantung Army's supply lines ran after crossing the Sea of Japan from the Home Islands—might have served as a final, decisive blow even if the main land offensives had not been so overwhelmingly successful. The fighting on the southern half of Sakhalin and in the Kurils is also interesting as a comparison of Soviet and US amphibious operations.
   Here's part of what happened on Shumshir Island:

   The ships carrying the amphibious assault force sailed from the port of Petropavlovsk and adjacent Avachinsk Bay at 0400 hours on 17 August and set course for Shumshir Island. While they were under way, Soviet aircraft bombed Japanese positions on Shumshir and Paramoshiri Island. At 0430 hours on 18 August, in a dense fog, the forward detachment landed in the region between Capes Kokutan and Kotomari-Saki on the island's northeastern coast (see Map 75). Although the few Japanese troops who defended this shore quickly retreated in surprise, the detachment encountered heavy machine gun, mortar, and artillery fire as it advanced inland toward Hill complex 170.7 (which consisted of the twin hills 171 and 165) and Cape Kotomari-Saki.
   The dense Japanese defenses inland and the heavy machine gun and artillery fire from well-dug-in Japanese forces halted the forward detachment in its tracks. Worse still for the attackers, the Japanese began counterattacking with tanks and infantry, but were driven back after losing many of the tanks to Soviet naval gunfire. With the foothold on the shore secure, the main force's first echelon began landing at 0630 hours along with the forces of the diversionary assault, which altered its course due to the heavy fog and dangerous shoals near its original landing site near Nakagava-Van Bay. At this time, Japanese shore batteries opened intense fire on the Soviet landing and support ships. Soviet fire in response proved ineffective because the Japanese batteries were fortified and well camouflaged.
   Compounding the landing difficulties, a loss of communications disrupted command and control of the landing force since, during the landing operation, the radios assigned to the forward detachment and the accompanying artillery correction posts were dropped into the seawater and would not operate. The headquarters of the Kamchatka Defensive Region, 101st Rifle Division, and 138th Rifle Regiment were still on board the ships and lacked any communications with their subunits that had already landed. Consequently Gnechko received the first radio messages relating to the forward detachment's operations five to six hours later, when the detachment was still locked in heavy fighting for possession of Hills 165 and 171.
   The main force's first echelon finally completed its landing operation at 0900 hours, but was unable to land much of its supporting artillery because it lacked sufficient means to move the artillery from the ships to the shore. Immediately thereafter, the troops from the second echelon also began landing but also without their supporting artillery. All the while, heavy Japanese artillery fire pounded the landing sites and ships offshore. To overcome the problem of transporting the artillery and supporting tanks, the sailors constructed special berths out of excess logs and rafts while under heavy enemy fire. The second echelon's forces finally completed their landing operations at 1300.

   In at least one way, combat on Sakhalin and in the Kurils resembled the kind of island fighting with which the US Marines were familiar: the Japanese fought stubbornly and often to the death, while the attackers took relatively heavy casualties and fell behind their timetables. Certainly the island operations were not comparable in swiftness to the successful operations on the mainland fronts.
   Delay caused by Japanese resistance on the islands is one of the reasons cited by Glantz for Soviet failure to conduct the offensive which had been prepared against Hokkaido. Of this planned invasion, the original volume says nothing. Glantz explains that newly released Soviet documentary materials show the northernmost Home Island among Soviet objectives, although little or nothing of this plan had been revealed until quite recently. The 87th Rifle Corps and 56th Rifle Corps were earmarked for the operation, and both were to be ready by 23 August, "...after they had completed their offensive operations on southern Sakhalin Island." On 22 August, however, shortly before the order to commence operations was expected, Stalin ordered the attack postponed. Glantz speculates that the assault units, held up by Japanese resistance on Sakhalin, could not have been ready on time anyway, but could conceivably have started as early as 24 or 25 August. While not all the relevant documents have been released, Glantz suggests some reasons for the eventual cancellation of the landings: Allied pressure, imminent Japanese surrender, and heavy fighting on Sakhalin. In any event, the Hokkaido story proves fascinating, especially since the landings would have put Soviet combat forces in Japan ahead of the American schedule for Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet, with dramatic consequences for the post-war years and the Cold War.
   Glantz concludes the first volume with forty or fifty pages of "Analysis and Conclusion" plus a further seventy-five pages of appendices.
   While the first volume looks at the campaign from a strategic perspective, the second volume focuses on the tactical level. In the original edition of the second volume, Glantz chose eight specific engagements and devoted a chapter to each. In the new edition, he appends two more tactical engagements and adds some meat to the original chapters.
   Here's the line-up in the new edition:

• The 5th Army's Penetration of the Border Fortified Zone
• The 1st Red Army's Advance to Pamientung
• The 35th Army's Advance to Mishan
• The Battle for Mutanchiang
• The 35th Army's Capture of the Hutou Fortress
• The 39th Army's Envelopment of the Halung-Arshaan Fortified Region
• The 36th Army's Advance to Hailar
• The 15th Army's Advance to Chiamussu
• The Battle for Southern Sakhalin Island
• The Amphibious Assault on the Kuril Islands

   In the first volume of the new edition, Glantz writes roughly five pages on the Kuril operations. In the second volume, the newly added Chapter Ten amounts to over thirty pages on the same operations. Some of the text is repeated almost word for word in the second volume, but Glantz also adds considerably more material and goes into far more detail.
   For example, here's how part of the Shumshir landing (see above) is described in the tactical volume:

   The direct fire set fire to two assault boats, and three boats suffered from five to nine direct hits, one of them being wrecked on the coast. According to an after-action report, "The ammunition on the stricken assault boats began exploding. The personnel began throwing themselves into the water and swimming to reach the shore." Despite the chaos and carnage, the assault force managed to land with considerable losses, although the engines of some of the assault boats were damaged.
   In response to the new threat, the support detachment ships Kirov, Dzerzhinsky, and Okhotsk opened fire on the Japanese shore batteries, but one Japanese battery suppressed and silenced the Kirov's fire. The responding fire of the Soviet ships proved ineffective because the Japanese batteries were fortified and well camouflaged.
   Compounding the landing difficulties, a loss of communications disrupted command and control of the landing force since, during the landing operation, 21 of the 22 radios assigned to the forward detachment and the accompanying artillery correction posts were dropped into the seawater and would not operate. The headquarters of the Kamchatka Defensive Region, 101st Rifle Division, and 138th Rifle Regiment were still on board the ships and lacked any communications with their subunits that had already landed.
   Because it lacked any communications with its units that had already landed, at 0900 hours the Kamchatka Defensive Region headquarters dispatched a forward officer observation point to the coast to determine the situation and receive reports from its subordinate subunits. However, since the officers had no radios, they could not fulfill their assigned mission. The Kamchatka Defensive Region's headquarters finally re-established radio communications with the forward detachment at 1100 hours but only after the detachment was able to use captured Japanese radios to communicate. Consequently Gnechko received the first radio messages relating to the forward detachment's operations five to six hours after it landed, at a time when the detachment was already heavily engaged in heavy fighting for possession of Hill 170.7 and nearby Hill 165.
   At 1020 hours Gnechko ordered D'iakov to organize his own observation post over the coast by 1100 hours so that he could exercise more effective command and control over the landed forces. However, "Later it was determined, that, for unknown reasons, the division commander did not do so until the morning of 19 August. The commander of the Kamchatka Defensive Region organized command and control over his landed units personally and directly through his own staff."
   The main force's first echelon finally completed its landing operation at 0900 hours. However, while it was able to bring its light infantry weapons ashore, it was unable to land much of its supporting artillery because it lacked sufficient means to move the artillery from the ships to the shore, and the landing was still being subjected to heavy fire from the Japanese shore batteries. A Japanese source criticized the forward detachment's decision to move inland, leaving the first echelon to its own devices:

Those who reached the shore unwisely pushed inland instead of dealing with the Japanese shore positions. Their mistake enabled the undamaged Kokutan and Kotomari batteries bracketing the beachhead to continue firing on reinforcements. Moving inland, attackers found the road to Kataoka blocked by two fortified heights (Hills 165 and 170). Undeterred by pillboxes along the slopes, the Japanese hurled themselves forward.

   Although it had suffered considerable losses during its landing, and the 138th Rifle Regiment commander lacked any command and control over his forces since he was still at sea on board a damaged ship, nevertheless the first echelon's forces began advancing against Japanese defenses on Hill 170.7. By 1130 hours the first echelon finally reached the forward detachment's positions, although its units were in a disorganized combat formation. Once forward, the force regrouped its subunits and prepared to assault Japanese defenses on Hill 170.7 together with the forward detachment.

   Clearly there's a fair amount of overlap between the two volumes when describing an event in one book at the strategic level and in the other book at the tactical/operational level, but overall the two books have widely different perspectives and emphasis. Among other differences, the strategic volume maintains much more of a unified structure for examining the campaign as a whole while the second volume takes an entirely episodic approach to presenting selected engagements.
   Nevertheless, both volumes are heavily supported by numerous maps (mostly good, but of varying quality since they seem to have been borrowed from various other sources rather than prepared specifically for August Storm), tables, charts, OBs, TOEs, and wartime documents with no lack of material relating to Japanese forces. Much of the Japanese material, especially the maps, seems to come from the only other serious English-language works on the subject, Japanese Monographs Number 154 and Number 155. Those maps have been copied directly from the monographs, but reduced in size to fit these smaller pages which means they end up a little fuzzy. Glantz's original editions also contained some large, multi-color folding maps which unfortunately don't survive in the new editions. On the other hand, the OB material has been beefed up considerably for both Soviet and Japanese forces and the new editions add much more in the way supplemental data in the appendices. The photos are serviceable (many with that painterly, retouched appearance of Soviet wartime images) and include a great many shots of harsh and distant battlefields that except for the fuzziness would look at home in National Geographic. As always, the author provides a plethora of footnotes and a thorough bibliography, in this case mostly Russian-language works.
   Individually, the strategic and operational/tactical volumes are both very good, and in combination they comprise an excellent, definitive English-language account of the campaign. In short, Colonel Glantz has done another outstanding job. These titles rank very near the top of the charts as the most important books of the year, and we highly recommend them. Serious readers will definitely want both volumes. However, if circumstances dictate that you can only obtain or read one of them, then The Soviet Strategic Offensive in Manchuria, 1945 is the way to go. Great stuff!
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Frank Cass or their US distributor, International Specialized Book Services.
   Thanks to Cass for providing these review copies.