ISBN 0-7006-1208-4
660 pages

Preface; Dramatis Personae; photos; maps; tables; Notes; Selected Bibliography; Index

Appendices: Top Secret German Planning Documents; Soviet Planning Documents; Red Army Order of Battle; German Order of Battle; A Rough Comparison of Red Army and Wehrmacht Forces; Soviet Military Casualties; Estimated Civilian Losses in the Siege of Leningrad

   David Glantz has authored shelf-loads of books about the Russian Front while almost single-handedly redefining the way Western historians view the Russo-German War. Now he has produced what is almost certainly his best work to date, an exhaustively detailed account of the entire long, bloody siege of Leningrad with extensive supporting materials—maps, photos, endnotes, index, appendices, and extensive OB sections—that attain the same high level of quality. We were sufficiently impressed with this book to name it as one of our Editor's Choice Awards for 2002.
   The book begins with a review of the military history of the city of St Petersburg - Petrograd - Leningrad from 1703 through the eve of the German invasion in 1941. This includes a brief overview of the city's role in the Russo-Finnish War of 1939-1940 as well as more detailed information on the evolution of defense planning by the Leningrad Military District covering the command structure, leaders, and the comings and goings of combat units.
   Beginning with the German invasion, Glantz compares the opposing forces and follows every step of the battle from the border onward as the Soviet defenders suffer defeat after defeat. As with his excellent Barbarossa, however, the author makes it abundantly clear how this campaign comprised far more than a steady cycle of German thrusts and Soviet retreats. Although they did not usually accomplish the desired results, the Soviets constantly attempted to launch their own operations to disrupt the enemy advance and grasp the initiative. The Soviet doctrine of defense proved anything but passive.
   The chapters describe each operation in a precisely ordered logic of intentions, time, forces, distances (always measured in kilometers and then parenthetically in miles), and casualties:

   General Karl Hilpert, the commander of the German XXVI Army Corps, whose forces defended the Shlissel'burg salient, reacted quickly to the Soviet assault despite his lack of significant reserves. With Lindemann's approval, lie moved five battalions of his 96th Infantry Division from Mga to Gorodok No. 2 and the forest east of Gorodok. Supported by a battery of 88mm guns from the 36th Flak Regiment, a battery of 150mm howitzers, and a company of Tiger tanks (four tanks) from the 502d Panzer Battalion, the composite force reinforced the sagging defenses on the 170th Infantry Division's beleaguered right flank. At the same time, a combat group from the neighboring 5tli Mountain Infantry Division reinforced the defenses south of Moskovskaia Dubrovka. The partially shattered 170th Infantry Division consolidated its forces along a line running west of Gorodok No. 1, and the shaken 227th Division withdrew its shattered left flank to new defenses facing south at Workers Settlements Nos. 2 and 3. Another combat group from the 96th Infantry Division attempted to plug the gaps on the 227th Division's left flank and rear by occupying defenses near Workers Settlement No. 1.
   After regrouping and replenishing his forces overnight, Dukhanov's troops resumed their offensive along the entire front on 13 January after another short artillery preparation. Simoniak's 136th Rifle Division, supported by tanks from Lieutenant Colonel V. V. Khrustitsky's 61st Light Tank Brigade, enveloped the 96th Infantry Division's right flank in Beliavskoe Swamp from the north and slowly advanced 4 kilometers (2.5 miles) eastward. After heavy fighting with the 96th Infantry Division, its forward battalions reached the region 1.5 kilometers (.9 miles) west of Workers Settlement No. 5, forming a deep salient only 4-5 kilometers (2.5-3.1 miles) west of the advancing 2d Shock Army. Simultaneously, Trubachev's 86th Rifle Division, now following Simoniak's 136th, advanced 1-1.5 kilometers (.6-1 mile) and approached Workers Settlement No. 3 and Preobrazhenskoe Hill, the main German strong point protecting the southern approaches to Shlissel'burg, before being halted by heavy resistance from the 227th Infantry Division.
   As had been the case the previous day, the attack on the 67th Army's right flank once again faltered. Borshchev's 268th Rifle Division, attacking on Simoniak's right flank, failed to dislodge the German 170th Infantry Division's troops defending Gorodok No. 1 and Gorodok No. 2, suffering heavy losses in the process. Worse still, at 1615 hours, the 96th Infantry Division, supported by 15 tanks, launched a surprise counterattack, forcing Borshchev's division to withdraw 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) in near panic. On Borshchev's right flank near Moskovskaia Dubrovka, Krasnov's 45th Guards Rifle Division once again made no progress in the Moskovskaia Dubrovka region and, in fact, lost ground to counterattacks by the German 5th Mountain Division. At nightfall, Dukhanov ordered his attacking divisions to repel the German counterattacks and prepared to commit his army's second echelon the next morning.
   To the east, Meretskov began his artillery preparation at 0930 hours on 12 January with more than 2,000 artillery pieces, 300 of which conducted direct fire against German defensive positions on the forward edge. While the artillery preparation was wreaking havoc on German defenses, special groups of snipers picked off German officers and soldiers. Forty minutes before the end of the artillery preparation, bombers and assault aircraft from the 14th Air Army struck German strong points at and around Workers Settlements Nos. 4, 5, and 7 and Siniavino. Simultaneously, sappers cut lanes through the German minefields. The ground and aerial bombardment disorganized the German defenses. A captured sergeant from the 227th Infantry Division's 366th Infantry Regiment captured the scene:

It was a nightmare. In the morning, the Russians opened fire from guns of all caliber. The shells impacted precisely where the bunkers were located. Even before the Russians attacked, many were killed and wounded in the 10th Company. Lieutenant Dehl, the company commander, and his senior sergeant and sergeant were killed. The soldiers were overcome by panic. The Russians had hardly approached when those located in the trenches greeted them with raised hands.

   Romanovsky's five first-echelon rifle divisions assaulted at 1115 hours across the entire sector from Lipka to Gaitolovo under the cover of a final artillery barrage and air strikes. The assault groups from two divisions on the right flank of Starikov's 8th Army joined the attack at 1135 hours. Against heavy resistance, the assaulting infantry and infantry support tanks penetrated the forward edge of the 227th Infantry Division's defenses and attacked the German strong points at Lipka, Workers Settlement No. 8, and Kruglaia Grove. On the right flank, Major General F. M. Parkhomenko's 128th Rifle Division penetrated the first German trench line but was halted south of Lipka by heavy fire from the 96th Infantry Division's 2d Battalion, 287th Infantry Regiment. This battalion, which had only recently reinforced the 227th Infantry Division, manned snow-covered bunkers in a cemetery on a hill adjacent to the 128th Rifle Division's right flank, and the snow prevented the attacking troops from detecting the bunkers. Soviet critiques later noted that the 128th Rifle Division's attacking battalions failed to maneuver properly, exploit their heavy weaponry, concentrate their direct fires, or cooperate properly with their supporting tanks.
   In Romanovsky's center, Colonel P. I. Radygin's 372d and Colonel A. P. Baraboshkin's 256th Rifle Divisions penetrated the 227th Infantry Division's forward defenses and advanced 2 kilometers (1.2 miles) north and south of Workers Settlement No. 8. In the process, Radygin's division overran the 1st Battalion, 374th Infantry Regiment, which had been attached to the 227th Infantry Division, but then encountered heavy fire from Workers Settlement No. 8. The 372d Rifle Division repeatedly assaulted the settlement, which was defended by the 374th Regiment's 2d Battalion, but failed to crack the strong point and suffered heavy losses. To the south, despite the heavy flanking fire from Workers Settlement No. 8 and Kruglaia Grove, Baraboshkin's right flank regiment managed to wedge between the two strong points but could advance no farther through the murderous fire.
   With the attack in his center faltering, Romanovsky asked for and obtained Meretskov's permission to commit Major General M. N. Ovchinnikov's 18th Rifle Division, supported by the 98th Tank Brigade, into combat from the second echelon early on 13 January. The fresh forces were to bypass Workers Settlement No. 8 from the south, attack toward Workers Settlement No. 5, and link up there with the 67th Army's advancing forces. Although committed in timely fashion, these reinforcements were clearly inadequate to outflank Workers Settlement No. 8 from the north and south. Making matters worse, heavy snow and strong winds disrupted the supporting artillery fire and tank attack and caused Romanovsky's fresh assault to fail.

   This sort of operational/tactical information flows relentlessly, page after page, as the Germans reach the outskirts of Leningrad, the Soviets miraculously hold the city, the siege begins, the Soviets eventually manage to open a slender lifeline, more ambitious Soviet offensives fail, and finally the Germans are dislodged and forced to withdraw. From June 1941 through April 1944 the fighting—and the torrent of units, localities, and numbers—scarcely halts. Glantz also covers in considerable detail the Soviet offensive in Karelia from June through August in 1944 that forced Finland out of the war.
   In addition to the steady torrent of battles and combat statistics, the book pauses briefly in two separate chapters to describe how the inhabitants of Leningrad endured. Even this material relies mostly on quoting directives and statistics. As with the entire book, the account is more about events than about people.
   And that raises an interesting point. The Battle for Leningrad is one of the top books of the year, and—as with almost everything else Glantz has written—it delivers more information about the subject than anything else already written in English. On the other hand, it should be noted that this kind of book can prove very difficult to read in long stretches. The incredible array of numbers, dates, and units can quickly become overwhelming if not downright numbing, because, as usual, Glantz writes austere, fact-laden prose intended to provide intense doses of data, not entertainment.
   For anyone interested in the nuts and bolts of the constant day-by-day ebb and flow of the campaign, this book lacks nothing. For anyone who wants to peek behind the scenes and understand the conflagration at a deeper level, this kind of approach—valuable as it is—will prove less engrossing.
   Although the book contains a few forays into territory not directly related to the conduct of the battles, the focus is very narrowly on the conduct of combat operations. For example, Glantz brings out some fresh information on the circumstances of General Vlasov falling into German hands, but gives scarcely any indication that the general would prove to be anything more than just another captured Soviet officer. Similarly, the text mentions in passing that the Germans ordered siege artillery (including "Dora") moved from Sevastopol to Leningrad, but then has nothing more to say about these interesting guns. When chapter twelve describes how Estonian SS troops broke and ran (citing Ziemke), the text provides no background information on the unit. (In a couple of places, the book mistakenly refers to the "SS Nederland Estonian Panzer Grenadier Brigade," although that juxtaposition of nationalities is probably just a typo.) These sorts of personalities, formations, and incidents could provide ample opportunity to add a wealth of fascinating digressions (see, for example, how Shelford Bidwell tosses out opinions like pungent grenades in The Chindit War, John Ellis manages to paint units like the Moroccan Goums in indelibly flamboyant colors in the course of Cassino, and Russell Weigley never loses sight of the human dimensions of the campaign in Eisenhower's Lieutenants), but The Battle for Leningrad almost inevitably rolls straight ahead to yet another offensive without pausing.
   This is an excellent book, and we always look forward to this kind of exceptionally informative work. We also look forward to the day when David Glantz, already a great researcher and a great military historian, will grow into a writer who interprets and explains events instead of just describing them. Meanwhile, we'll gladly gobble up everything he cares to write about the Russo-German War.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from the University Press of Kansas.
   Thanks to UPK for providing this review copy.