ISBN 0-7110-2899-0
224 pages

Introduction; maps; photos; Conclusion; Chapter Notes; Bibliography; Index

   So large and widespread was the Second World War that it remains impossible to comprehend in detail without compartmentalizing the various theaters, fronts, campaigns, and battles. Authors Chris Mann and Christer Jorgensen have done just that with their new book, isolating events in Scandinavia geographically—although spanning several distinct campaigns—and studying those localized events in some depth. Given the variety of military action waged from 1939 through 1945 in this geographical region, in the air above it, and in adjacent waters, the authors have much, and much of interest, to convey to their readers. Some of that material should be familiar to anyone with a passing interest in World War II, while other parts of the story will probably prove less so.
   Of the campaigns in the northern theater, perhaps best known is the Winter War between Finland and the Soviet Union during 1939-1940. The authors use the Winter War as the beginning point of their book, but it's mostly an account of how Finland gained its independence, inter-war developments, and Finnish-German relations. The actual military campaign is compressed to little more than two pages, all a bit hurried, such that General Franz Halder is mistakenly identified as the "Wehrmacht (German Armed Forces) chief of staff." Beyond the first chapter, the authors cover events in more depth (including accurate references to Halder), perhaps because, as the title indicates, the book's overall emphasis is more narrowly focused on German operations.
   The second chapter covers the German invasion of Norway in 1940 and amounts to about thirty pages of text and photos. There are plenty of other books about this campaign, some far more detailed, but the authors do a credible job of hitting the highlights, especially from the German perspective—although using almost exclusively British books for sources. Nothing to complain about, but little new for anyone who has read Derry, Ziemke, and Claasen.
   As the first of a trio of chapters covering German operations in Finland, chapter three proves to be a little meatier than the opening two chapters of the book. The authors devote a fair amount of space to Finnish operations against the Soviets (almost twenty pages) before turning to German operations, largely utilizing Ziemke and Lucas as sources. Again, this is not bad for a general overview, but the text is not flawless, such as claiming during the description of Operation Polarfox in 1941 that SS-Kampfgruppe Nord "was renamed (inappropriately) as the 6th SS Mountain Division," when (according to Tessin) the kampfgruppe was redesignated SS-Division Nord in September 1941, became SS-Gebirgs-Division Nord in September 1942, and didn't become 6th SS-Gebirgs-Division Nord until 1943. Such quibbles aside, the account is not bad, especially for XXXVI Corps operations, which usually take a backseat to Dietl's offensive farther north.

   While the Finnish 6th Division crossed the frontier on 1 July at midnight, the German corps did not inaugurate its offensive, with a customary Stuka attack, until 16:00 hours. But in summertime the Arctic is bathed with sunlight both day and night. In addition, the heat was a scorching 80 degrees Fahrenheit (27 degrees Celsius), which caused forest fires (set alight by the artillery salvoes and the dive- bombers) and there were swarms of stinging mosquitoes. The German advance was stopped in its tracks by the Soviet border fortifications and poor battle prowess of the SS troops, earning Demelhuber a sarcastic "congratulation" from von Falkenhorst for the behaviour of his troops. During 2-3 July, the 169th Division made several attempts to break the deadlock. On 4 July XXXVI Corps' headquarters staff were astonished to see terrified motorized SS troops fleeing down the road, claiming that they had encountered Russian tanks and that the bridges across the Kerni River had to be blown. For Feige and von Falkenhorst, this simply confirmed once and for all that the SS troops were wholly unreliable. Feige ordered the 6th Division to advance northwards toward Kayrala. On 6 July the 169th Division, supported by two panzer companies, began attacking and by midday had reached Salla. The two armoured companies lost most of their tanks but had knocked out 16 Soviet ones within a hour. By 17:00 hours the town was captured, but the Germans were immediately thrown back by fierce Russian counterattacks. It was only through a Russian retreat eastwards that Salla was captured by the morning of 8 July. Most of the Soviet 122nd Division had escaped, but had left most of its artillery behind and all its 50 tanks were destroyed. The corps was proud to have captured Salla and inflicted such a stinging defeat upon the enemy, but von Falkenhorst commented sarcastically that the positions that SS Nord had confronted could have been taken by raw recruits (von Falkenhorst's comments were quite unfair). While SS Nord pursued the Soviet 122nd Division towards Fampela, the 169th Division turned east to prevent the enemy from making a stand at Apa and Lake Kuola.
   In the early morning on 9 July, units from the 169th Division reached within 2.4km (1.5 miles) of Kayrala but were thrown back by strong Russian counterattacks. The Soviets had the 122nd Division behind the lakes, the narrows between them were held by the 104th Rifle Division while the 1st Armoured Division was positioned around Allakurtti. It was a formidable array of units. The corps wanted simply to force the Russians out of the defensive line, but headquarters wanted it to make a thrust much deeper: to the east of the Nurmi River. On 16 July von Falkenhorst arrived at the front to inquire what was holding up the advance, and was told that the German troops were unfamiliar with and intensely disliked forest fighting. By comparison, both the Finns and Russians were much better at it. Unimpressed with these "excuses", von Falkenhorst would report to Hitler that XXXVI Corps was completely "degenerate". His conclusion was that the terrain was fine, the roads, compared to what Dietl confronted, were veritable boulevards and that he saw troops lolling about in hammocks when they should have been working or fighting. Von Falkenhorst concluded he would order Feige to get a move on or he would find a new commander. Yet again von Falkenhorst, who was not a frontline commander, trivialized the corps' problems. For example, the troops he found "lolling" were in fact resting from work carried out on the roads - work carried out at night to avoid the heat and mosquitoes that were present during daytime. During 27 and 29 July, the corps made two separate and desperate attacks against the Soviets but without result. By 30 July XXXVI Corps had advanced 20.8km (13 miles) and lost 5500 troops in the process. The 169th Division had been reduced to 9782 officers and men after suffering almost 3300 casualties.

   The following chapter takes the story of the Finnish front through the next three and a half years in the span of about twenty pages, describing the static, mostly quiescent nature of the front and focusing on fortifications, partisan and anti-partisan action, and conditions endured by the troops. The photos accompanying this chapter, all of Soviet forces, are especially interesting, although it's unclear if they all really show the northern theater.
   Chapter five provides a complete change of scenery, shifting to the convoy battles in northern waters. Once again, this is familiar territory previously covered in much detail by many writers, including Richard Woodman and—most recently—Adam Claasen in Hitler's Northern War, which tackles the campaign mostly from an aerial perspective. At over forty pages, this is the longest chapter of Mann and Jorgensen's book, and it does not neglect the Luftwaffe's role in the naval operations.

   The British Admiralty demanded that the Arctic convoys cease through the summer months, and so PQ18 did not sail until September. Forty merchant ships were assembled, and for the first time an Arctic convoy was given its own local air cover by the inclusion of the escort carrier HMS Avenger. An anti-aircraft cruiser, HMS Scylla, 16 destroyers and a whole host of corvettes, trawlers and minesweepers completed the convoy's protection. The Home Fleet would provide distant cover. The Germans had also made considerable plans for PQ18, boosted by their success against the previous convoy. The Scheer, Hipper and the light cruiser Koln were moved to Altenfjord. Hitler, as ever, insisted they take no risks, so Raeder cancelled the operation. The experience of PQl7 had convinced the Luftwaffe erroneously that the previous success could be repeated merely by the use of aircraft. Twelve U-boats were sent out, but the main effort would be made by Colonel-General Stumpff's Luftflotte 5. The Germans had assembled a considerable force in northern Norway. Forty-two He 111H-6 torpedo bombers of KG 26 were joined by 35 Junkers Ju 88A-17s, a new Ju 88 modification also capable of carrying torpedoes, flown in specially from France. They would operate in combination with the ]u 88 bombers of KG 30 using a tactic called the Goldern Zange (Golden Comb). Mid-level and dive-bombing by KG 30 would break up the cohesion of the British escorts, while low-level torpedo attacks would do the real damage. The Germans were aware that HMS Avenger was sailing and Goring ordered that, "the attack against the aircraft carrier must be so violent that this threat is removed." He told his pilots that a victory over PQ18 would be of vital significance to the war against the Soviet Union, as it would deprive the Red Army of important equipment and thus ease the progress of the army at Stalingrad and the drive into the Caucasus.
   Captain Lieutenant Max Martin Teichert's U-456 was the first to spot the convoy as it rounded the southwest corner of Iceland. An Fw 200 picked it up again on 8 September. From then on PQ18 was constantly shadowed by U-boats and long- range reconnaissance aircraft. The U-boats made a number of attacks and two merchantmen were sunk on the morning of 13 September. However, the main attack came that afternoon. The lightly armed Hurricanes flying off Avenger were unable to drive off a wave of Ju 88 bombers making a high-level pass. Then came the Golden Comb attack. Twenty Ju 88s of KG 30 carried out a high-level diversionary run, which caused the required degree of disruption. They were followed by the torpedo bombers of KG 26, 28 He 111s in two waves, followed by 18 Ju 88s from Bardufoss. Another 17 Ju 88s of KG 30 from Banak were in support. As Sub-Lieutenant Hughes aboard HMS Scylla recalled: "they rose on the horizon, black and repulsive, and they extended far on either side of our view. They came in low on the starboard bow of the convoy and seemed to fill the whole horizon." The convoy opened up with everything it had; the Germans came in so low even the 4.7in guns of the destroyers could be brought into action. They pressed their attacks with "suicidal daring [and] flew in amongst the ships, dropping their torpedoes at very- close range." Eight ships were lost in a matter of minutes at the cost of only five aircraft.
   The next air attack, by Heinkel He 115 seaplanes of the Kriegsmarine flying out of Billefjord, was a much more half-hearted affair. They showed little of the determination and elan of their Luftwaffe colleagues. They lost two aircraft and were driven off at the cost of one Hurricane. The U-boats continued to make attacks when they had the opportunity. On the 14th U-457 sank the tanker Athel Templar and escaped the pursuing destroyers by diving under the convoy and becoming lost amid the noise of the convoy's propellers. The losses were not all one way: HMS Onslow destroyed U-5S9. A specific attack by Ju 88s of KG 26 was made on HMS Avenger that day and was broken up with the loss of 11 aircraft. Dive-bombing by KG 30 continued, and in the afternoon another attempt was made on the aircraft carrier, but this also failed to sink her. Five bombers were lost and nine so badly damaged that they were later declared unserviceable. The next day the bombers returned, and by the afternoon seemed content to bomb from above the clouds. The Germans were losing heart. This was confirmed by intercepted radio signals which showed increasing disillusionment amongst the German air crews. The tail-end of the battle of PQ18 was played out over the next few days. Scylla, Avenger and the destroyers detached from the convoy to join the escort of QP14, and were replaced by four Soviet destroyers. Another merchantman was lost, but so were four more German aircraft.
   In all 13 merchant ships out of 40 had been sunk, 10 by aircraft and three by U-boats. However, the Germans had lost 41 aircraft and three submarines. The loss of such highly trained crews was a serious blow. The Luftwaffe had misinterpreted its previous success and had made the costly discovery that it could not break up a determinedly defended convoy alone. So PQ18 was an Allied victory, albeit a very expensive one. It also marked a turning point in the Arctic naval war, as the Germans would never again be able to muster such numbers of aircraft in the area. Luftflotte 5 was stripped in the wake of the Allied landings in North Africa. When the next convoy sailed for Russia, Luftwaffe resources in northern Norway were limited to long-range reconnaissance aircraft and He 115s.

   Probably the least studied aspect of the northern theater, at least in the English language, the Soviet summer offensive against Finland in 1944, the "Lapland War," and the Soviet penetration into northern Norway comprise the penultimate chapter of the book. In many ways the most interesting operations—certainly the most successful and mobile—of the campaign in the north, the authors demonstrate how the Soviets managed to build up overwhelming superiority and launch their version of blitzkrieg in the same terrain and climate conditions that had stymied the Germans in 1941. The Soviet offensive fell first on the Finnish defenses outside Leningrad, and those operations comprise about five pages through the truce in September 1944. With the end of Finnish participation in the war against Stalin, the Germans found themselves in hostile territory, and on 6 September they were ordered to withdraw toward the west. Perhaps because this material is relatively unfamiliar, the authors make an especially good showing with their account of the Finnish attacks on the withdrawing Germans and the Soviet Petsamo-Kirkenes operation, with Ziemke and Gebhardt much cited. This chapter is probably the highlight of the book.
   In the last chapter and the Conclusion, the authors offer more information on Norway during the occupation, Norwegian SS volunteers, SOE operations in Norway, and British commando raids. With the final weeks of the war about the only aspect of the conflict in this region left uncovered, the authors have little to say about the insertion of British forces into Norway, the entry of Norwegian military forces trained in Sweden, and western Allied concerns about Soviet demands for a permanent presence in northern Norway.
   Hitler's Arctic War is a handsome book, nicely designed and graced with many crisp photographs not seen before. At over a hundred photos, images occupy about the half the space on the book's 224 pages. As an attractive, well-illustrated primer on the northern theater, rather than a major ground-breaking tome, the book succeeds fairly well despite a couple of clinkers. While neither Mann nor Jorgensen impresses as an especially scintillating writer, and the editing seems a bit weak in places, overall it's a quick, easy read. If you have time to read only one brief book on the Arctic theater, or only enough room on your shelf for a single volume on the subject, you could do far worse than this one. Given more time and shelf space, however, don't overlook other sources, some of them cited by Mann and Jorgensen, such as Derry, Ziemke, Woodman, Claasen, and Gebhardt.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Ian Allan.
   Thanks to Ian Allan for providing this review copy.