ISBN 0-7006-1192-4
305 pages

List of Abbreviations; Preface; Introduction; photos; maps; statistical appendix; endnotes; Bibliography; Index

   In his new study of the Volkssturm, David Yelton serves notice in his Preface that he has reached some unique conclusions about the nature of the Nazi militia:

   While labeling the Volkssturm a failure or desperate is not inaccurate, neither is it a complete explanation. My research has led me to conclude--contrary to much existing scholarship on the period--that Nazi Germany's leadership began to formulate and implement a relatively coherent strategy in the late summer of 1944. This strategy aimed at winning the war, but in a peculiarly National Socialist manner. The plan called for creating a stalemate that would prolong the war, maximize enemy casualties, and ultimately collapse the supposedly inferior Allies' morale. Nazi leaders envisioned the Volkssturm playing a critical, dual role in this strategy. First, they intended it to be a militia, mobilizing men as part-time soldiers for the local defense of their hometowns. Second, they planned to use the Volkssturm as a means to indoctrinate all German men into willingly and fanatically participating in and sacrificing for the ultimate victory. Moreover, achieving this motivational goal would unify the German Volk--obediently, fanatically, and loyally--behind the leadership of the Party. This would complete the cherished Gleichschaltung that the NSDAP had pursued for years as its most fundamental objective.
   Today it is certainly difficult to see how Germany could have won the war after mid-1944, but my aim is not to argue that the Nazis' plan was feasible. I merely intend to identify the perceptions that drove decision making in the Third Reich in late 1944 and early 1945 and to show that the strategy was consistent with the Nazi system and its worldview. While I want to show that influential German leaders considered their plan workable, the majority of the book focuses on the precise reasons why the Volkssturm failed to achieve its overall objectives. Among the most salient obstacles to Volkssturm success were the deteriorating military and economic situations, poor civilian morale, Nazi political infighting, and, perhaps most important, the fundamental inaccuracy of the ideological assumptions--both of Allied strength and of German and NSDAP abilities--that guided Nazi thought. Because of the Volkssturm's scope, understanding the reasons behind this organization's existence and performance helps us better grasp the German perspective--at all levels--during the last months of the Third Reich.

   Yelton begins his exposition with a discussion of the German Replacement Army's "alarm companies" formed in 1941 from local civilians who were trained at monthly drills for defense of nearby installations in Germany. "In case of commando raids, sabotage, prisoner-of-war or foreign worker uprisings, or even enemy invasion, alarm companies would mobilize and fight as soldiers under Wehrkreis command." In 1942 these alarm companies were transferred to police control and redesignated Statwacht and Landwacht. By the end of 1943 this force amounted to almost a million troops. Nevertheless, in the middle of 1943 Adolf Hitler explicitly turned down plans to begin creating Wehrmacht-controlled militia units in the east using this source of manpower. In addition, the political in-fighting among Nazi party figures—notably Heinrich Himmler and Martin Bormann—meant that nearly all of the top government leaders opposed the idea of a state militia, at least until each had worked out his own plan to wrest control of the organization.
   Following Germany's disasters on the Eastern and Western fronts in the summer of 1944, Heinz Guderian in September proposed formation of a militia to help stabilize the Russian front. Largely at the behest of Bormann, Guderian's concept was altered so that the putative force would be organized and controlled by the Nazi party, not the Army. Given the desperate situation and Bormann's ideological arguments about the "holy people's war" as well as Hitler's anger at the military after the 20 July assassination attempt, the Fuehrer approved plans for the Volkssturm and the long-delayed militia was formally announced on 25 September 1944.

   While the enthusiastic energy and apparent--as opposed to real--efficiency with which Party officials undertook their new duties must be counted as a major reason in overcoming Hitler's long-standing aversion to militias, Martin Bormann's personal intervention seems to have been the final and decisive factor in Hitler's decision to shift control over the militia from the relatively well-prepared Wehrmacht to the very Party leaders who had stymied earlier militia proposals. Like Hitler, Bormann's vehement opposition to militias had begun to soften because of fears of internal unrest from the large number of foreigners (slave laborers and POWs), concerns about declining public morale, and the reliability of the army in the aftermath of July 20. During August, Bormann had in fact begun moving in the direction of creating a dependable armed force that could counter internal uprisings by launching an effort to arm all Political Leaders....
   Given the fact that during August, militias--both proposed and real--were blossoming like desert Howlers after a rain, Bormann must have recognized his two options: gain control of the movement and enhance his power, or oppose the militia and risk having a rival such as Himmler or one or more Gauleiters gain political influence at his expense. Under these circumstances, and with Guderian having convinced Hitler to form a substantial regional militia, Bormann chose the former course of action.

   Other than simply harnessing more manpower to supplement the military effort, what did the Germans hope to achieve with the Volkssturm? By imbuing the militia with Nazi spirit and a sense of self-sacrifice, Hitler and Bormann and other leaders intended to inflict so many Allied casualties that the Grand Alliance would lose the will to finish the war. As Yelton describes how the German leaders intended to accomplish these goals, the text echoes terms and attitudes that seem more appropriate to other national and political philosophies. Bormann banned clergy from serving in the Volkssturm and prohibited units from utilizing chaplains. Commanders were to be referred to as "unit leader" rather than "Herr," and sometimes militia men were encouraged to use the term "comrade." Unit political leaders would serve functions very similar to Soviet commissars. In addition, the troops were to be constantly indoctrinated that they should be willing to sacrifice themselves to save their families, their homes, and their nation. Not unlike the Japanese, the Volkssturm's "...success depended, as did the broader Nazi strategy for victory, on making individual Germans want to prefer death in battle over surrender." More than any other part of the book, some of these descriptions of Nazi plans demonstrate to a harrowing degree the utter fanaticism of the collapsing regime.
   The structure and purpose of the Volkssturm through a series of highly political machinations ended up under the very centralized control of Martin Bormann. Yelton makes clear how the idealized nature of the "self-sacrificing" organization was soon subverted by the byzantine rivalries and overlapping powers of the Reich's leaders. Everyone, it seems, at every level wanted some piece of the action for his own purposes. The author concludes two detailed chapters about national and local administration of the militia with this summary:

   In the long run, Bormann's Volkssturm dream was sabotaged by the very system and men he trusted to make the vision into reality. He, in his zeal to exclude his rivals, handicapped his own efforts by holding the reins of power so tightly that he stifled any initiative and enthusiasm for the Volkssturm that his regional and local subordinates might display. Likewise, lower-level Nazis often demonstrated a counterproductive selfishness of both a personal and institutional nature. Other local officials unwittingly undermined the Volkssturm by their own incompetence. The wisest among them recognized the impossibility of their situation and turned over many of their powers to the Wehrmacht, the only organization with even a chance to have made the force useful on a large scale. Rather than generating fanaticism and efficiency, the ill-defined and highly competitive Nazi administrative structure proved ineffective in the Volkssturm's case. The Volkssturm was conceived as an expression of the National Socialist will to resist; it is fittingly ironic that the negative features of the Nazi political system helped strangle enthusiasm for the Volkssturm both nationally and locally.

   Regardless of their enthusiasm for the Volkssturm, millions of Germans served. For the most part, they were drafted via the "Aufgebot" system and Levy classifications which essentially netted all males from 16 to 60 who met minimum physical requirements and were not exempted due to civilian employment deemed essential to the war effort. In theory, men were classified as qualified to serve only in their home district, or else anywhere needed, and only for periods considered sufficiently short to avoid major disruption in war production work. As with nearly every aspect of the Volkssturm, these draft classifications generated considerable political squabbling by those who sought to gain power and prestige by controlling the decision-making process. Again, Bormann ended up on top.

   Once established, Bormann fully exploited his influence over personnel issues through a series of detailed Implementation Instructions (Ausfuhrungsbestimmungen), many of which addressed the crucial, thorny issue of where to draw the line between the First and Second Levies. In preparing these edicts, Bormann gladly redressed many of the grievances of any official willing to recognize the Party Chancellery's political control over the militia. For example, Bormann was enraged by Reich Postal Minister Ohnesorge's collaborative effort with Berger to procure deferrals and segregated units for Reichspost employees; but once Ohnesorge acknowledged Party Chancellery authority, Bormann guaranteed deferrals for 30 percent of male postal employees and granted permission to form segregated Levy II Postal Police units. More strikingly, once Speer ceased open efforts to undermine Bormann, he received guidelines for forming "factory-affiliated units," a very generous 70 percent deferral rate for industries under his ministry's supervision, and a voice for factory managers in assigning deferrals to their own employees. All of this deviated from basic stated Volkssturm principles and contradicted earlier orders. The deals struck to produce these Implementation Instructions--which Bormann issued "in cooperation" with the officials responsible for supervising the relevant economic sector--clearly reveal that political and economic pragmatism often outweighed ideological calls for unity when it came to the Levy System.

   Yelton goes on to scrutinize the impact of the Volkssturm on various sectors of the economy. This chapter is also supported by a "Statistical Appendix" amounting to almost twenty pages of tabular data. From an individual rather than statistical perspective, however, the author demonstrates that being called into the Volkssturm was often, despite the official rules and regulations, an entirely capricious decision which had more to do with pulling strings, local political clout, personal vendettas, incompetent paper-shuffling, or sheer expediency.

   From a purely economic standpoint, the Volkssturm Levy System met its basic goal of mobilizing men while limiting the damage done to war production. Although the Volkssturm complicated matters, caused disruptions, and overburdened the existing draft machinery at a time when conscription officials should have been focused on making the complicated shifts necessary to release men for Wehrmacht service, it did not cause Germany's war economy to collapse. But in seeking to achieve its economic aim, the Levy System violated the Volkssturm's fundamental motivational principle--that people would fight for the Volk once they saw it transcended distinctions of class, occupation, or rank. The existence of deferrals made it impossible to believe that the burden of self-defense was shared equally. Rather than contributing to the creation of a sense of unity, the Volkssturm Levy System--intended to satisfy pragmatic economic and political concerns--undermined the hope that Germans could work together in a selfless manner. Therefore, from an ideological standpoint, the Levy System failed disastrously.

   While the Levy system and its inequalities generated a certain amount of dissatisfaction, one other issue in particular threatened to scuttle the entire Volkssturm concept. Given the Wehrmacht's treatment of enemy partisans, German civilians were—understandably!—nearly unanimous in their refusal to serve as guerilla fighters without military status and the consequent protections afforded—at least in theory—by international law. Yelton devotes a chapter to this topic, pointing out, for example, how Hitler in 1940 had denounced the British Home Guard as illegal. In one of the relatively few areas of wartime negotiations with the Allies (conducted through intermediaries), Germany altered policy and began treating French Forces of the Interior (the Maquis) as regular troops, while in return the United States and Britain agreed the Volkssturm men would be treated as legal combatants "so long as the militia acted in accordance with international law."
   Partly to further the impression of legal military status, militia units were eventually organized much like Army units. Although almost no units were fully equipped, they all had TOEs very similar to equivalent Army formations, at least in theory. Partly to prevent identification as partisans, militia men were forbidden from carrying their own personal weapons (such hunting rifles). At first Volkssturm members wore their own civilian garb, but the Party soon attempted to clothe everyone in various mixed and matched military uniforms. Along with the standardized armband, these steps were intended to prevent the Volkssturm from being perceived as partisans.

   The decision to make the Volkssturm a legal militia not only shaped organizational issues but also profoundly affected decisions concerning weaponry, equipment, uniforms, and training. Adherence to international law in these areas made the Volkssturm ever more dependent on the Wehrmacht because it was the only institution with the skill, experience, and resources required to prepare a legal traditional militia for battle. Ultimately, this created a paradoxical situation--at least from the Nazi viewpoint--where NSDAP motivational efforts were generally ineffective and even counterproductive, while Wehrmacht instructional, technical, and/or logistical involvement not only boosted the recipient units' combat potential but also raised morale. Thus, making the Volkssturm a legal militia further moved the force away from the original Nazi idea of creating a fanatic people's militia. In the final analysis, however, despite strenuous efforts by the Party and army, adequately preparing the Volkssturm on a national scale proved well beyond the capabilities of any and all Nazi German institutions.

   Training programs, run mostly by the Replacement Army, emphasized anti-tank defenses in an ordinary infantry role rather than guerilla tactics. For these purposes ample numbers of panzerfauste were usually available, but other equipment was often difficult to obtain. Local leaders concocted some bizarre schemes—such as buying arms on the black market in occupied Italy—to equip their favored formations. By early 1945 it became clear to most Volkssturm men that their units would never be fully armed, they would never be properly trained, and they would never have competent leaders. Morale dropped sharply and absenteeism at Volkssturm training sessions grew rampant.

   Other Germans expressed their lack of confidence in the Volkssturm through humor. In one joke a company leader discovers that so many of his men were absent from training because "some are at confirmation class, the rest are collecting their pensions." Others combined disdain for endless reports of secret weapons with opinions on the Volkssturm: the latest miracle weapon was a supersensitive listening device for all German cemeteries. If it detected any slight breathing, the corpse would be exhumed and enrolled in the local Volkssturm. Also in this genre was the quip that all now knew what the V-2 and V-3 were--the V-2s were sixteen-year-old Volkssturmers, and the V-3s were the sixty-year-olds.

   Despite the poor morale, most militia units remained obedient, although Yelton documents a few cases of subversion and even some armed resistance against Hitler's Nazi state.
   For many readers, Yelton's last two chapters will be the most interesting, comprising as they do the record of Volkssturm combat action on the Eastern and Western fronts respectively.
   During the first actions in the east, local Party officials retained control of Volkssturm units. In East Prussia, the performance of those militia battalions was rated as "adequate" by the Army in October 1944 after taking heavy casualties but helping to halt Soviet attacks. Soon the Army was taking tactical control of Volkssturm formations and integrating them into defensive plans and positions. During the Soviet offensive in January 1944, Volkssturm performance was mixed. Some units fled. Some fought tenaciously. Some partly trained militia men armed with panzerfauste slowed the enemy just long enough for their families to be safely evacuated from their local villages. Even in the most favorable circumstances, the Volkssturm tended to take very heavy casualties. Nevertheless, the Wehrmacht continued to utilize militia battalions in the front lines, particularly in the Fortress cities. In the Battle of Berlin, according to Yelton, Volkssturm personnel comprised almost half of German manpower. The author provides considerable detail about Volkssturm forces committed to combat and devotes several pages to analyzing factors affecting their performance in various situations.
   Volkssturm battalions were not as successful on the Western front. Yelton ticks off all the reasons—notably, rather less desire to fight the Brits and Yanks—and then reviews various engagements where the militia was committed. Although the militia seldom proved effective, the Wehrmacht had little choice but to use Volkssturm forces in large numbers. On the upper Rhine, for example, "...the German army stationed there became so dependent on the militia that it was jokingly known as the Nineteenth 'Volkssturm' Army."

   Furthermore, to develop fallback positions, AOK 19 planned an extensive deployment of Levy II units in fortifications along both the border and the crestline of the hilly Black Forest. Several army staffs supervised the Volkssturm units slated to improve and man these defenses; and Gaustabsfuhrer Burst ordered each of the twenty-eight battalions assigned to the Black Forest Border Position to set up a headquarters there, lay out fire plans, and conduct Sunday training in their assigned sectors. All other armed Volkssturm units were to prepare for local defense of their hometowns. For its part, AOK 19 instructed each town's military commander to establish immediate, permanent liaison with the local Party headquarters and to do everything possible to supervise, coordinate, and improve his area's Volkssturm units. Despite these efforts, Party-army relations at the lowest levels were not always smooth, and AOK 19 simply could not adequately arm, uniform, supply, or train all the region's Volkssturm units, particularly the Levy II battalions slated for deployment in the unfinished Black Forest positions or in local defense.
   The Nineteenth Army's extensive preparations deterred a direct assault, but on March 29 the French First Army's Rhine crossings at Speyer and Germersheim flanked the army's defenses. The French advance forced AOK 19 to abandon its prepared positions and rehearsed tactics, thus putting its Volkssturm units at a distinct disadvantage. Further complicating matters was Wurttemberg Gauleiter Murr's effort--ultimately squelched by Hitler himself--to withhold promised Volkssturm reinforcements for use in his own Gau. Finally, AOK 19, lacking reserves and regular troops, faced a hopeless struggle that prompted widespread desertion and led some Volkssturm units to surrender quickly, as happened at Lichtenau and Balzhofen.
   None of this is surprising; AOK 19's commanders themselves harbored no illusions about Volkssturm combat capabilities. What is interesting is how well a number of Volkssturm units did, especially considering that they lacked extensive support from regular troops and were fighting a fluid defensive action for which they had not trained extensively. Resistance from outnumbered Volkssturm battalions and antitank teams in the Pforzheim-Ettlingen-Rastatt area prevented the French from quickly rolling up the army's entire Rhine front, while other units fought well at Offenburg, Zell, and elsewhere.

   Yelton goes on to describe the Volkssturm failure at Remagen. The militia units there were "untrained, lightly armed, and ill informed" and put up almost no resistance to the American advance. Had Remagen's local forces delayed the 9th Armored Division, they might well have bought sufficient time for German engineers to destroy the Ludendorff railway bridge before it could be captured.
   Where Volkssturm resistance was strongest, Yelton often traces the reason to "fanatical" local leaders and fear of execution for dereliction of duty. In particular, it seems militia units often performed best when fighting alongside SS troops. On the other hand, conventional wisdom claims that the Volkssturm's Hitler Youth units were the most fanatical fighters, but Yelton finds few hard facts to substantiate these stories. "Also there is substantial evidence that HJ units were frequently evacuated rather than employed in combat, and where HJ units fought, they often did so due to poor evacuation procedures rather than pure fanaticism."

   As on the Eastern Front, western Volkssturm success hinged upon Wehrmacht assistance before and during combat, both to enable the militia to fight and to give their local victories strategic meaning. OB West and OKH viewed the Volkssturm differently, however. Both considered the force useful, but OKH, desperate for manpower, tended to work hard to control Volkssturm units and improve and employ them on a large scale. OB West, until 1945 better supplied with reserves and defending a front that was both shorter and largely outside of Germany, took less interest in the Volkssturm. Unlike Guderian, OB West never seriously challenged Party control of the Volkssturm. Generally it considered the force useful only for local defense, and therefore left its use and improvement to local commanders. In turn, these officers, particularly if faced with uncooperative NSDAP officials, sometimes lacked the time, will, or material, personnel, or political resources needed to make the Volkssturm effective in a significant way.
   Whereas OKH mobilized groups of Volkssturm units simultaneously and made some coordinated efforts to integrate them into their defensive plans and to prepare them to perform prearranged tasks, western commanders tended to activate Volkssturm battalions as needed, singly or in small groups. Except in the West Wall's Saar and Upper Rhine sectors, western commanders tended to view and use the Volkssturm as a tactical stopgap; eastern commanders viewed the Volkssturm as an operational-level resource. As 1945 progressed, officers on the Western Front threw Volkssturm troops into the line as units or individuals with increasing frequency and simply expected them to perform as seasoned infantrymen. Given time, support, and guidance, Volkssturm units could do this, as shown by Battalions 38/20 and by some of the units on the Upper Rhine; but by 1945, time was a luxury. Therefore, it is little wonder that Volkssturm men, thrust into combat situations with little preparation and or guidance from either the Party or the army, surrendered in droves. Western commanders, particularly early on, had an unrealistic view of individual Volkssturm unit capabilities and never fully appreciated the degree of assistance required to make the units effective. As a result, the army provided the militia with less support in the west than the east, one of the two main reasons for the western Volkssturm's poorer performance.

   In his erudite "Conclusion," Yelton reviews the main points of his text and uses the Volkssturm as a lens for studying Hitler, the Nazi power structure, and the Wehrmacht. As to the Volkssturm itself, it seems that Hitler's ongoing refusal to sanction formation of a militia force at an earlier stage of the war might have been the most limiting factor in Volkssturm performance. Yelton points out that if the militia had been formed earlier, the extended time for organizing, equipping, and training might have paid off with improved effectiveness on the battlefield. The book's final sentence brings the discussion to a fitting end: "...[the German Volkssturm] shows how Nazi ideology largely superseded reality as the basis for decision making in the Third Reich."
   Although the last two chapters delve into combat operations, Yelton devotes far more chapters to the overall philosophy, politics, and personalities behind the Volkssturm. Even at that, this is a relatively short book. The end matter—statistical appendices, extensive endnotes, lengthy bibliography, and thorough index—at 140 pages nearly matches the length of the main text. For all its academic orientation and scholarly approach, Hitler's Volkssturm never becomes dry or unreadable. The text is deftly written, packed with fresh insights, and beams with occasional flashes of droll humor. About the only element missing from the book is an order of battle with details on exactly what battalions existed, where they were raised, and where and when they were committed to operations. Despite that gap, Yelton's book is definitely one of the very best books of the year, and highly recommended.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from University Press of Kansas.
   Thanks to UPK for providing this review copy.