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Ross, Steven T. U.S. War Plans, 1938-1945. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002.

ISBN 1-58826-008-9
317 pages

Editor's Note; Introduction; tables; About the Book

   Steven T. Ross has over the years put together a number of volumes compiling assorted documents of wartime planning. His latest, covering American plans for the years 1938 through 1945, will be of interest to anyone studying the Second World War.
   Following a three-page Introduction, the book contains thirty-two different sets of plans divided into three broad categories:

Part 1 Pre-War Plans

1 Study of Joint Action in the Event of Violation of Monroe Doctrine by Fascist Powers, November 12, 1938
2 Rainbow No. 1, October 14, 1939
3 Rainbow No. 4, August 14, 1940
4 Plan Dog, November 12, 1940
5 United States-British Staff Conversation Report, ABC-1, March 27, 1941
6 The Victory Program, September 11, 1941
7 Rainbow No. 5 (Revised), November 19, 1941

Part 2 The War in North Africa and Europe

8 Outline Plan, Operation Torch, October 8, 1942
9 Operation Husky, March 24, 1943
10 Operation Avalanche, August 31, 1943
11 Operation Shingle, January 12, 1944
12 Operation Neptune, May 20, 1944
13 Fortitude, February 23, 1944
14 AGWAR, for United States Joint Planning Staff, May 8, 1944
15 Operation (Anvil) Dragoon, August 1, 1944
16 Operation Market, September 1944
17 Appreciation and Plan of Operations, January 20, 1945
18 SCAF 260 (Final Offensive), March 31, 1945

Part 3 The War in the Pacific

19 Joint Directive for Offensive Operations in the Southwest Pacific Area, July 2, 1942
20 The Elkton (Cartwheel) Plan, February 28, 1943
21 Joint Chiefs of Staff Directive, March 28, 1943
22 Operation Plan No. 14-43, June 3, 1943, and Serial 00958 Warning Order, September 22, 1943
23 Operation Plan No. 13-43 (Galvanic), October 5, 1943
24 Operation Plan No. 16-43C (Flintlock Revised), December 16, 1943
25 Operation Hailstone, January 18, 1944
26 Operation Catchpole, January 18, 1944
27 CinCPac Forager, April 23, 1944
28 CinCPoa No. 8-44 (King II), September 27, 1944
29 Operation Musketeer III, September 28, 1944
30 Operation Detachment, October 7, 1944
31 CinCPoa No. 14-44 (Iceberg), December 31, 1944
32 Operation Downfall, May 28, 1945

   These run from about three pages to much more sizeable chunks, such as more than thirty pages for "The Victory Program" and nearly as many for "Rainbow No. 5 (Revised)." Each plan is introduced by a few paragraphs outlining the context of the plan, then Ross quotes more-or-less the full body of the plan, with this editorial caveat: "The sources of the documents reproduced in this book are archival copies of varying quality. Every attempt has been made to reproduce the documents exactly, but there is the possibility that some of the more illegible originals were misread."
   The documents themselves are not actually facsimile reproductions, but rather nicely re-formatted pages freshly word-processed and properly sized for the book so they are perfectly clean and legible. In addition to pages of text in outline and bulleted format, many of the plans also include a great deal of tabular data.
   Here's an example of one of the shorter plans:

Operation Plan No. 14-43, June 3, 1943, and Serial 00958 Warning Order, September 22, 1943

   Although the Navy preferred to execute the old Orange Plan, which called for an advance through the Central Pacific, the Guadalcanal Campaign led inexorably to further operations in the South Pacific. Since American forces were also fighting on New Guinea, advances in the Solomons placed additional pressures on the Japanese.
   Campaigns in the Solomons were never part of U.S. pre-war planning. They were an improvisation, a response to initial Japanese advances. The
   American drives made slow progress but Japan committed and lost a large percentage of its naval air arm in numerous engagements throughout the region.


Task Organization

(a) Task Force 31 - Rear Admiral Turner.
   Units allocated by CTF 32

      8 DD
      24 PT
      12 PT in reserve at LUGSAIL
      2 Tugs
      2 Barges
      43rd Division
      9th Marine Defense Battalion
      1 Bn. 155mm Hows.
      1st Marine Raider Regiment less 2 Battalions.
      2 Btrys 90 mm AA guns (from 70th CA)
      2 Btrys Automatic weapons (from 70th CA)
      1 Company native troops
      ACORN 7
      1/2 20th CB's
      24th CB's
      Argus 11
      No. 4 Naval Communication Unit
      Four Naval Base Detachments
      Boat Pool No. 8

(b) Task Force 33 - Vice Admiral Fitch.

      Land based aircraft Sopac Area.
      Tender based aircraft Sopac Area.
      Initially, aircraft Cardiv Twenty-Two.

(c) Task Force 36

      Task Group 36.1 - Rear Admiral Ainsworth.

         Crudiv 9, NICKOLAS (Comdesron 21),
         Desdiv 41.

. . . .

Warning Instructions

1. For hostile dispositions see current intelligence summaries.

2. a. MISSION - Forces of the South Pacific Area will seize and occupy simultaneously positions in the southern part of the NEW GEORGIA Group preparatory to a full scale offensive against NUNDN-VILA and later BUIN-FAISI.

b. TASKS

(1) Seize, hold and develop a staging point for small craft in the NICKHAN ANCHORAGE area.
(2) Seize, hold and develop VIRU HARBOR as a staging point for small craft.
(3) Seize SEGI and construct a fighter airfield in that vicinity.
(4) Seize, hold and develop a position on RENDOVA ISLAND as a supply base, advanced PT Base, and as a base of departure for an attack on MUNDA or VILA. Initial seizure will be in such strength as will make means available for the immediate exploitation of any favorable opportunity for the seizure of MUNDA.

c. TARGET DATE - Dog day will be June 15th or shortly thereafter. Exact date will be announced later.

3. a. FORCES TO BE EMPLOYED IN AMPHIBIOUS PHASE OF OPERATION

(1) Task Force 32.
(2) Ground forces indicated below. These will be made available by Commanders concerned at times and places specified by Commander Task Force 32 and will upon embarkation pass to the latter's command.

   43rd Division (less one CT at Russell Islands).
   9th Defense Bn (less tank platoon).
   1 Bn l55mm How (from Guadalcanal).
   1st Raider Regiment (less two Bns and Det. Regtl Hq Co.).
   1 Btry Automatic Weapons 70th CA.
      Acorn 7.
      Argus 11.

      Personnel and equipment to form four (4) Naval base units, total strength approximately 2,000. Commander Task Force 32 will submit recommendations to this Headquarters for composition and organization of each unit.

b. NAVAL AND AIR SUPPORT - Details to be announced later.

4. a. Commanding General GUADALCANAL will support the operation by making available supplies in the GUADALCANAL-RUSSELLS areas (including the DRYGOODS stock pile) and furnishing the necessary labor details for loading or transshipment in that area.

b. Troops making initial landings will be accompanied by three units of fire and thirty days supplies except that AA units and WICKHAM and VIRU and SEGI Groups will carry 5 units of fire. Ammunition and supplies will be built up to the following levels as early as practicable:

   5 Units of fire. (Army unit of fire will apply).
   60 Days supplies.

. . . .


22 Sept. 1943.

From: Commander South Pacific.
To: Commanding General, First Marine Amphibious Corps.
Commander Task Force Thirty-One.
Commander Task Force Thirty-Three.

Subject: Warning Order.

Reference: (a) Comsopac secret serial 001224 of 11 July, 1943.
(b) Comsopac secret serial 001421 of 5 August, 1943.

1. Reference (a) and (b) are cancelled. You will be prepared to execute, on or about 1 November, 1943, either of the two plans listed in paragraph 3 below.

2. For either of these plans, you are allocated the forces hereafter listed:

(a) Under Command CTF 31.

   All units of TF 32.
   Desron 21, Desdiv 43.
   PTs, YMs and AMs as allocated by Commander South Pacific.
   Corps troops of First Marine Amphibious Corps.
   3rd Marine Division.
   37th Inf. Division.
   1 Brig., 3rd N.Z. Division.
   3rd Marine Defense Battalion.
   198th CA(AA) Regiment.
   2nd Prov. Raider Regiment.
   1st Marine Parachute Regiment.
   Acorns 9 & 11.
   Facilities of Cub 9. (incl. 1/2 6th Spec., 75th and 88th C.Bs)
   Boat Pool No. 10.

(b) Supporting Forces.

(1) Under Command Commander South Pacific.

   TFs 37, 38, and 39.

(2) Under Command CTF 33.

   All land and tender-based aircraft, South Pacific, plus initially VF 33 and Carrier Air Groups 38 and 40.

(3) Under Command CTF 72.

   Submarines as allocated.

3. (a) Plan I.

Seize and hold Treasury Island and northern Empress Augusta Bay Area, Bougainville Island, and construct airfields in the vicinity of Empress Augusta Bay.

(b) Plan II. (Alternate)

(1) Phase 1.
Seize and hold Treasury Island and Choiseul Bay Area, install radars, PT bases and staging points thereat and construct airfields in the vicinity of Choiseul Bay Area, in preparation for Phase 2.

(2) Phase 2.
Seize and hold a hostile airfield in the vicinity of Tenekau, Bougainville Island, during the latter part of December, 1943. Forces for this phase will be assigned later.

4. Commander Task Force Thirty-One will be in command of this operation and will coordinate detailed planning therefor.

5. Commanding General, First Marine Amphibious Corps, will be in command of the land forces.

6. Decision as to the Plan to be executed, and my Operation Plan, will be promulgated at a later date.

ROBT. B. CARNEY, Chief of Staff.

   Some portions of some of these plans are available elsewhere, such as in the US Army official volumes, but this is a splendid compilation of so many, and such complete, planning documents. While certainly not the sort of thing the typical reader will devour cover to cover, U.S. War Plans, 1938-1945 makes a great reference volume. It might have been improved by a bit more commentary from Ross—for example, by how much did given operations diverge from the original planning (the "Victory Plan" would be a classic case), and what lessons did planners learn for future operationss?—but that is apparently beyond Ross' intended scope. This is nonetheless worth a look for serious students of the war.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Lynn Rienner Publishers.
   Thanks to Rienner for providing this review copy.

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Reviewed 16 June 2002
Copyright © 2002 by Bill Stone
May not be reproduced in any form without written permission of Stone & Stone
 

 

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