ISBN 0-7006-1158-4
368 pages

Preface; Acknowledgments; photos; maps; Notes; Bibliography; Index

Appendices: Equivalent Ranks; The Falaise Pocket

   Few WWII topics enjoy among English-language readers and authors the same degree of popularity as D-Day and the Normandy campaign. We've certainly reviewed our share of books on that topic in the last few years, including some excellent—and sometimes opinionated—titles by Balkoski, Mansoor, Lewis, Zetterling, Bando, Isby, Jarymowycz, Reynolds, Carafano, etc. To that parade of books about Normandy it's time to add one more.
   Mark J. Reardon begins his new book from University Press of Kansas conventionally enough with a review of the strategic situation in Europe in the spring of 1944, and especially the situation in France. He enumerates the German defensive forces, then examines the competing plans of Erwin Rommel (panzers held close to the coast for immediate counterattack) and Gerd von Rundstedt (panzers held farther back for a more carefully planned and coordinated attack after the main Allied effort had been identified). That's not an unusual evaluation of the situation, but Reardon puts a different spin on Adolf Hitler's intentions.

   Hitler believed that, in the long run, the destruction of a few [Allied] assault divisions would not suffice to provide him with the strategic breathing space necessary to regain the initiative on the Eastern Front. In order to indefinitely cripple Allied follow-on efforts, it would be preferable to allow the invaders to land ten to fifteen divisions before launching the decisive counterattack to destroy the lodgment. An additional advantage to be gained by confining the Anglo-Americans' lodgment for several months was that the planned German counterattack would take place under fall weather conditions adverse to the employment of tactical close air support. The delay would also permit the Germans to build up sufficient air and sea power to seriously attrit the Allied invasion fleet.
   Accepting temporary stalemate in order to gain strategic advantage with the onset of autumn weather appeared to offer many advantages to the defenders. Several key conditions, however, had to be met before Hitler could expect this course of action to produce the desired results. First, German troops had to retain control of seaports to deny the Allies a protected anchorage and cargo handling facilities. By confining the Anglo-Americans to unprotected beaches, their logistical system would become very vulnerable to bad weather as the summer wore on. Second, the Allied main effort had to be established. Third, the decisive panzer counterattack would only be launched when it possessed a favorable opportunity to destroy a substantial number of Allied divisions

   That's an unconventional insight, and not Reardon's last insight of that nature in Victory at Mortain.
   The author continues his overview by describing the situation from the perspective of the Allies and discussing the inexorable logic which led them to choose Normandy as the site of their return to the continent.
   Reardon then sketches the outline of the landings and the early stages of the battle in just a few pages, emphasizing the nature of the battlefield, especially the hedgerows which would play an important part in later operations. He also notes how the Germans proved reluctant to commit Panthers and Tigers—"designed for operations on the featureless plains of Russia"—in the bocage. Unlike most commentators who usually emphasize how the terrain made it difficult for the Allied forces to operate effectively, Reardon reminds readers that the hedgerows also caused tactical difficulties for the panzers, showing that the defenders had to be just as flexible, adaptable, and capable of improvising as the attackers.
   In addition to surveying the terrain and how US tactical formations in particular learned the hard way how to deal with strongly defended hedgerows, Reardon also discusses the American generals, in particular Omar Bradley and J. Lawton Collins. The biographical sketches lead to the planning for Operation Cobra and the opening days of the climactic offensive, setting the stage for the real subject of the book. Reardon concludes his first chapter with these observations:

   Operation COBRA demonstrated conclusively that the difficulty of combat in the hedgerows had actually worked to the advantage of First Army. Despite heavy losses, the intensity of the fighting served to rapidly weld together green American units. As a result of this experience, the American commanders who survived that terrible experience grew increasingly competent, assured, and expert in their trade. Tanks, artillery, infantry, and close air support worked together with an ease and effectiveness they had not exhibited in early June and July....
   In a strategic sense, the excellence at which the German soldier conducted defensive operations in the hedgerows served to work against the Wehrmacht by fostering Hitler's belief that success in France could be gained by confining the Americans to Normandy for an indefinite period. Hitler also failed to recognize that American combined arms employment and leadership had fundamentally improved. Instead, he attributed the Allied success to heavy bombers, faulty dispositions of LXXXlV Armee Korps, and subsequent mistakes on the part of the 7 Armee staff.

   The second chapter of the book describes the activation of 12th Army Group and Third Army, then follows George Patton's drive into Brittany. Reardon discusses the difficulties in passing American forces over the single bridge in Avranches, the debate about sending forces into Brittany as opposed to moving against the exposed German flank, and even looks at Luftwaffe operations against Allied columns and chokepoints. All in all, this chapter—and the American operations it describes—sets the scene for the German counter-offensive.
   Reardon shifts his focus in chapter three to the German perspective, detailing the movement of forces allowing Gunther von Kluge to form a semblance of a defensive line with the 7th Army from Vire to Barenton. The field marshal also promptly spotted the opportunity to slam shut the gap at Avranches, seal the Allies back in Normandy, and isolated the spearheads which had already penetrated into Brittany. The trick would be to mass sufficient force to drive to Avranches. The remainder of the chapter meticulously describes how various divisions were extricated from other battlefields and assembled for the counter-offensive. Reardon also inventories AFVs of participating units, outlines each division's combat history, and provides biographical sketches of the main commanders.
   The fourth chapter covers the ongoing Allied push that upset German plans and deployment at Mortain. It continues with detailed information down to platoon and squad level while discussing weaponry and tactics.

   Each of the rifle regiments of the 30th Infantry Division possessed a company of towed three-inch guns of the 823d Tank Destroyer Battalion. The 823d was unique in that it represented a curious step backward in American organizational development during the Second World War. The poor showing on the part of the half-track-mounted 75mm gun in North Africa, compared with the successes gained by the British who employed towed six-pounders, had convinced the Americans in late 1943 to convert twenty self-propelled TD battalions to towed guns. The towed guns were issued on a basis of one battalion per infantry division, while the self-propelled TD battalions were allocated to corps and army.
   Soon after the invasion took place, it became apparent that the hedgerows, small fields, and apple orchards made Normandy a vastly different place to fight in comparison to the wide-open desert spaces of North Africa. Additionally, infantry units discovered that their organic antitank weapons, the 57mm gun and M1A1 rocket launcher, would not effectively protect them from German panzers. The 57mm gun in particular lacked the penetrating power necessary to destroy German tanks at combat ranges. Although the bazooka was capable of knocking out an opposing panzer, in the hands of unseasoned troops it often proved ineffective.
   Consequently, towed TD's gravitated toward the front lines, taking over the responsibilities of divisional antitank weapons. When towed tank destroyers were employed in the front lines, their unprotected crews suffered heavy personnel losses. Towed guns also were frequently abandoned when their supporting infantry was forced to retire. The large front covered by infantry divisions normally required the deployment of all supporting TDs, which restricted antitank coverage to a thin line lacking depth. At any given point, the most that could be expected was the mutually supporting fire of two guns.
   Against small attacks these tactics proved satisfactory. German armor had normally been employed only in small numbers against First Army to date, which meant that American antitank defenses in Normandy had yet to undergo a severe test. However, a postwar report noted that the lack of centralized control and defense in depth was inadequate "against the employment of large scale attacks...had the enemy been willing to accept losses, a fast moving hard hitting attack could have penetrated our lines at will."

   Reardon continues with the opening of the German attack, Operation Luttich. The Allied advance had disrupted assembly of the striking force, and airpower also delayed movement of German forces from other areas toward Mortain. Late arrivals, traffic jams, and other SNAFUs caused the start of the assault to be postponed. At the last moment there were even pleas to relieve one key commander and/or cancel the attack entirely. The confusion and hesitancy rampant throughout the German chain of command is not something often associated with German planning, but Reardon makes it clear that in some ways the generals were their own worst enemies. He goes on to trace the failure of Allied intelligence, including Ultra, to help the Yanks respond to the impending attack.
   The German assault is then described in unit-by-unit detail.

   Kampfgruppe Fick launched an attack against G Company at 0220 hours. Lieutenant Ronal Woody had no warning that an assault was about to occur until the Germans began firing from a nearby wooded area. After spraying G Company with machine-gun fire, the SS advanced, screaming "Heil Hitler" at the top of their voices. The Americans fired back furiously, forcing their attackers to seek cover. Despite the fierce resistance, the SS troops continued to work their way forward in short rushes. Several of G Company's outposts were overwhelmed. Having failed to knock out G/120th Infantry with a direct assault, small groups of SS began infiltrating around the flanks of the American unit. Although G Company continued to offer stiff resistance, the Germans penetrated the widely separated rifle platoons protecting the center of the 2d Battalion perimeter.
   The flanking maneuver by Kampfgruppe Fick, consisting of Untersturmfuehrer Kuske's 3 Kompanie of SS-Panzeraufklarungs Abteilung 17, was able to launch a surprise foray against H/120th Infantry. The American heavy weapons company was at a disadvantage because it was arrayed to provide support to the rifle companies, not repel a direct assault on its own position. In bitter hand-to-hand fighting, the Germans succeeded in overrunning the H Company mortars and company command post. Captain Byrn led his headquarters personnel west to safety. A counterattack by a rifle platoon of G Company failed to dislodge the Germans from the H Company positions.
   Soon after H Company was overrun, Lieutenant Colonel Hardaway reported to the regimental command post that heavy firing had broken out near K Company. Several German tanks were also probing the defenses of Lieutenant Ralph Kerley's E/120th Infantry. Additionally, the 2d Battalion antitank platoon had at least one 57mm gun knocked out. Realizing that the 2/120th's situation was becoming more serious by the minute, Colonel Birks decided to commit his regimental reserve.

   Both sides suffered from confusion and lack of coordination exacerbated by faulty communications and limited visibility caused by morning fog. Reardon's description of isolated, surprised American outposts being assaulted by SS troops brings to mind the opening stages of the Battle of the Bulge. And, like the Bulge, the outcome of the offensive would depend largely on the determined resistance offered by a few widely separated American positions without support, orders, or a clear sense of what was happening. While the author also follows the action from the German side of the lines, most of his details here focus on the smallest US units and individual GIs.
   Although they probably did not realize it at the time, the GIs were aided by ineffective German command and control, lack of mutual support among the panzer formations, failure to fully exploit success, and surprisingly inflexible German tactics. In addition, Allied airpower—particularly in the guise of rocket-firing Typhoons and P-47D Thunderbolts—began to make itself felt on the battlefield.
   Perhaps the key to the Allied position in the early going, or at least the position which has received the most attention over the years, was that held by the 2nd Battalion, 120th Infantry Regiment, 30th US Infantry Division. Partly overrun, chopped into separate pockets, and isolated on Hill 314, the survivors—dubbed "The Lost Battalion" in Reardon's chapter title—managed to cling to their exposed positions mostly due to heavy artillery support that disrupted German shelling and attempts to assemble for an assault on the hill. The ensuing battle for Hill 314 and environs is described in dramatic detail. Similarly, the crucial contribution of the 1st Battalion of 11th Infantry and attached tank destroyers is measured as one of the most important components of the battle.
   Reardon continues to follow the action in the next chapters as the tide gradually shifts against the assaulting Germans. With the introduction of more Yank reinforcements and the further intervention of Allied airpower, the attackers lost all forward momentum, found themselves squeezed back to their start line, and eventually threatened with encirclement. As the Germans withdrew, the "lost battalion" on Hill 314 was finally relieved after spending five days under siege. Mortain itself was recovered after being thoroughly destroyed by concentrated American artillery fire on the night of 11-12 August. Turning his attention farther east, Reardon connects the end of the Mortain operation to the Battle of the Falaise Pocket.
   Unlike many other recent books on operations in France in 1944, Victory at Mortain does not set out to prove controversial points about American performance. Indeed, American performance—especially that of 30th Infantry Division—mostly speaks for itself.

   The culminating point in the Normandy campaign can arguably be traced to von Kluge's decision to launch a counteroffensive against Avranches. His hopes for victory, however, were dashed when the 30th Infantry Division held XLVII Panzer Korps long enough for the Allies to employ airpower and send reinforcements. The Americans also kept the Germans from reorganizing for a renewed counteroffensive by applying continuous pressure at Mortain. Fixed in place by indecision at senior command levels, the Germans proved unable to regroup their panzer divisions in time to prevent the bulk of their troops in Normandy from being forced out of position by the Canadian and American threat on either flank.

   In many ways, Reardon's book resembles James Jay Carafano's After D-Day: Operation Cobra and the Normandy Breakout, another fine examination of post-D-Day operations with no particular ax to grind. Like Carafano, with no need to debate larger issues of training, doctrine, replacement procedures, and relative combat efficiency, Reardon concentrates on blow-by-blow descriptions of combat and maneuver. In his concluding chapter, however, he does take the German commanders to task for poor planning, faulty execution, and uninspired leadership.

   Hampered by inadequate reconnaissance, 7 Armee remained unaware that only a single American cavalry squadron initially screened the gap between Barenton and Mortain. Lacking such information, Hausser subsequently discarded that sector as a viable avenue of approach, deeming it unworthy of reconnaissance effort. Rather than utilize thinly defended secondary roads to bypass the American defenses, 7Armee opted for a direct route that placed the panzer divisions on a collision course with the defenders. By emphasizing mass rather than maneuver, the Germans were forced to rely on brute force to produce the victory they sought.
   However, brute force was simply not available. The poor planning and coordination between arms as well as the diversion of critical units to other sectors combined to dissipate the opening shock of the German counteroffensive. Although the Americans were significantly outnumbered at the onset of Unternehmen Luttich, they were not simultaneously confronted with an overwhelming number of challenges that would have produced a rapid collapse. The attackers moved along predictable routes into the teeth of the thinly spread American antitank defenses. When confronted by resistance, the panzers failed to bypass the defenders, which resulted in a prolonged delay and heavy casualties for the attackers. This surprising lack of tactical flexibility doomed the initial German effort to failure.
   Tensions within their command and control structure prevented the Germans from revising their operational plan when it quickly proved inadequate. When the first attempt failed, Hitler took personal control of Unternehmen Luttich, severely limiting von Kluge's ability to orchestrate the fight. The sheer mechanics associated with controlling a counteroffensive in Normandy from distant Berlin, however, resulted in an unwieldy decisionmaking process that proved unable to cope with the rapidly changing battlefield situation. The discord between von Kluge and Hitler also meant that the Germans were ill prepared for a major operational transition in the wake of the failed Avranches counteroffensive.

   For readers interested in this part of the war, and there seem to be many, Victory at Mortain is strongly recommended. While not the first book on the topic, this one undeniably distinguishes itself as the best yet; it's certainly a more thorough and accomplished work than, for example, Alwyn Featherston's Saving the Breakout. Not only is Reardon's book the latest in a long line of top quality releases from University Press of Kansas, it's certainly a contender for our annual Top Ten awards, especially given readers' appetites for books about Normandy.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from University Press of Kansas.
   Thanks to UPK for providing this review copy.