ISBN 0-7006-1128-2
403 pages

Foreword; Preface; Acknowledgments; Introduction; footnotes; photos; maps; charts; tables; diagrams; Afterword; Glossary; Bibliography; Index

Appendix: 22nd Infantry Soldiers Who Gave Their Lives during the Battle of the Huertgen Forest, 16 November-4 December 1944

   Hell in Huertgen Forest by Robert Sterling Rush emerged as one of the winners in our Top Ten voting for the year 2001, confirming this book as one of the best new WWII-related titles of last year.
   While Huertgen Forest has much in common with recent efforts by authors such as Mansoor (The GI Offensive in Europe), Doubler (Closing with the Enemy), Bonn (When the Odds Were Even), and Brown (Draftee Division)—all of which work to rehabilitate the reputation of American infantry units vis a vis their German opponents in Europe—Rush examines infantry combat far more microscopically and analyzes the factors influencing that combat with more statistics, closer inspection, and perhaps more even-handedness. In the end, his conclusions might be less sweeping, but they also seem more convincing.
   The book is divided into three sections: The Environment, The Huertgenwald, and Analysis.
   The first section meticulously describes the terrain facing the combatants in the battle, and includes some well-executed maps (created by the author) with multi-dimensional views of the battlefield. Rush goes into considerable detail to emphasize the nastiness of the terrain and the effects of the cold, wet, muddy environment on individual soldiers as well as small units.
   Much as Joe Balkoski (Beyond the Beachhead) and others have done in books about the western front and Normandy in particular, Rush compares and contrasts American and German firepower at the lowest tactical levels. For example, Balkoski has this to say about the German MG 42: "The American rifle company was dependent on its nine BARs for rapid fire, but these weapons could not stand up to the MG 42s. Instead of forcing the Germans to keep their heads down with a large volume of M1 and BAR fire, as the American manuals demanded, it was usually the Yanks who got pinned." Rush sees it a little differently:

   With the terrain limiting the effectiveness of the infantryman's normal support, combat at the basest level in the Hurtgenwald was much like that of World War I: attackers with rifles against entrenched defenders with machine guns. Both the M-1 and MG 42 influenced their respective country's small-unit tactics. The U.S. ground forces depended on the individual infantryman and the well-aimed fire from his semiautomatic M-1 rifle, while the German army increased small unit firepower by increasing the number of light machine guns. These two contrasting approaches, one that emphasized weapons of mobility, the other, weapons of stability, were probably the best solution to each army's tactical needs during 1944.
   The U.S. soldiers in the attack required freedom of movement and the ability to shift fires rapidly. There were no crew-served weapons assigned to U.S. platoons, and although the Infantry School wanted a light machine gun for its squads, they did not want one that required a crew and increased ammunition requirements. Although this omission decreased the overall firepower of the infantry squad, it also meant there were no focal points on which the Germans could direct their fire. Eleven riflemen moving forward either could direct their fire toward eleven different targets or concentrate on just one.
   The German dependence on the MG 42 machine gun was part of the legacy of World War I, and the dilemma of diminishing manpower and requirements to man an extended front necessitated an even greater reliance during World War II. Although semiautomatic rifles in small numbers were available in Germany, the German army placed emphasis on crew-served weapons as the basis for their squads. The MG 42 had a very high rate of fire and greatly increased the overall rate of fire of a squad. However, although the machine gun was good in suppressing targets, it only fired where it was pointed. Its crew was easily suppressed by return fire from other points on the compass, which in turn reduced the German squad's ability to defend itself to four men with bolt-action rifles.

   In a manner reminiscent of Draftee Division, Rush follows the US 4th Infantry Division and its 22nd Infantry Regiment through training and preparation for combat. Like most American divisions, the 4th suffered through the process of repeatedly losing groups of trained men who were transferred elsewhere (often as the cadres for new units) and who were then replaced by raw recruits. The division arrived in the UK in January 1944, elements landed at Utah beach, and it participated in the attack on Brest and the breakout from Normandy. After reviewing the 4th Division as a whole, Rush turns his attention to the 22nd Regiment and inspects its organization, strength, procedures, and overall status on the eve of the Huertgen battles, all this accompanied by detailed organigrams, charts, and tables.
   Next Rush scrutinizes—with more tables, charts, and diagrams—the German units in the Huertgen, reviewing their prior combat histories, discussing organization and tactics, and in particular studying the replacement system, about which he has little favorable to say.

   As demonstrated in Table 2, the [German] army kept its wounded assigned to the tactical unit, at least on paper, much longer than the Americans, thus artificially exaggerating the unit's strength and delaying the flow of replacements. This practice, as we shall see, is important to understanding the dynamics of the battle in the Hurtgenwald. As long as the soldier filled a slot on the unit's books, there was no replacement. Once in combat, the German system of sending replacements for the previous months' killed and missing and for those wounded over sixty days did not allow units to regain their authorized strength unless they were pulled out of the line for a significant period of time. And even then, most units were seldom refitted to 100 percent strength. Even if there had been more replacements and fewer divisions, the replacement system would have kept units in the line starved for manpower.

   The next two chapters, amounting to about fifty pages, compare and contrast the German and American systems of recruiting, training, and motivating soldiers. Rush looks at the overall process but also at the experiences of individual infantrymen, quoting their letters and recollections at some length. Rush also introduces his readers to the most important officers who led the units in the battle. As always, this material is lavishly illustrated with tables, charts, and diagrams such as "Extract of a 12-week Training Schedule (circa October 1942) for [German] Infantry Recruits." Rush concludes that by late 1944 German units had no chance to develop strong cohesion and morale was low, requiring troops to be motivated by the strictest disciplinary measures. Likewise, the German army no longer maintained "...any semblance of a coherent manpower policy." At the same time, Rush emphasizes that the 22nd Regiment was at its peak of skill, experience, and efficiency. Even so, the prospects for the Americans looked grim.

   Nonetheless, the lack of first-class soldiers in the Hurtgenwald did not hamper a strong German defense. They overcame their personnel deficiencies by mining the few roads, trails, and firebreaks in the Hurtgen and plotting artillery concentrations on road and trail junctions throughout the forest. With the terrain further constricted, even poorly organized squads could hold out against much larger units and inflict heavy casualties on any attacker

   The centerpiece of the book, "Part II: The Huertgenwald," occupies about one-hundred-sixty pages. It begins with a chapter describing the initial fighting in the forest, particularly around Schmidt, and sets the scene for the US 4th Infantry Division and its 22nd Regiment.
   As the attack opens on 16 November 1944, Rush shifts the pace and focus of his narrative to emphasize in great detail the blow-by-blow account of the 22nd's battalions, companies, platoons, and individual infantrymen, as well as the German defenders. Every step of the battle and every fact is heavily footnoted. The footnotes also provide (much the same way they provide in the Australian and New Zealand official history volumes) extensive biographical background for individual soldiers who are mentioned in the text.
   Within each chapter, for each day Rush consistently writes about the overall view of the battle from the regimental headquarters, then looks in turn at the operations for each of the regiment's battalions (and attachments), and finally reviews the day's events from the German perspective. This approach, along with daily situation maps, provides an enormous amount of data about the conduct and progress of the battle, making it all easy to assimilate. The focus remains very much on the punch and counter-punch of small units, but Rush carefully includes a remarkable amount of material about individual soldiers. He also conveys the cold, wet, dismal environment in which the battle took place, but does so without resorting to the hyperbolic, adjective-laden prose used, for example, in Into the Shadows Furious (which was about another battle fought under less than ideal conditions).
   Here's an example of how Rush describes the battle:

   It was an infantryman's show again, but after days in the forest, some were not up to the performance. The soldiers had taken such a terrific beating from German mortar and artillery fire that leaders literally had to pull some out of their holes to make the attack. Nevertheless, once the attack got started, the company moved rapidly six hundred yards past Road Y to the hill on the other side. There, Easy's soldiers ran into ten enemy dugouts. Captain Newcomb positioned the 1st and 2d Platoons to provide covering fire and called for the 3d Platoon to make a flank attack on the German positions. Private First Class Crayton Strickland reported to Newcomb as one of the six remaining men in the 3d Platoon.
   Newcomb promoted Strickland on the spot to staff sergeant, put him in charge of the platoon, and told him to make a flank attack on the German positions. Strickland took his six men and rolled up the dugouts from the right. Of the six, three were wounded or killed during the attack, with Strickland one of the wounded. When Easy Company dug in for the night, there were only thirteen men left in the 1st Platoon, ten in the 2d, three in the 3d, and three in the weapons platoon, for a total of less than three full-strength rifle squads.
   The three remaining soldiers in the weapons platoon became pack mules. Sergeant Picarello, the only soldier remaining in the mortar section, carried the company's SCR 300 radio, a 60mm mortar, and a bag of ammunition. Lieutenant Lloyd, the weapons platoon leader, became the company radio operator and forward observer after a shell wounded the designated radio operator and mortar and artillery observers. At the end of the day, Lieutenant Mason became the executive officer, and two newly assigned officers, Lieutenants Railton and Larson, took over the 1st and 3d Platoons respectively.
   Fox Company received sixteen brand-new replacements just thirty minutes before the attack, all of them loaded down with nonessential equipment. In the half hour before they stepped across the line of departure, Lieutenant Wilson, the new Fox Company commander, recorded all the men's names, ranks, and serial numbers, decided which platoons to assign them to, and had them throw away the unnecessary equipment.
   Since this was Lieutenant Wilson's first assault as a company commander, he planned for all the eventualities. He sent one of his platoon leaders forward to find the trail serving as the boundary between Fox and Easy Companies. Later, when the attack began, he had that lieutenant's platoon lead the company attack because he knew where the trail was. After Fox Company had moved about three hundred yards, Wilson realized his company was not where it was supposed to be. Instead of being south of the road as planned, Fox Company was attacking through Easy Company's area north of the road. But getting to the right location proved difficult.
   The Fox Company soldiers ran into mortar and machine-gun fire when they attempted to cross the road. The forwardmost platoon leader was wounded, and the other officer killed. Wilson now had a platoon sergeant and two of his squad leaders leading his three platoons. Things looked desperate. When Lieutenant Wilson called Lieutenant Colonel Kenan and told him of his predicament, Kenan said that while he understood, Wilson must continue the attack: "I know that you can and I know that you will." With these words of encouragement, Wilson immediately reorganized his company and continued the assault.
   Continuing east, Lieutenant Wilson's company ran into several dugouts as well as two dug-in assault guns and was also hit by flanking fire coming from the area in front of Easy Company. Fox Company kept moving forward and by 1600 hours had passed the firebreak about 250 yards east of Road Y.

   After the long middle section describing combat operations, Rush closes the book with about sixty pages of analysis and conclusions.
   As with many of the writers mentioned above who stake out positions opposed to conclusions drawn by an earlier generation of writers such as Dupuy and S.L.A. Marshall, Rush spends much time and energy refuting conclusions drawn by Martin van Creveld in Fighting Power. He amasses statistics and marshals arguments to show, for example, that American infantry divisions proportionally devoted more officers to rifle units, that these officers were well-trained, battle-tested, and relentlessly weeded out if found wanting, and the "American method of officer selection and assignment" actually meant that US infantry regiments usually produced most of their own leaders.
   The author especially turns his attention to comparing and contrasting US and German replacement systems. Again, he disagrees strongly with much of van Creveld's work, and uses those disagreements to propel his discussion. Although, he says, the German replacement policy might have been effective in 1939-1941, by November 1944 the American process was much superior.

   Although this book examines only one American infantry regiment, it suggests that American infantry organizations in 1944 were more rather than less effective than German ones. The American system of replacement sustained battle worthiness by ensuring that units never dropped below the point where organizational coherence was affected. In contrast, the German system of keeping veteran units at minimal strength while forming new units ignored the inherent strength that organization offers. Only when units became battle hardened around a cadre of survivors did combat power increase, and as long as there was a continual influx of new soldiers around this battle-hardened core, units kept going and kept fighting. A good replacement system enabled the senior leadership to learn the battlefield and the enemy before being pulled out because their unit had become ineffective.
   If we are to believe van Creveld's assertions that American units were organizationally deficient, the 22d should have ceased to exist as an organization ten days into the battle. And yet the regiment continued to move forward as long as there remained a cadre of veterans in the squads and platoons for the replacements to coalesce around, there was experienced leadership at the company and higher levels, and the support structure of the organization continued to function. It was only when the experienced soldiers in the platoons and squads were no longer present and the organization was worn out by constant battle that the regiment bordered on imminent collapse and had to be removed from the action. Two German divisions, the 275th and 344th, and regiments of three others collapsed under the strain of combat in the Hurtgenwald. The high casualties, inadequate replacement system, and collapsing support structure doomed the remaining veteran Landser on the line to probable death or capture.
   There is no doubt that soldiers who identify with one another generally will fight better. Nevertheless, when old comrades disappeared, soldiers clung to the organization. Organizations operate smoothly as long as there is an abundance of everything and the mission is being accomplished at a reasonable price. Similar to sports teams, all of whom appear cohesive as long as they are winning, military organizations moving forward rarely have cohesion problems. With the appearance of stress, however, a never-ending friction begins that only organizations with a strong mettle and a capability to change can survive. The 22d's organization remained effective almost to the end because of its organizational cohesion, while the German units it faced collapsed.

   Rush makes a great point of disproving the thesis that American infantry "casuals" did not rejoin their original units (in most cases, he concludes, they did), and he insists that the American practice of feeding infantry replacements into units in the front line for on-the-job training kept US units at combat strength and—until all the old hands were gone—did not diminish unit cohesiveness. Interestingly, the Afterword by Colonel Earl Edwards, Operations Officer of the 22nd in 1944, offers a slightly different perspective: "I still flinch at the memory of those young kids being led up the dark roads at night to their units, with many being killed or wounded on the way. We put those who made it up there in a foxhole, whispered where their squad mates in other foxholes were, and told them not to move from their holes until morning. They had no time to learn who their squad members or squad leaders were before being put in the crucible of combat."
   The author quotes from a string of surveys, studies, manuals, and books while investigating "What Kept the Soldier Fighting?" As usual, he also pores over service records of individual riflemen to see how their experiences in the Huertgen shed light on the issue. One infantryman makes a particularly telling point: "Every day we would pray for darkness and then when night would come that was so bad we would pray for daylight." In this chapter, Rush takes issue with some of S.L.A. Marshall's work—such as the necessity of cohesion at the squad level in order to have effective larger units—as well as continuing to disagree with van Creveld.
   This is not the first book about Huertgen Forest, but it is certainly one of the best. By comparison, Edward G. Miller's book, A Dark and Bloody Ground, another well-received work, covers a broader and longer slice of the campaign than Hell in Huertgen Forest, with approximately twenty pages devoted to the 22nd Regiment's operations. Nonetheless, many of the same minor characters appear in both accounts (such as German Lance Corporal Hubert Gees), as do many of the same minor incidents (such as a rifle grenade in the chest). A Dark and Bloody Ground provides more information on the campaign as a whole, but Rush gives considerably more in the way of statistics and analysis along with much more operational detail about a single regiment.
   This book also transcends operations, offering thoughtful evaluation of the internal dynamics of small units. Although Rush's emphasis is on a US infantry regiment, he doesn't neglect the German defenders. And, unlike some other commentators, he also clearly distinguishes between the German army of 1939-1941 and the units defending the Huertgen Forest in 1944. For example, the German practice in 1944-1945 of burning out units, then pulling them from the line and refilling them with untried rookies, seems to have been based less on doctrine and more on lack of alternatives.
   Also unlike some other authors, Rush doesn't seek to demonstrate American infantry superiority by either artificially inflating or flatly deprecating their opponents. For all the American advantages, such as a regiment nearly at full strength and at the peak of its tactical skill and experience, this was a tough, bloody business. For all the German weaknesses, such as a relative lack of unit cohesion and untrained infantry replacements, Rush calls them "tenacious."
   Given the nature of the terrain, had the attackers been any less skilled, or had the defenders been in any better condition, it's difficult to see how the 22nd could have accomplished as much as it did.

   The fighting in the Hurtgen was not an anomaly in the history of infantry combat. Although the terrain may have differed, with thick forest instead of hedgerows or steep mountain slopes, any battles involving determined and stubborn defenders fighting from prepared defensive positions will produce heavy losses among the attacking infantry. The Germans found this true in Russia and the Ardennes, the Russians in Russia, Poland, and Germany, the Americans and British in the Pacific, the Mediterranean theater, France, Belgium, and Germany.
   Just fifteen days after their experience in the Hurtgen Forest, the exhausted and understrength 4th and 28th Divisions played major roles in slowing down and ultimately defeating fresh German divisions, inflicting on them the same type of casualties they had earlier suffered in the Hurtgenwald. Perhaps at this stage of the war, the defense had regained superiority over the offense at the point of battle. In November and December, American and German leaders watched their carefully husbanded offensive power dissipate against hastily organized bands of soldiers backed up by heavy weapons, first in the Hurtgen Forest against small groups of dispirited German soldiers and later in the Ardennes where intermingled units of American infantry and support units held on to villages and crossroads long enough to throw off the German timetable. There were no breakthroughs in technology for the offense that had not been countered, and on the front line—up to the instant of breakthrough—war was attritional. To the German Landser or the American GI, battle was not a Materialschlacht (battle of material), but an unending terror of not living to see the next sunrise.
   Although this book is concentrated on a single American infantry regiment, it suggests that American infantry organizations in 1944 were more rather than less effective than German ones. Even though the 22d's exposure in the Hurtgenwald was unusual in intensity, there is no evidence that the 22d differed from its sister infantry regiments in any fundamental way. That was certainly true insofar as the replacement system was concerned, and as we have seen, the replacement system made major contributions to sustained combat effectiveness. The American system of replacement sustained battle worthiness by ensuring that units never dropped below the point where the structure was affected. In contrast, the German system of keeping veteran units at minimal strength while forming new units ignored the inherent strength that organization offers.

   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from University Press of Kansas.
   Thanks to UPK for providing this review copy.