ISBN 0-89141-715-X
312 pages

Acknowledgments; Introduction; photos; maps; Notes; Bibliography; Index

Appendices: Orders of Battle; Combat Awards; Medal of Honor Citation; United States Army Forces, CBI Theater; Chronology: CBI Theater, 1944-1945; Colonel Hunter's Letter to General Stilwell

   In his Introduction, Nathan Prefer explains that, in the literature of World War II, CBI—the China-Burma-India theater—"remains largely ignored." While it's indisputably true that the theater has produced a relative dearth of English-language titles, there have been some excellent ones, and pound-for-pound CBI is extremely well-served by the likes of William Slim (Defeat into Victory), Shelford Bidwell (The Chindit War), Louis Allen (The Longest War), and memoirs by participants such as John Masters, Michael Calvert, and Bernard Fergusson. Still, Prefer is right that the American participation—admittedly limited in comparison to the British effort—has not been as thoroughly chronicled outside Barbara Tuchman's fine Stilwell and the American Experience in China (mostly a political/strategic account) and the valuable U.S. Army official history volumes.
   Prefer aims to add his own effort to the niche topic of General Stilwell's combat operations in CBI. In fact, this account really focuses on American forces (with less on Stilwell's Chinese troops), on north Burma (with less on Stilwell's responsibilities in China itself), and on the Yank campaigns there not only during Stilwell's tenure, but also after his departure. For the most part, then, Vinegar Joe's War is about the 5307th Combat Unit (Provisional), better known as Merrill's Marauders, and its successor, the 5332nd Brigade (Provisional), better known as Mars Task Force.
   The bulk of the book follows the story of those two units: how they were formed, how each came to be regarded as the only unit in north Burma willing to follow Stilwell's orders without reference to Chiang Kai-Shek, and how the Marauders in particular were used, over-used, and abused in an effort to compel Chinese forces to greater participation and exertion. While the Chinese units in Burma, as well as American support forces, are not ignored, the emphasis remains firmly on the Marauders and the Marsmen with detailed accounts of marches, maneuvers, and combat down to squad and platoon level. Prefer also tells the stories of personal heroism and stoic human suffering under appalling conditions. Although many of these stories come from surviving veterans, far too many of them conclude with posthumous decorations or anonymous graves. There is no shortage of leeches, dysentery, mud, jungle, and death.
   For all Prefer's description of the action, there is surprisingly little analysis in the book. For example, in his Introduction the author explains "...the American involvement in the Burma campaign, in particular, is a classic study in refuting some historian's [sic] arguments about the skill and professionalism of the U.S. Army in the Second World War." However, when he explains how General Willey intentionally disobeyed orders to cut the Burma Road because of concerns it would cause excessive American casualties, and how as a result the Japanese were able to withdraw their forces to safety relatively unhindered and unscathed, Prefer offers little commentary and little to reconcile this disobedience and failure with American skill and professionalism. By comparison, The Chindit War by Shelford Bidwell, which is for the most part about British operations, offers significantly more pithy commentary and insightful opinion in its few pages devoted to the Americans.
   In sum, Vinegar Joe's War serves as a perfectly adequate primer on operations in north Burma and adds some personal anecdotes contributed by Marauder veterans, but it's probably not destined to become a classic and won't offer vast amounts of fresh information to anyone familiar with other accounts, notably the three-volume U.S. Army history of CBI.
   In some ways, the new anecdotes aside, Prefer's book can be seen almost as an abridgement of those official "greenbooks." In fact, there are some surprising similarities in the text.

   U.S. Army Official History: "Boatner's successor, General Wessels, had been on the staff of the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Ga., when he was sent to CBI as a part of Stilwell's plans for training the Chinese Army. When it finally became apparent that the Chinese did not accept these plans to an extent that would occupy all of the 2,213 officers and men sent to CBI to train the Second Thirty Divisions in east China, Wessels was sent to SEAC headquarters."
   Prefer: "General Wessels had been on the staff of the infantry school at Fort Benning, Georgia, before coming to the China-Burma-India theater as a part of Stilwell's plan to train the Chinese army in American tactics. Once it became clear that the Chinese had little interest, General Wessels was assigned as a staff officer at Southeast Asia Command (SEAC) headquarters."

   U.S. Army Official History: "After a conference with Hunter he personally ordered that a Chinese battalion of at least 400 men be sent to penetrate through the Japanese positions to Sitapur roughly on a southeast azimuth, cutting off the Japanese to the north from Myitkyina proper."
   Prefer: "During his latest visit to Myitkyina, General Stilwell had ordered Colonel Hunter to send one battalion of the Chinese 42nd Regiment on a specific azimuth to cut off the Japanese defenders from the north."

   U.S. Army Official History: "Then Willey reflected and decided that more than the 475th would be needed along the Burma Road, for on 13 January both regiments were alerted for operations against the road. Willey also tried, but unsuccessfully, to obtain the services of the Chinese 1st Separate Regiment. NCAC refused, but Willey's request made clear that he wanted to drive on the Burma Road with the equivalent of a U.S. division."
   Prefer: "General Willey reflected on his original dispositions and changed them. He was concerned that one regiment might not be sufficient to close the road. When, on 13 January, both regiments reported themselves ready for operations, he alerted both regiments to proceed to the road. General Willey then tried, without success, to have the 1st Chinese Separate Regiment returned to his command to secure his rear areas. Clearly, General Willey felt that nothing less than a division-sized unit could successfully accomplish the mission assigned to his brigade."

   It should also be noted that the maps in Vinegar Joe's War seem to have come, without changes and apparently without attribution, from the American official histories.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Presidio Press.
   Thanks to Presidio for providing this review copy.