ISBN 1-55587-880-6
248 pages

Preface; Introduction; maps; OB charts; tables; Bibliography; Index

Appendix: Red Army Reserves

   In the wake of his excellent books such as Hitler's Nemesis: The Red Army, 1930-1945, The Soviet Economy and the Red Army, 1930-1945, and his Top Ten book Kursk: Hitler's Gamble, 1943, Walter Dunn has written another valuable study which will be certain to command the attention of students of the Russian front.
   Despite its magnitude and importance -- "World War II's greatest battle" -- there have been relatively few English-language accounts devoted to Operation Bagration, the destruction of Germany's Army Group Center in Belorussia in the summer of 1944. Dunn has undertaken a concerted and successful effort to bring together the existing sources in English, German, and Russian, "compare quantitative data...and to present a rational interpretation of events." In this task he has been aided by his massive database of accumulated Red Army OB material. (That's a database, by the way, which really deserves publication in its own right.)
   The book begins with a careful survey of the eight critical factors which made possible Soviet victory in the battle:

• Local superiority
• Deception
• Surprise
• Leadership
• Timing
• Use of terrain
• Training
• Technology

   Dunn then reviews the overall strategic position on the Eastern front with his usual thoroughness and explains in particular how the Germans mistakenly believed they could withstand a Soviet offensive in Belorussia and how this belief derived from a failure to comprehend the Soviet ability to surreptitiously move entire armies to that part of the front without being detected, and -- perhaps even more importantly -- the German complacency about vast numbers of American-built four-wheel-drive trucks which would enable Soviet logisticians to keep their armies supplied even though the few decent roads remained blocked by bypassed German fortresses. Dunn is, as always, especially convincing when discussing quantitative aspects of warfare such as logistics requirements.

   The rail capacity was divided between daily supplies required by the troops, new units being moved into the sector, and reserves of supplies being stockpiled for the offensive. Although the Red Army man lived on far less than his German counterpart, the authorized allotment for an actively engaged rifle division in December 1943 was 311 tons of munitions, 19 tons of rations, 15 tons of fodder for the horses, and 13 tons of fuel, for a total of 358 tons. While a division was in reserve the quantity of munitions was greatly reduced, resulting in 275 tons per day for an inactive division. With the equivalent of more than 150 divisions in the four fronts [committed to the offensive], the daily requirement was at least 41,250 tons or about 20 trains per day each with about 2,000 tons of supplies. A car usually carried from 40 to 50 tons with about 45 cars per train for a total of 2,000 tons per train. Therefore, daily maintenance for active units required nearly one-fifth of the 100 trains that arrived each day.

   Dunn pursues this thought with meticulous calculations, worthy of a staff officer, of trains, supplies, and troop movements which make clear the magnitude and complexity of Soviet preparations for Bagration, especially given the need to conduct much movement at night in order to mask it from the Germans. Under the circumstances, the Soviets were successful at utilizing the capacity of the transportation system to the utmost in order to maximize their buildup.
   The next chapter devotes about fifteen pages to discussing the comparative strength and organization of Soviet and German combat units at this stage of the war. This includes some highly detailed TOE information.

   At the beginning of 1944, all three types of Red Army assault gun regiments were increased to twenty-one guns, and a company of infantry armed with machine pistols was added. Later in the year a few brigades with three regiments of assault guns were formed. During 1944 the JSU152, the SU100, and the SU85 were produced in significant numbers to upgrade the power of the medium and heavy regiments. The regiments were generally at full strength. In July 1944 the 1228th Assault Gun Regiment had twenty-one SU76s, 1 light truck, 18 heavy trucks, 4 special trucks, and 42 machine pistols.

   As he did in Kursk, Dunn spends a meaty chapter looking into the manpower situation on both sides of the front. He points out here how the Soviets were able to bring their units up to strength on the Eastern front during the months before the offensive while the Germans had to concentrate on creating new units for serving in the west to defend against the anticipated Allied invasion.
   The author lavishes similar attention on German and Soviet production statistics, offering numerous tables to illustrate the staggering Soviet superiority in numbers and delving into qualitative aspects of weapons both from a detached, technical perspective and from the viewpoint of the troops themselves.

   Soviet arms production was providing the Red Army with an ample supply of weapons, in fact so many that production was cut back in 1944. In contrast, although German arms production increased sharply in 1943 and the first half of 1944, the German army was short of weapons.

   After eighty pages of this kind of introductory material, Dunn launches into his account of the actual campaign. He describes the battle in geographical sequence, with a chapter each devoted to the northern shoulder, Vitebsk, Bogushevsk, Orsha, Mogilev, Bobruysk, and the southern shoulder. These are all done in a straight-forward, blow-by-blow, unadorned style at the corps/division/brigade level with ample details of dates, times, locations, strengths, casualties, and distances.

   At 0800 on 24 June, Belov's Tank Corps poured through the gap at Shumilino opened by the 6th Guards Army between the 252nd German Division and the German Sixteenth Army to the north. Tanks moved with difficulty on the poor roads soaked with rain and could not move off the roads into the swamp. The Germans methodically destroyed all bridges as they withdrew, further slowing the tanks. Butkov's tanks reached the Dvina River 6 kilometers south of Ulla at 1100, despite the congested roads, captured a damaged bridge, and crossed the river. By the evening of 24 June, the 67th Guard Division of Yermakov's 23rd Guard Corps of the Soviet 6th Guard Army crossed the Dvina River north of Beshenkovichi and held a 50-kilometer front along the river south of Ulla. The 252nd German Division held the west bank of the Dvina 10 kilometers northwest of Beshenkovichi, but a gap was opening between the division and Detachment D to the south. Better weather on 24 June enabled the 3rd Air Army commanded by General N. F. Papivin to make 1,127 sorties against the Germans.

   Page after page in these chapters makes it apparent that by this stage of the war there was little hope for the German army on the Russian front. Although much of Army Group Center offered determined resistance, the defenders were out-numbered, out-gunned, and out-generaled.

   The vast number of reserves available to the Red Army, including two field armies behind the 1st Baltic Front, should lay to rest the theory that had Hitler not intervened, the German generals would have been able to withstand the attack by assuming a mobile defense and adding a few panzer divisions. By June 1944 the Red Army had an overwhelming preponderance of force in White Russia, and the question was not if the Germans could be beaten, but how badly and how soon.

   To support this assertion, Dunn offers not only an extensive array of OBs for the units at the front for both sides, but also a lengthy appendix of Soviet reserve formations with dates of their commitment to various sectors of the front. Dunn also offers a strong concluding chapter which sums up the most important aspects of the battle and offers a number of original insights. Never one to ignore the behind-the-scenes factors, Dunn reiterates the importance of logistics in general and trucks in particular.

   Technology played a major role in the success of the campaign. The Soviet mechanized infantry brigades traveling in American-built trucks were at the heart of the White Russian offensive. The Russians were able to move these four-wheel-drive vehicles, along with tanks, through the swamps, carrying motorized infantry and supplies and towing guns. Well-balanced combat teams of tanks, assault guns, motorized infantry, engineers, and artillery emerged from the forests on both sides of major highways, enveloping group after group of the roadbound Germans trying to conduct an orderly withdrawal in the face of heavy frontal attacks. Rather than being tied to the good roads like the German rear-axle-drive trucks and the horsedrawn wagons, the Soviet motorized infantry could move on marginal dirt roads across country, bypassing the German roadblocks. Once the Soviet trucks had passed the roadblocks on the better roads, they resumed travel at a speedy 30 kilometers per hour rather than 30 kilometers per day. Facing this threat, when a defense zone was broken, the Germans were forced to flee immediately. The German units that did not withdraw expeditiously were surrounded and captured.

   He goes on to explain how the capacities of the supply trucks, and their extended turn-around times as the front lines advanced farther and farther from supply depots, were the deciding factors in bringing Soviet forward progress to a halt. As in the opening chapters, Dunn also makes some interesting points about weather patterns in Belorussia at this time of the year and how they affected the campaign. Finally, he has much to say about the political context of the offensive and Stalin's motives for choosing the uninviting terrain of Belorussia as the setting for his operation.
   How does Soviet Blitzkrieg compare with Kursk? In the latter, there was not a single map; the new book includes a dozen unspectacular but workmanlike maps which make it much easier to follow the flow of events. Kursk also devoted considerable text to explaining OBs which could have been more efficiently presented in charts; the new book utilizes many nicely done OB charts to impart the same kind of information. Dunn has also provided a much more thorough chapter of conclusions to wrap up this book.
   On the other hand, Soviet Blitzkrieg, although not without Soviet and German sources, more so than Kursk seems to rely on readily available English-language books such as Battle for White Russia by Gerd Niepold and Belorussia 1944: The Soviet General Staff Study translated and edited by David M. Glantz and Harold Orenstein.
   Despite improved presentation, Soviet Blitzkrieg is probably not quite as effective as Dunn's award-winning Kursk. Still, this is undoubtedly the best synthesis of Operation Bagration from both Soviet and German perspectives, and certainly superior to, for example, Hitler's Greatest Defeat by Paul Adair.
   Recommended for those interested in the Russian front, and especially for wargamers and others who want detailed OB and TOE material.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Lynne Rienner Publishers.
   Thanks to the publisher for providing this review copy.