1-85367-322-6
332 pages

Editor's Introduction; maps; diagrams; Bibliography; Index

   Among the multitudinous English-language treatments of the campaign in North Africa in World War II, the Allied perspective predominates. Even in the best of those histories which deal with both sides of the front—for example, the South African official history series and the New Zealand official history series—information about the Allies tends to be more readily available and more reliable than information about the Axis. Thus, it's nice to see a detailed operational account from the Axis point of view, and this newly published book by Rainer Kriebel proves to be such an account.
   Kriebel actually wrote this book shortly after the war under the auspices of the U.S. Army as part of the Foreign Military Studies program. By way of qualification, Kriebel served as Ia (senior staff officer) of 15th Panzer Division in Africa from spring 1941 through March 1942 (when he transferred to the Russian Front) and took part in the campaigns he analyzes, the British "Crusader" offensive of November 1941, the Axis withdrawal from Cyrenaica, and Rommel's counter-offensive in January 1942. As the senior staff officer of 15th Panzer, Kriebel saw the battle, the German forces, their Italian allies, the enemy, and Erwin Rommel in light not often reported in other histories of these operations.
   Kriebel opens his report with an overview of the situation, the relationship between the Germans and Italians, and the forces of the opposing armies. This introduction is mostly drab and unremarkable, but the author shifts into a stronger, more gripping narrative when he begins his explication of the actual operations. This has been written with clear knowledge of military matters in general, a firm grasp of this particular battle, and strong opinions about what events decisively influenced the campaign.
   Among other things, Kriebel often criticizes Rommel's generalship:

   The conduct of operations also suffered because Rommel had not clearly defined the sphere of command of the Afrika Korps, and often interfered personally in the command of particular units, without informing the division in question or the Afrika Korps. A number of mutually contradictory orders was the result. In the end, the divisions took matters into their own hands simply by acting on their own initiative without reference to orders, as the situation required.
   Frequently the orders given by Rommel on the spot contradicted every tactical principal and resulted in expensive failure. For instance, tanks were repeatedly sent in to attack well-mined field fortifications with no support from other weapons. On 25 and 26 November, the 15th Panzer Division was given the task of attacking a line of enemy infantry stretching over 25 kilometers. Particularly glaring examples of such tasks were orders to Engineer Battalion 33 to attack an enemy regiment in the strongpoint of Capuzzo in their vehicles and to Reconnaissance Battalion 33 to advance against the whole of the 4th Indian Division at Sidi Omar.

   In addition to ground operations, which he describes in much detail, Kriebel also pays considerable heed to logistics and air support. His report concludes with Rommel's amazing counter-offensive and follows the Axis advance through the capture of Benghazi and the approach to Gazala.
   This is meaty information, nicely served. It's important, however, to keep in mind that the book is written from the German perspective and its descriptions of Allied units, actions, and intentions is not always as strong. For example, Kriebel mentions:

   During the afternoon Reconnaissance Unit 3, stating that it was hard pressed by the enemy, withdrew across the high ridge south of the Via Balbia and 20 kilometers to the west of Bardia and there took up hedgehog positions. The enemy pulled off in a south-easterly direction (the enemy apparently consisted of a reconnaissance unit reinforced by the light army tank unit of the 4th Indian Division).

   The South African official history by Agar-Hamilton and Turner has a slightly different take on the situation and the Allies involved:

   Away to the east 4th Armoured Brigade also reached its objective and leaguered north of the Trig el Adb in the neighborhood of Bir bu Meliha. The German Reconnaissance Unit 3 fell back before them in some agitation, reporting that it had been attacked by 200 tanks.

   This is a two-edged sword, of course, and the New Zealand and British official histories go on to report that after 4th Armoured Brigade dislodged the Germans, one battalion (3rd Royal Tank Regiment) of the brigade and one independent battalion (King's Dragoon Guards) conducted the pursuit. This kind of partial, overlapping, and occasionally contradictory material is to be expected among sources, so it's especially interesting to see how Kriebel describes some other actions for which the Allied perspective is readily available. On 30 November, for example, 24th and 26th battalions of the 6th Brigade, 2nd New Zealand Division, were overrun. Kriebel reports:

   During the morning the 15th Panzer Division had moved its formations via Sidi Veimum into the dip north-west of Bir Bu Creimisa, making use of smooth depressions. Schutzen Regiment 115 was left south of Bir Salem to organize its units. Forming up for the attack proved difficult, owing to the need to avoid a minefield in the sector of the assault. A violent air attack at 1445 hours on the division and corps battle headquarters caused further delay. Thus, it took until 1540 hours for the 15th Panzer Division to the left of and next to Group Mickl to get ready and attack after a really unsatisfactory preparation by the army artillery. It attacked in its usual order—Panzer Regiment 8 (50 tanks) with antiaircraft artillery and the bulk of the artillery forward, and Machine Gun Battalion 2, Motorcycle Battalion 15, and Antitank Battalion 33 behind—drawn up in depth, echeloned to the north-east. In order to broaden the attack, it was decided to push forward the attack of Group Mickl with its tanks and artillery.
   A heavy barrage by two artillery battalions was rapidly traversed. At 1630 hours the foremost elements broke into well-constructed New Zealand positions on the ridge. The first wave of Panzer Regiment 8 advanced as far as the lower ground on Trigh Capuzzo, while the main body rolled up the enemy positions in the sector of Group Mickl towards the east. The British—one reinforced regiment of the 2nd New Zealand Division—offered stubborn resistance. It was not possible to clear the ridge completely of the enemy until darkness fell. Six hundred prisoners, 12 guns and numerous antitank weapons were captured....

   Here is the same scene as recorded in the New Zealand official history:

   There was therefore no relief from this fierce shelling for the infantry and supporting arms and these suffered 'a real hammering with heavies'.... C Company of 24 Battalion...could plainly see German tanks refueling at Bir Bu Creimisa and saw Hurricanes bomb them with little apparent effect....
   At this stage shellfire increased greatly throughout the brigade area, telephone lines were cut, and the situation soon became confused....
   Weaknesses in anti-tank layout were now exposed, too late to remedy them....
   Then, at a critical moment, the [New Zealand] field guns ceased to fire....
   So much metal was screaming through the air at this stage that few men cared to keep their heads up for very long; but those who did saw what looked like a well-planned manoeuvre executed with great precision. In reality it was not at all what General Cruewell ordered. He had given the saddle west of Belhamed as the objective of the panzers: General Neumann-Silkow decided instead to send 8 Panzer Regiment 'across into the area of Mickl Group and to attack Sidi Rezegh first' so as not to expose its right flank. The regiment descended from Bir Bu Creimisa and I Battalion under Captain Kuemmel, with 88-millimetre guns in close support, made straight for the Sidi Rezegh escarpment at a point 1000 yards east of Abiar el-Amar and began to descend at once, finding the slope unexpectedly steep. II Battalion under Captain Wahl and the field and medium guns, echeloned to the right rear, came under heavy fire from 6 Brigade and Wahl turned to face this. I Battalion carried on eastwards along the foot of the escarpment towards the Mosque, meeting little opposition; but II Battalion met fierce resistance and Colonel Cramer ordered Kuemmel back to the top to help overcome this. To add to the vigour of the infantry component, 2 MG Battalion joined in on the left of Mickl Group, making up a force roughly equal to three infantry battalions; but heavily though this out-numbered the defenders, it could make little progress until the tanks broke the back of the defence. About 5.15 p.m. the tanks drove in close and began to take prisoners, but this process lasted until dusk and made Neumann-Silkow postpone the Belhamed operation until next day.

   Thus, it's clear that neither side really knows as much as it thinks it does about the other—even in books written some years after the events—and some inconsistencies might never be entirely resolved. All the more reason to value Kriebel's detailed operational account from the German perspective and to study it in conjunction with Allied accounts.
   Kriebel's report amounts to approximately 240 pages. It is followed by two shorter reports, each of about thirty pages, taken from the U.S. Military Intelligence Service during World War II: "Artillery in the Desert" and "German Defensive Tactics, 7 May - 15 June 1941." The whole has been ably edited and annotated by Bruce Gudmundsson.
   While this doesn't qualify as a carefully researched, painstakingly assembled, fully-rounded history of the campaign which can serve as the ultimate authority on events in the desert from November 1941 through January 1942 (there are, for example, no OBs, and TOE material is mostly limited to some useful remarks by Gudmundsson), it nevertheless provides important insights from a German officer who was on the spot, insights that neatly complement much of the existing literature of World War II in the desert.
   Recommended.
   Available from online booksellers, local bookshops, or directly from Stackpole Books in the United States and Greenhill Books in the United Kingdom.
   Thanks to Stackpole for providing this review copy.