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Reynolds, Michael. Men of Steel: I SS Panzer Corps: The Ardennes and the Eastern Front, 1944-45. Rockville Centre, NY: Sarpedon, 1999
ISBN 1-885119-66-6
In his first book about the German I SS Panzer Corps, Steel Inferno, Michael Reynolds (a retired British general and biographer of Jochen Peiper) fashioned a synthesis of existing German and Allied accounts of the Leibstandarte and Hitlerjugend divisions in Normandy. His story of the two SS divisions proved popular enough to be selected as one of the Top Ten books of 1997.
Whilst it is certainly true that the 'twin villages' were tactically important and dominated the direct approaches from the north-east, east, and south-east, it is certainly not true that the track from the Udenbreth road 'converged, funneling along a single track into Rocherath-Krinkelt'. The tracks today are the same as they were in 1944 and although it was, and still is, quite possible to follow a track running north-west from the Udenbreth-Neuhof road towards Rocherath, the main forest trails from the Udenbreth-Neuhof road run west and south-west (through the Honsfelder Wald and Langelenfenn) to Murringen and the vital Losheimergraben-Bullingen road. These tracks are clear on pre-war maps but are not shown on MAP II in Cole's Official History and consequently they have been ignored by most historians....
Indeed, although focusing on the actions of the SS, Reynolds integrates
much information from Allied sources, notably after action reports, into
the narrative. One of the strengths of this book is the manner in which the
author sorts through the available evidencefor example, regarding
claims versus actual tank lossesand suggests the reality most likely to have
occurred.
And so ended the part played by the designated Divisions of Hitler's Bodyguard Corps in the Ardennes campaign. Once again, they had given their all and been reduced to mere spectres of the Leibstandarte which had participated in the campaign in Russia in 1943 and the Hitlerjugend in Normandy in 1944. In summary, it can be said that they had been ordered to fight through unsuitable terrain, starved of essential supplies and denied the air support this type of offensive demanded. But it also has to be said that, due to failures by German intelligence staffs, the men of the LAH and HJ had often been surprised by the situations in which they found themselvesfor example, the presence of the 2nd US Infantry Division in the northern attack areaand by the speed of the American reaction to their attacks, e.g., the rapid movement of the 1st and 30th US Infantry Divisions and CCB of the 3rd Armored to the threatened areas. But there was one more thing which spelled disaster for Hitler's last offensive in the Westthe bravery and tenacity of the American front-line soldier. This came as a shock to the Germans who, like their Fuehrer, had a poor opinion of the US Armyand it may also have come as a surprise to many readers. Hopefully this narrative will have helped to correct the widely held misconception that the Americans were routed in the Ardennes and that the majority of the 'GIs' ran awayas the Waffen-SS found to its cost, nothing could be further from the truth.
The following chapter describes the general situation on the Russian front
at the beginning of 1945 and recounts the refitting of LAH and HJ and their
movements toward their next battlefields. Although brought up to strength
in raw numbers, both divisions were far short of experienced NCOs and
officers, and no time was available to complete training or undertake field
exercises. Reynolds also reviews Soviet organization, tactics, and
equipment. As an aside, it should be noted that while discussing Soviet
units, Reynolds constantly reminds readers of the true nature of those
forces by referring somewhat irritatingly to units such as "I Guards Mechanized Corps
(Panzer Division)" and "V Guards Tank Corps (Panzer Division)."
The Germans claimed seventy-one tanks, 179 guns, howitzers and anti-tank guns, 537 prisoners and 2,069 Russian dead in the fighting up to 22 February. Of these, Peiper credits Werner Poetschke's mixed SS Panzer Battalion with twenty-three T-34s destroyed, thirty Hungarian, Italian, British and German built tanks captured and 280 enemy killed. According to a return signed by Fritz Kraemer, the Chief of Staff of the Sixth Panzer Army, I SS Panzer Corps suffered 2,989 casualties, including 413 killed in the same period and, rather surprisingly, only three Mk IVs, six Panthers and two Tigers lost or in need of long-term repair. Figures quoted in the Histories of the LAH and HJ would indicate that this is a major understatement.
After a few days of refitting and receiving replacements, the Leibstandarte and Hitlerjugend divisions launched Operation Spring Awakening, the Lake Balaton offensive, on 6 March. Rather like Hitler's Ardennes offensive, this assault was designed to throw the Soviets off balance, bring their advance to a standstill, and buy time for some kind of miracle.
Whatever the truth about the fighting on 6 March, it was certainly not a good day for the Germansthey had failed to surprise their enemy and their gains were depressingly small. In the case of I SS Panzer Corps the deepest penetration was a mere 4km. By 9 March, the corps was making much better progress and Reynolds describes the fighting but remains hampered by incomplete and contradictory sources.
Although the descriptions of the fighting on 12 March are very similar in both the LAH and HJ Divisional Histories, there are conflicting claims as to which units carried out the assault across the Sio canal just to the west of the Bozot river. Ralf Tiemann states that it was made by Hansen's 1st SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment LAH and the Division's 1st SS Reconnaissance Battalion, with 'elements' of the HJ's 26th Regiment. Hubert Meyer, on the other hand, claims that the assault was carried out by the 1st and 2nd Battalions of Braun's 26th SS Panzer-Grenadier Regiment, with support from the heavy weapons of the Regiment, artillery, and some of Brockschmidt's Jagdpanzers. In the opinion of this author, Meyer is more likely to be correct, since the sector to the west of the Bozot was the responsibility of the Hitlerjugend and there was a greater need for the Leibstandarte's infantry in the attack on the built-up area of Simontornya. The description of subsequent events will therefore be based on this assumption.
Despite the momentary successes, the exertions of the corps were futile and by 19 March the LAH and HJ halted their final offensive and withdrew.
In the last few chaotic weeks of the war it was inevitable that many unit records and war diaries would be lost or destroyed, or in some cases not kept at all. So it was with the Leibstandarte and Hitlerjugendtheir War Diaries for this period do not exist. Readers will no doubt have noticed that fewer details of the fighting are being provided and the beginning of the Soviet offensive sees the picture becoming even more blurred. As we approach the end of the fighting, whole units will disappear from our scene without mention, or come and go like they ghosts they have since become. Every effort has been made to produce a comprehensive image but much reliance has had to be placed on individual memories which may or may not be wholly accurate.
Under the circumstances, Reynolds relies heavily on the LAH and HJ divisional histories by Tiemann and Meyer, but, as shown above, sometimes even those two sources disagree on important aspects of the battle or leave out engagements altogether.
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Reviewed 16 January 2000
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